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INTRODUCTION
The Orthodox and Conservative Jewish religious traditions im-
pose strict requirements on adherents' ability to divorce. In addi-
tion to obtaining a civil divorce, the parties must conduct a religious
divorce ceremony in accordance with Jewish law.' At this ceremony,
the husband or his designated agent must hand to the wife or her
designated agent a written document known as a get.2 If one party
refuses or is unable to participate in the religious divorce ceremony,
then the other party is precluded from remarrying within the faith.
For a variety of reasons, most often the victimized spouse will be the
wife. A woman facing such marital disadvantage is known as an
agunah,s and this Article deals with her difficult, and often tragic,
1. See infra Subpart I.A.
2. The get is a written bill of divorce that a husband or his agent must physically
hand over to his wife or her agent in the presence of witnesses. Unlike the ketubah, see
infra note 119 and accompanying text, the entire document must be handwritten for the
particular divorce for which it is being used. The language of the get is predominantly
Aramaic, with a smattering of Hebrew. The requirement of a get is found in Chapter 24
of the Book of Deuteronomy:
When a man takes a wife and marries her, if it then comes to pass that she finds
no favor in his eyes for he has found something unseemly in her, he shall write
her a document of divorce and give it to her hand, and send her out of his
house.
Deuteronomy 24:1 (translation by author).
3. The term "agunah," which appears frequently in the Talmud, see, e.g., BABYLO-
NIAN TALMUD, see infra note 4, GrrrIN, at 2b-3a, is derived from the term "agun" or
anchor, and refers to parties who are literally "chained" to their former spouses. See id.
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plight.4 The other side's refusal to grant a get occasionally is moti-
4. In order to understand the sources used in this Article, it is helpful to compre-
hend the basic structures of Jewish law. The supreme source of authority is the Penta-
teuch, the first five books of the Old Testament, which for halachically committed Jews,
see infra note 17, constitutes not just a source of inspiration, but a detailed legal code
covering a host of civil and criminal matters as well as those areas that are convention-
ally regarded as "religious." Along with this written text of the law, there was a received
supplementary oral tradition interpreting the text and applying its directives to various
situations. For hundreds of years, this tradition, though not inaccessible, was not com-
mitted to writing. For useful sources on the evolution of the oral law, see MEIR BERG-
MAN, GATEWAY TO THE TALMUD (1985); Z.H. CHAJES, THE STUDENTS' GUIDE THROUGH
THE TALMUD (Jacob Schacter trans., 2d ed. 1960); HARRY SCHIMMEL, THE ORAL LAW
(1971); ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD (1976).
The earliest authoritative redaction of the oral law was the Mishna (Manual of Study)
compiled in Palestine by Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, who died circa 219 Common Era
(C.E.). The Mishna, however, was not a true code of law. It records many diverse opin-
ions within the tradition and does not attempt to resolve conflicts among them. Many of
its formulations were left deliberately obscure and incomplete so that the bulk of the
tradition would remain oral. Moreover, many formulations in the Mishna were stated
without accompanying reasons or policies, and were difficult to apply as precedent. Fi-
nally, the Mishna is occasionally self-contradictory. It was probably intended to serve as
a manual or outline to judges, rabbis, and students in their attempts to organize and
master a huge corpus of law and application.
An intense process of debate, dissection, analysis, and commentary on the Mishna,
covering a span of almost 400 years, was ultimately incorporated into a work known as
the Gemara ("teaching"), edited by a college of scholars headed by Rabbis Ashi and
Ravina. The work known as the Talmud thus comprises two separate works: the Mishna,
a product of second century Palestine, and the Gemara, containing the accumulated com-
mentary and debate for four centuries on the Mishna. As would be expected, the Gemara
is far more voluminous than the Mishna. It is not uncommon for a five-line paragraph of
Mishna to be followed by ten or twenty pages of the Gemara. Technically, there are two
Gemaras-one a product of the Babylonian academies and the other a product of the
Palestinian. The Babylonian is deemed the more authoritative source and an unspeci-
fied reference to the Talmud or Gemara throughout this Article refers to the Babylonian
version, which will be cited as BABYLONIAN TALMUD. The standard edition of the Babylo-
nian Talmud is a photo offset of the 1895 Vilna-Romm edition containing the basic
commentaries of Rashi ( 11 th century France), Tosafot (I lth- I2th century France), and
many others, along with cross-reference notes and finding aids. All page references are
to the Vilna edition and its later offsets. The entire Talmud (without the commentaries)
has been translated into English and published by the Soncino Press under the editor-
ship of Isidore Epstein. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD (Isidore Epstein ed., 1960).
The Talmud is the authoritative and definitive source ofJewish law and practice to
this day. Once again, it must be emphasized that in no sense is the Talmud a code of
law. It records a bewildering diversity of opinions and except in comparatively few in-
stances makes no attempt to provide final halachic decisions. As a legal work, it is far
more concerned with viewing and presenting all sides of a question than it is with pro-
viding a definitive response.
Post-Talmudic halachic literature therefore takes on three basic forms. There is a
huge body of literature whose primary focus is commentary explaining and developing
the complexities of the Talmudic discussion. The premier works in this genre are the
commentaries of Rabbi Shlomo Ben Yitzchak (1040-1105) of France (Rashi) and the
school of the Tosaphists (the "supplementers" to Rashi's commentaries), a number of
whom were members of Rashi's own family. These two commentaries are printed side-
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vated by a sincere desire for reconciliation, but more often by sheer
malice, spite, or an attempt to obtain valuable concessions in terms
of alimony, property settlements, or child custody. In any event, it
is not uncommon for abandoned wives to remain in an agunah status
for many years.5 Neither civil nor religious authorities can effect a
religious dissolution-only the parties themselves can dissolve their
union. As a practical matter, then, Jewish religious divorces require
mutual consent and participation, and thus give rise to the possibil-
ity that parties will refuse to cooperate in order to obtain pecuniary
or nonpecuniary advantages, or simply to inflict pain.
The number of women subject to this status is unclear. Some
estimates have placed the number to be as high as 150,000 in the
state of New York alone, while others contend that there are as few
by-side with the text of the Talmud itself. There are literally hundreds of other works of
commentary of varying degrees of authoritativeness.
A second strand in the literature consists of codifications and codes, works that at-
tempt to abstract from Talmudic commentary guidelines and principles for practical
decisionmaking. Absent a formal legislative body that can enact positive law, the author-
itativeness of a code depends on the erudition and prestige of its author and the cogency
of its reasoning. Of the many and varied codes that have been compiled, comparatively
few have achieved universal recognition; among them are Mishna Torah, authored by
Maimonides; Tur, authored by Rabbi Jacob Ben Asher; and Shulchan Aruch, authored by
Rabbi Yosef Karo.
Finally, there is the growing case law or responsa literature. Questions of how to
apply existing principles of halacha were addressed to prominent rabbinic leaders and
their written responses would often be collected and published in book form. Not all
rabbis published their responsa, nor are all published works entitled to the same weight.
Nevertheless, over the past thousand years, a voluminous collection of thousands of
volumes from hundreds of authors has been generated, covering every conceivable as-
pect of Jewish law and coming from every part of the globe. This process continues to
this day.
5. Obviously, a party is an agunah only if his or her religious principles prohibit
remarriage without a religious divorce. The vast majority ofJews no longer followJew-
ish religious law and, consequently, the presence or absence of a get is a matter of indif-
ference to them as individuals, though it is a major concern for the Jewish community at
large. Moreover, the Reform movement has officially abandoned the requirement of a
get, though many encourage its execution to avoid complications later. See SOLOMON
FREEHOF, REFORM JEWISH PRACTICE 99-110 (1944). But see infra note 256. Thus, the
parties who are immediately affected are religiously observant and knowledgeable Or-
thodox or Conservative Jews. For these Jews, the lack of a get is a true chain and a
source of anguish. As one woman, who had to wait three years for a get, remarked:
Your life is in limbo. You cannot begin to date, let alone think of marrying.
You are at the mercy of another person who can resort to blackmail and other
pressures, and your children are privy to the tension. Many women in this legal
entanglement speak of feeling like hostages.
Georgia Dullea, Orthodox Jewish Divorce. The Religious Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1982,
at 40. Indeed, this author knows of one case where a woman has been unable to marry
for over 20 years. For a graphic fictional description of the agunah's fate, see CHAIM
GRADE, THE AGUNAH (1974).
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as fifty.6 Whatever the number, however, each case carries its share
of human misery and serves as a sad reminder of how noble reli-
gious teachings can be manipulated to serve immoral individual
purposes. It also highlights the relative impotence of religious law
as law in a secular society, an inevitable by-product of our federal
constitution's fundamental concept of the separation of church and
state embodied in the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
This Article will describe the contours of the problem, includ-
ing a description of Jewish divorce procedure, the grounds under
which it can be invoked, and the consequences of failing to imple-
ment it, and will consider the possibilities of utilizing the secular
judicial system as a remedy.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
As far back as Biblical times, there were attempts to alleviate the
plight of a spouse who would otherwise be unable to remarry. 7 His-
torically, the agunah problem originated not in the recalcitrance of
the husband, but in his unexplained absence. Jewish law does not
recognize a presumption of death arising from prolonged absence.
If a husband were captured in war or his whereabouts were other-
wise unknown, his wife would not be permitted to remarry until his
6. A New York Times article quoted the astounding figure of 150,000. See Dullea,
supra note 5, at 40. Nat Hentoff quoted a figure "of at least 15,000." See Nat Hentoff,
Who Will Rescue the Jewish Women Chained in Limbo?, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 13, 1983, at 6.
Hentoff's figure leads one to suspect that the ten-fold increase in the New York Times
report may have been a typographical error. At the other extreme, Rabbi Mendel Ep-
stein, a long-time activist in the area of "agunah rights," claims that at any one time,
there are no more than 50 women who meet the basic definition of agunah. See RABBI
MENDEL EPSTEIN, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO THE GET PROCESS 2 (1989). Rabbi Epstein de-
fines an agunah as a woman unable to obtain a get after she has exhausted all rabbinical
procedures and obtained a rabbinical order directing the husband to give a get, which he
then refuses to do. See id.
As noted earlier, if neither party knows or cares about a get, then the absence ofaget
creates no individual hardship. See supra note 5. The New York Times figure of 150,000
may well include all Jewish married couples who have divorced without a get, but only a
tiny fraction of them perceive their status as problematical. While the Hentoff figure
claims to comprise "religiously observant Jewish women who have been [civilly] di-
vorced" without ajewish divorce, Hentoff, supra, at 6, many of these women have not yet
invoked the conventional channels and procedures available for obtaining a get, EPSTEIN,
supra, at 2. Epstein's own number, however, ignores the heavy obstacles that women
face in securing a rabbinical court order, see infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text,
and is therefore far too low. Ultimately, whether a woman is or is not called an agunah is
largely irrelevant. Nothing substantive turns on the nomenclature. If her marriage is in
fact ended and she does not have the freedom to remarry, she has a problem worthy of
consideration.
7. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, SHABBAT, at 56a.
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death could be definitely established.8 The burden of proof for es-
tablishing the husband's death was originally quite high-nothing
less was accepted than the eyewitness testimony of two observers
who actually saw the corpse and could conclusively identify the body
as that of the husband.9
According to the Talmud,'" King David instituted a practice
that required all soldiers assigned to combat to execute and deliver
gittin " to their wives so that if any of them were taken prisoner or
missing in action, their wives would be able to remarry. If the sol-
dier returned safely, the parties could remarry each other. Although
this procedure created the risk that one's wife might abscond with
another-upon receipt of a get, nothing compelled her to wait for
her husband's return' 2 -such a step was justified to avoid the
anguish of a wife remaining in limbo. Indeed, according to some
commentaries, this takkana 13 dated from the Mosaic era.' 4
A second example of concern for the agunah dates from the Sec-
ond Judean Commonwealth, where the rules requiring evidence to
8. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, GITrIN, at 28a-28b.
9. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 87b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
supra note 4, GITrIN, at 2b.
10. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, SHABBAT, at 56a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
supra note 4, KETUBOTH, at 9b. The Talmud attempts to explain why David's marriage to
Bathsheba, although clearly characterized as an immoral act, was technically not adul-
tery, because she had been divorced from her husband Uriah before he went to war. Id.
Had David committed adultery, he would not have been permitted to marry Bathsheba
even after the death of Uriah.
The analysis in the text follows the interpretation of Rabbeinu Tam. See BABYLO-
NIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, KETUBOTH, ToSAFOT, s.v. Get, at 9b. But see RABBI SHLOMO
BEN YITZCHAK, KESUVOT, s.v. Get, at 9b [hereinafter RAsHI]. Rashi, who lived in the late
1 th century, is regarded as the greatest commentator in Jewish history. His commen-
tary on the Talmud, explaining the text phrase by phrase, is indispensable to scholars of
Jewish law. See also supra note 4.
11. "Gittin " is the plural of "get."
12. But see "Divorce of Vienna" controversy as recorded in RABBI MEIR OF LUBLIN
(d. 1615), TESHUVOT MAHARAM LUBLIN nos. 102-06. A young man anticipating death
from a serious illness had given his wife a divorce. He recovered and sought to remarry
her. When she refused, Rabbi Meir ruled that the prior get was invalid, for it was given
with the understanding that if the husband recovered, they would be reunited. A con-
trary opinion was expressed by Rabbi Shmuel Eidels (16th century Poland) and the bulk
of the Polish rabbinate. Id.; see also J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC
PROBLEMS 152-53 (1977).
13. A takkana (plural: takkanot) is a legislative enactment by competent rabbinical
authority to ameliorate the effects of an unduly harsh Biblical or Talmudic law or to
enhance the social welfare. See ARNOLD COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO JEWISH CIVIL LAW
62 (1991).
14. See Comment of Rabbi Yaakov Ben-Asher (d. 1343) [hereinafter BAAL HATURIM]
to Numbers 32:21 (comment is found in standard editions of MIKRAOT GEDOLOT, the He-
brew text of the Bible with standard rabbinic commentaries included).
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establish death were considerably relaxed.' 5 In order to alleviate
the burden of proving a spouse's death, the testimony of one, rather
than two witnesses, was deemed sufficient; this witness could even
be someone who was normally ineligible to testify.' 6
This particular scenario has by no means faded from the scene.
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, for example, hundreds of women
had no definitive proof of their husbands' deaths, and rabbis were
faced with the agonizing duty of relieving their plight while remain-
ing faithful to the dictates of Jewish law. A number of eminent
halachic 1 scholars performed this duty with great distinction.' 8
Presently, this problem recurs with some regularity in the State of
Israel and, less frequently, in the United States.' 9
Nevertheless, in recent years we have seen the emergence of a
different sort of agunah case: one in which the husband is very much
alive and present but uses his power to grant or withhold a get as a
stranglehold to wring out favorable concessions from his spouse.
While Talmudic precedents are thus not directly on point, they do
indicate the concern that classical Jewish law had for the woman's
15. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 87b. These rules were later
codified in RABBI YOSEPH KARO (d. 1575), SHULCHAN ARUCH, EVEN HAEZER 17:3-131
[hereinafter SHULCHAN ARUCH]. The Shulchan Aruch ["The Prepared Table"] is regarded
as the definitive code of Jewish law by Orthodox Jewry.
16. Id.; see also BLEICH, supra note 12, at 166. Examples of normally ineligible wit-
nesses include women, minors, relatives of the decedent or wife, or persons guilty of
certain religious offenses. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 87b.
17. Halacha (Hebrew for "way of life") is the entire corpus ofJewish law. Judaism, as
traditionally understood and practiced, is not exclusively a religion concerned with litur-
gical ritual and the like, but a complete body of substantive and procedural law that
regulates every aspect of human conduct and interaction. See supra note 4. Side by side
with prescribed rituals such as prayer and the eating of kosher food, the Talmud con-
tains detailed rules and doctrines pertaining to torts, contracts, property rights, and per-
sonal status. By and large, even those purely "legal" rules are still religiously binding
on observant Jews, though there exist few, if any, mechanisms of enforcement.
18. Examples include the late Dr. Isadore Grunfeld of the London Bais Din; Rabbi
Yitzchok I. Weiss of Manchester and Jerusalem; Rabbi T.P. Frank of Jerusalem; and
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, for many years the "dean" of halachic authorities in the United
States. A touching vignette of the personal anguish rabbis felt for the predicament of
these "war widows" is recounted by the former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Lord Im-
manuel Jakobovitz. See Immanuel Jakobovitz, Preserving the Oneness of the Jewish People:
Can a Permanent Schism Be Averted?, TRADITION, Winter 1989, at 91.
19. On an individual basis, rabbis often advise persons going to war or going abroad
under hazardous conditions to execute a get, following the venerable precedent insti-
tuted by David or even Moses. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14. The Israeli
Chief Rabbinate at one time toyed with the idea of imposing this procedure for all Israeli
soldiers going to combat, but concluded that mandating even a pro forma divorce would
adversely affect combat morale. See BLEICH, supra note 12, at 154.
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plight and the willingness of the halachic system to take concrete
steps to alleviate that concern.
To fully comprehend the nature of the problem and the difficul-
ties in trying to solve it, three Jewish law concepts must be under-
stood: (1) the get and Jewish divorce procedure, (2) the role of the
bais din ,2 and (3) the rules governing divorces executed under
duress.
A. What is a Get?
A halachically valid marriage may be terminated in only two
ways: through death of a spouse, or by the granting of a get.2 1 A
civil divorce has no effect in the eyes of halacha, and any subsequent
cohabitation or remarriage in the absence of a get is regarded as
adulterous.2 2 "Get " is an Aramaic term meaning document. The
"document" refers to a brief written statement containing a legally
prescribed text.23 The marriage is terminated when the husband or
his designated proxy hands this document to his wife or her desig-
nated proxy.24 A rough translation follows:
On the - day of the week, the - day of the month of
, in the year __ from the creation of the
world according to the calendar reckoning
we are accustomed to count here in the city
which is located on the river I
the son of do willingly con-
sent being under no restraint to release, to set free, and put
aside you, my wife daughter of
who has been my wife from before. Thus I
do set free, release and put thee aside in order that you
may have permission and the authority over yourself to go
and marry any man you may desire. No person may hinder
you from this day forward and you are permitted to every
20. Hebrew for "House of Justice," bais din is the term for a rabbinic tribunal, nor-
mally comprised of three rabbis. While Biblical and Talmudic law vests batei din (the
plural form) with extensive enforcement powers, batei din in the United States do not
possess such authority.
21. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, KIDDUSHIN, at 2a.
22. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
23. See ALEXANDER KOHUT, ARUCH HASHALEM, S.V. Get. (Aruch Hashalem is a diction-
ary of Talmudic and Midrashic literature originally compiled by Rabbi Nathan of Rome
(1 th century). Doctor Kohut (d. 1894) added additional etymological and philological
material.) While the term get is occasionally employed in reference to any legal docu-
ment, its predominant usage is in connection with bills of divorce. See BABYLONIAN TAL-
MUD, supra note 4, ToSAFOT, at 2a; supra note 2.
24. See supra note 2.
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man. This shall be for you from me a bill of dismissal, a
letter of release, and a document of freedom in accordance
with the laws of Moses and Israel.
the son of witness
the son of witness 25
The execution of a get is a private act and it does not require the
participation of, or even the consent of, a rabbinical tribunal. In
view of the fact that the formalities surrounding the writing and
transfer of a get are numerous and complex, however, a rabbinical
court of at least three is invariably present. Even so, the rabbi's role
is supervisory only. In the eyes of halacha, it is the husband who
divorces his wife, in contradistinction to the customary civil law view
that the state or the judiciary dissolves the marriage. Under Biblical
and Talmudic law, any coercion directed toward a husband in the
giving of a get rendered the divorce a nullity, while a wife could be
forced to receive a get.26
The basic ceremony is fairly simple and can normally be accom-
plished in under an hour. The husband and wife meet at a prear-
ranged time and place with three rabbis present. One rabbi, known
as the Mesadar HaGet ("arranger of the get "), will be primarily re-
sponsible for ensuring observance of the requisite religious formali-
ties and the other two will serve as witnesses. Also present will be a
scribe, who will compose the text of the get by hand.2 7 Because the
writing of the get devolves upon the husband, the husband must for-
mally designate the scribe as his agent before the scribe can begin
the composition of the get. The get must contain proper dates based
on the traditional Jewish calculation, location, and names of the hus-
band and wife, including common nicknames, followed by the tradi-
tional designation of the parties as "son of" or "daughter of." Last
names are not used, and all names must be spelled correctly. In-
deed, one of the most difficult, albeit tedious, jobs of the Mesadar
HaGet is to determine which names should be included 2' and how to
transliterate those names into Hebrew. Upon completion of the
writing of the get, two witnesses sign at the bottom. The husband
25. See RABBI ASHER BEN YECHIEL, PisKAi RoSH, end of Gi-rIN (translation by
author).
26. See infra notes 41, 72-76 and accompanying text.
27. The get, although only a twelve line standardized text, may not be printed, xer-
oxed, or even prewritten with spaces left blank for names and places. See SHULCHAN
ARucH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 131:1.
28. One can imagine the confusion if Robert is sometimes called Rob, Bob, Robby,
Bobby, or Skip, and also has a Jewish name of Rafael that he never uses; the same ques-
tions may be raised regarding his father, his wife, and her father.
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and wife are both asked a set of formalized questions as a final assur-
ance that the get is not a product of duress, compulsion, extortion,
or the like. The husband then takes the document, physically de-
posits it in his wife's hands, again in the presence of witnesses, and
upon the get's delivery, the marriage is officially terminated.29 If
either husband or wife cannot be present, the entire procedure may
be carried out by designated proxy and the Mesadar must ensure
that all powers of attorney are in proper form.
After receiving a get, a divorced woman is free to marry anyone
she chooses including her former spouse, except for the following
persons: (a) a Cohen -descendant of the priestly class, (b) a man
with whom she committed adultery, (c) persons who served as wit-
nesses for the get, (d) her former husband if in the interim she mar-
ries someone else who then dies or divorces her, or (e) her former
husband if she was guilty of adultery during the course of a mar-
riage.3" In addition, she must wait ninety days from the delivery of
the get to determine whether or not she is pregnant from her first
husband.31
Interestingly, just as a civil divorce has no validity in the eyes of
religious law, a religious divorce is not civilly recognized. Unlike
marriage, where virtually all states recognize that a ceremony per-
formed by an authorized minister of the faith is accorded validity,
the power of dissolution still rests exclusively with the secularjudici-
ary.32 Thus, the get is totally unrelated to either the granting or
withholding of civil dissolution. As a matter of practice, however,
many rabbinical tribunals will not supervise the execution of a get
until all attempts at reconciliation have failed. This may often mean
delaying the get until a judgment of dissolution has been entered. 3
29. As a procedural matter, divorced women generally do not keep the get, but re-
turn it to the custody of the bais din, which will issue an official receipt stating that theget
was properly delivered. If further evidence of her divorced status ever becomes neces-
sary, the bais din will produce the original from its archives.
30. See Leviticus 21:7 (prohibiting a divorc&e from marrying a Cohen (descendent of
the priestly class)); Deuteronomy 24:1-4 (prohibiting remarrying one's own spouse once
she has married); SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 11: 1 (a woman guilty of
adultery may not remain with her husband).
31. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 41a; SHULCHAN ARUCH,
supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 13:1. The delivery of a get also triggers alimony, child sup-
port, and custody rights, but these are beyond the purview of this Article. See Diane
Engel, Marital Property Rights in Jewish Law: A Survey and Comparison, NAT'LJEWISH L. REV.
97 (1987).
32. This, however, was not always the case. Civil divorce is a comparatively late
development.
33. This is the official practice of the Chief Rabbinate of Great Britain, which has
taken the position that such deferral is required by secular law. See Susan Maidment, The
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B. The Right to Initiate the Jewish Divorce Process
The Mishna 34 in the tractate Gittin discusses the grounds upon
which divorce should be pursued and records three opinions.3 The
House of Shammai maintains that one should not divorce one's
spouse unless she is guilty of adultery.36 The House of Hillel per-
mits divorce even on the basis of trivial dissatisfactions such as burn-
ing the soup." Finally, Rabbi Akiva asserts that a husband has the
right to divorce his wife even in the absence of any basis for dissatis-
faction-for example, he is simply attracted to someone else. 38 It is
clear from a number of statements in the Talmud that these opin-
ions do not pertain to the legal validity of a get, but merely to the
moral advisability of instituting the procedure.39 In fact, a husband
has an absolute right, or at least power,4" to divorce his wife at will
for no reason at all and without her consent.41
The absolute right of a husband to institute divorce proceed-
ings, recognized by Biblical and Talmudic law, underwent a drastic
change in the tenth century.42 Rabbeinu Gershom,43 acknowledged
Legal Effect of Religious Divorces, 37 MOD. L. REV. 611, 620 & n.44 (1974). Rabbis in the
United States do not have a standard practice.
34. See supra note 4.
35. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, GITrIN, at 90a.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., id.. The Shulchan Aruch, however, does note that it is morally improper
to divorce one's first wife for any grounds short of actual or suspected adultery or ex-
treme nastiness of disposition. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER
119:34.
40. To use the terminology of Wesley Hohfeld, a person has a "right" to perform a
certain act only if others have a "duty" to let him perform it. Because Jewish law may
prohibit divorce for less than weighty reasons that a bais din is duty-bound to discourage,
the husband does not have a "right" of unqualified divorce in Hohfeldian terms.
"Power," on the other hand, refers to a capacity of creating, divesting, or altering rights
and does not necessarily imply a duty on others of noninterference. In that sense, the ex
post facto validity of a get executed for any reason at all is indicative of a "power" rather
than a "right." See generally WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 64-114 (1964). Hohfeld's unique terminology has been
quite influential in modem jurisprudential thought, though his scheme is both incom-
plete and difficult to master. See, e.g., RoscoE POUND, 4 JURISPRUDENCE 77-106 (1959)
(listing bibliography of writings on the subject).
41. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 11 2b (codified in SHULCHAN
ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 119:6) ("A wife may be divorced either willingly or
unwillingly but a husband may be divorced only from his free will.").
42. Despite the availability of "no fault" divorce, at least on the part of the husband,
the Talmud is replete with references concerning the tragedy of divorce. See, e.g., BABY-
LONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, GtrtIN, at 80b ("When one divorces his wife, even the
altar in heaven sheds tears."). The rabbinic court is enjoined to attempt to bring the
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leader of East European Jewry, spearheaded the enactment of a de-
cree that prohibited a husband from divorcing his wife against her
will except in narrowly defined circumstances. He also instituted a
decree banning the Biblically' permitted-though discouraged-
practice of polygamy." This legislation essentially introduced a
spirit of equality in divorce proceedings, and for the most part ne-
cessitates that all divorce occur through mutual consent. 45 As one
authority noted:
When [Rabbeinu Gershom] saw how the generation
was abusive of Jewish daughters insofar as divorcing them
under compulsion, he enacted that the rights of women be
equal to those of men, and just as a man divorces only from
his own will, so too a woman might henceforth be divorced
only willingly.46
Although subsequent to the enactment of the decree husbands
and wives seem to be on the same footing, this is not entirely true.
In the first place, the consequences of adultery on the part of a mar-
ried woman are considerably more severe than they are for a mar-
ried man. If a married woman-including any woman halachically
married, whose marriage has not been terminated by a get-cohabits
with a man other than her husband, whether the man is married or
not, she and her paramour are guilty of a capital offense.47 Any chil-
parties to an amicable reconciliation. Indeed, even after the divorce, the parties may be
encouraged to remarry (unless the husband is a Cohen).
43. Rabbeinu Gershom ("Our Master" Gershom), known by his contemporaries as
Me'or HaGolah ("The Light of the Diaspora") lived in Mayence (Mainz) in the latter part
of the 10th century. Historians have debated whether he in fact promulgated the takka-
not that have been attributed to him. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIAJUDAiCA, Gershom Ben Yehuda, at
511-12 (1971); ARYEH GROSSMAN, THE EARLY SAGES OF ASHKENAZ 1451 nn.135-37
(1981).
44. See BLEICH, supra note 12, at 146-47. The ban on polygamy is codified in
SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 1:10. Interestingly enough, the Sefardic
communities of North Africa, Palestine, and Spain (Moslem countries) never accepted
Rabbeinu Gershom's takkanot and continued the practice of polygamy until very recent
times. Id. I believe, however, that even these communities did not permit the divorcing
of a woman without her consent. The Bait Yosef, in his comments to Tur Even Haezer,
informs us that Rabbeinu Gershom intended his ban to be in effect only until the end of
the Fifth Millennium (1240 C.E.), and continued adherence to the ban is no longer a
matter of strict law, but simply long-standing community custom. Others maintain that
the Ashkenazic communities through their religious leadership renewed the ban before
its expiration date without stipulating a time period for its enforcement. See generally
Gedaliah Schwartz, Heter Meah Rabbanim, 11 J. OF HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y 33, 37-38
(1986).
45. See BLEICH, supra note 12, at 146-47.
46. RABBI ASHER BEN YECHIEL (d. 1480), TESHUVOT ROSH 42:1.
47. See Deuteronomy 23:22. This fact has only theoretical importance today. Under
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
dren resulting from such a union face the stigma of mamzer.48 If the
relationship was consensual the woman forfeits her alimony rights
and is not permitted to remain married to her husband even if he is
willing to forgive the offense.4 9 Moreover, subsequent to a divorce
from her husband, she is not permitted to marry her paramour.50
On the other hand, if a married man commits adultery with an un-
married woman, under Biblical law no crime has been committed. 5 1
Any resulting children are not tainted with the stigma of illegiti-
macy; the husband is permitted to remain with his wife if she con-
sents and even perhaps if she does not. Further, in the event of
Biblical law, Jewish courts had the authority to impose capital punishment for a variety
of offenses including blasphemy, murder, adultery, and desecration of the Sabbath. See
GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 159-60 (1973). Rape of an unmarried
woman was not a capital crime. See Deuteronomy 23:28-29. Even when the laws of capital
punishment were in effect, however, the procedural and evidentiary requirements for
the imposition of a capital sentence were so difficult to satisfy that the Mishna in the
tractate Makkot remarked that any court that executed one individual in seventy years
was considered unusually violent. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, MAKKOT, at 7a.
The power to impose capital punishment lapsed with the Roman conquest of Judea in
30-40 C.E., and at least with respect to Biblical offenses, has not been reinstituted in the
State of Israel. HOROWITZ, supra, at 215-16. As a matter of religion and conscience,
however, "capital offenses" are deemed more serious transgressions than noncapital
sins. See RABBI MOSES BEN MAIMON (MAIMONIDES) (d. 1204), MISHNA TORAH [RESTATE-
MENT OF THE LAW], HILCHOT TESHUVA [LAWS OF REPENTANCE] 1:4 [hereinafter RAMBAM,
MISHNA TORAH]. (The Mishna Torah is a monumental redaction of the entire corpus of
Jewish law in a unique organizational scheme. The terse and undocumented formula-
tion of Maimonides, as well as the many disagreements with his contemporaries,
spawned a huge literature of annotation and commentary that is still growing today. See
supra note 4.)
48. The term mamzer is normally translated as "illegitimate," but has a specialized,
technical meaning that is not captured in that translation. In the first place, a child born
out of wedlock is not a mamzer and is under no disability at all. A mamzer is a child
conceived in an incestuous relationship or an adulterous union between a married wo-
man and any man not her husband. Second, a mamzer's disabilities, while quite severe,
are also limited to one particular sphere-restrictions on the choice of marriage part-
ners. A mamzer may not marry another Jew unless that person is also a mamzer or a
convert. In all other respects, however, such as inheritance rights and eligibility for
community positions of authority, halacha does not permit discrimination. Indeed, the
Talmud states that a "mamzer who is a scholar of the Law is entitled to more respect than
a High Priest who is an ignoramus." BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, HORIYOT, at
13a.
49. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 115:5 (forfeiture of ketubah);
id. at 178:16 (prohibiting continuance of the marriage).
50. See id. at 11:1; ARUCH HASHULCHAN, EVEN HAEZER 178:30.
51. That "no crime has been committed" means only that the act is not adulterous.
A married man cohabitating with an unmarried woman is, under strict Biblical law, no
different than an unmarried man cohabitating with an unmarried woman. The marital
status of the male is simply irrelevant. Nevertheless, although the male's marital status
does not make the union adulterous, nor does it taint the offspring with the stigma of
mamzeirus, it is prohibited to the same degree as any out-of-wedlock relationship.
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marital breakup, he may marry his lover.52
Although Rabbeinu Gershom's decree normally precludes both
polygamy and divorce without the wife's consent, the impact of this
decree may be avoided. While a married woman can in no instance
be permitted to remarry without a get (because to do so involves a
Biblical infraction not subject to Rabbinical annulment or dispensa-
tion), the Rabbinical ban of Rabbeinu Gershom may be annulled
pursuant to a procedure described as a Heter Me'ah Rabbanim ("Dis-
pensation of 100 Rabbis"). The first mention of this extraordinary
procedure appears in the Kol Bo, 53 which states:
The excommunication ban which Rabbeinu Gershom
decreed is not to be lifted except with the approval of one
hundred sages from three communities and from three
countries such as Aragon, Lombardy, and France. They
should not agree to remove it until and unless they see an
unquestionable and clearcut reason for such leniency, and
also that the particular case be clearly defined.54
Sometimes, the effect of the annulment is to lift the ban on polyg-
amy, thereby permitting the husband to marry again while remain-
ing married to the first spouse. At other times the heter permits the
institution of an involuntary divorce.55 It should be noted, however,
that as a practical matter, many Rabbinical authorities were ex-
tremely reluctant to participate in this annulment procedure.56
The essence of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is that now, neither
party normally can execute the get process without the consent of
the other. In theory, therefore, each party may be held hostage to
the other's recalcitrance. Nevertheless, because the negative conse-
52. But see REMA, comment to SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 154:1
(stating that if the husband is a "frequenter of prostitutes" and the wife demands a
divorce, "some are of the opinion that the husband may be forced to grant aget "); RABBI
Tzvi ASHKENAZY, TESHUVOT CHACHAM Tzvi, no. 133 (limiting the ruling of Rema to the
habitual offender, not the one-time adulterer who has repented of his sin). The unfaith-
ful wife is not given the luxury of repentance.
53. The Kol Bo is a halachic work by an unknown author, and is thought to be of
Spanish origin (circa 13th century).
54. KOL Bo, Ch. 116; OTZAR HAPOSKIM, EVEN HAEZER 1:10. The grounds for which
such dispensation may be granted are many: (1) where the husband is unable to have
children with his present wife, (2) where the first marriage is prohibited by Jewish law,
(3) where the present wife refuses to cohabit with her husband, (4) where a wife unjusti-
fiably abandons her home, or (5) where the present wife suffers a mental disability that
renders her unable to accept a get.
55. For an extensive discussion, see OTZAR HAPOSKIM, supra note 54, EVEN HAEZER
1:68; Schwartz, supra note 44, at 41-49.
56. See RABBI SHLOMO KLUGER (d. 1868), HAELEF L'CHA SHLOMO, EVEN HAEZER 7;
Schwartz, supra note 44, at 46.
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quences of a refusal of the other party to consent to a get are both
more severe and less avoidable for the wife than for the husband,
the agunah issue is perceived correctly as predominantly, though by
no means exclusively, a woman's tragedy.
C. The Role of the Bais Din
1. General Function.-"Bais din" 57 is the term for a rabbinical
tribunal commonly comprised of three rabbis, or one rabbi and two
lay persons, assembled to decide matters of Jewish law or resolve
disputes. Under classical Biblical and Talmudic law, each commu-
nity had its own bais din that would be empowered to rule on matters
ofJewish law and to compel obedience to its rulings.5 8 Indeed, even
after the destruction of the Judean state, for hundreds of years Jews
were able to maintain the rule of Jewish law and to preserve the
functioning of their courts. As one commentator noted, "Among all
the institutions of self-government in the Middle Ages, the Jewish
court was by far the most distinctive and characteristic." 59
The aftermath of the French Revolution, however, led to a frag-
mentation of communal cohesiveness, the withdrawal of legal recog-
nition of religious communities as politically autonomous entities,
and the development of the separation of church and state. These
developments created a situation where batei din no longer had coer-
cive power and could decide only those disputes that the parties vol-
untarily submitted to them. As a matter of religious law, it is still
true today that civil disputes amongJews must be submitted to a bais
din rather than a secular tribunal.6" If an individual refuses to re-
spond to the summons of a bais din or initiates action in a secular
tribunal, the court may issue a k'sav siruv-a citation declaring him
to be in contempt.6 Nevertheless, the k 'sav siruv itself carries with it
no legal sanction; at best it may result in a certain degree of commu-
nity pressure, but more often it does not.62 Moreover, as a practical
57. See supra note 20. The information in this Subpart is a product of the author's
own experience sitting on a bais din. For a more detailed discussion, see Harvey Kirsh,
Conflict Resolution and the Legal Culture: A Study of the Rabbinical Court, 9 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
335 (1971). See also Dov Frimer, The Role of the Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J.L. & RELIGION
297 (1982).
58. See generally AARON SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAKING: A STUDY
THROUGH TIME 236-80 (1979).
59. Comment, Jewish Divorce and the Civil Law, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 300 n.24
(1962).
60. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, HOSHEN MIsHPAT 26:1; EMANUEL QUINT,
1 A RESTATEMENT OFJEWISH CIVIL LAW 176-81 (1990).
61. SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, HOSHEN MISHPAT 11:1.
62. Id.; id, YORE DE'AH 334:11-12 (refusal to obey the decision of a bais din may result
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matter, many batei din are extremely reluctant to issue a k'sav szruv
and, as a result, even the small amount of pressure that could be
applied to the recalcitrant party through this process often fails to
materialize. Thus, in the absence of an arbitration agreement, it is
extremely difficult to compel an unwilling party to take a dispute of
any nature to a bais din. If neither party is willing, it becomes
impossible.
Another point to consider is that most communities today do
not have a standing bais din. There is, for example, no officially des-
ignated bais din in Baltimore whose rulings are accepted by all seg-
ments of Baltimore Jewry. Indeed, there is not even an officially
designated Orthodox or Conservative bais din on either the local or
national level whose rulings would be even morally binding on ad-
herents of their respective movements.
In the absence of a standing bais din, which is normally regarded
as the preferable alternative, the Shulchan Aruch rules that each party
may pick one judge of his or her choice and the two chosen judges
select a third judge.63 The vast majority of disputes submitted to a
bais din are decided under this procedure, commonly referred to as
ZABLA, an acronym for "Ze Boreir Lo Achad" ("each chooses one").
While the paucity of rabbinical judges in the community may make
ZABLA a necessity, the procedure raises a host of problems.
Giving the defendant the right to choose a judge creates oppor-
tunities for indefinite delays and makes it virtually impossible ever
to hold a defendant in contempt; until he makes his choice, there is
no bais din that can issue a k 'sav siruv. Moreover, many parties have a
common misconception that in a ZABLA each of the two judges is
supposed to function as an advocate for the side that chose him.
This is patently untrue. All three judges are supposed to be unbi-
ased, disinterested adjudicators.' Nevertheless, as a consequence
of this misconception, litigants may have a fundamental disrespect
for the process--even more so in light of the fact that the bais din
also can contain laypersons who are not experts on matters of Jew-
in the imposition of a ban or excommunication). In a religiously observant society, the
imposition of a ban may be potent. In a largely non-halachic society, however, a recalci-
trant defendant will simply ignore the ban just as he ignored the bais din, and his friends
and colleagues may follow suit.
63. SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, HOSHEN MISHPAT 13:1-2.
64. See RABBI ASHER BEN YECHIEL [RosH], SANHEDRIN 3:2. But see RABBI YECHIEL M.
EPSTEIN, ARUCH HASHULCHAN [SETrING OF THE TABLE], HOSHEN MISHPAT 13:1-2. The
Aruch Hashulchan was an early 20th century attempt to restate Jewish law in contempo-
rary terms and to show the historical development of the law from the Talmud through
the present day. Its chapter headings are the same as the Shulchan Aruch.
327
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ish law. Believing that the process is tainted, they refuse to utilize it,
and often disregard its orders. Furthermore, it cannot be denied
that in more than a few cases, litigants' contentions that the ZABLA
judges are not neutral or are not learned have been borne out. This
too explains why k'sav siruv is so infrequently issued, and, when is-
sued, so widely ignored. Even litigants acting in bad faith escape
the wrath of their communities by alleging bias of one of the ZABLA
judges, an accusation typically hard to disprove.
Finally, regardless of the neutrality or competence of the bais
din in an individual case, the fact that each bais din is an ad hoc group
means there is no institutional continuity, no sense of precedent,
and few or no standardized procedures regarding standards of evi-
dence, use of documentation, participation of attorneys, and the
like. Different batei din simply do things differently, sometimes
based on halachic considerations, sometimes based on the curbstone
equities of the case, and sometimes based on common sense. Under
a ZABLA system, therefore, there is no real way litigants can know
the rules of the game in advance. As a result, attorneys often coun-
sel their clients to stay away from a bais din.
Many of these problems could be eliminated if community-wide
standing batei din were established.65 Such institutions would enjoy
community acceptance, and their orders would more likely be
respected. Unwilling litigants would in turn feel greater pressure to
comply. Because the members of the bais din would not be chosen
or compensated by the parties, but instead funded by the commu-
nity, bias or the appearance of bias would be minimized. Also,
greater expertise in halachic rules governing dispute resolution
would be fostered. Most important, a community-wide bais din
could establish uniform standards of practice and procedure to dis-
pel the appearance of instability, inconsistency, and arbitrariness.
These standards could be published and circulated among all seg-
ments of the Jewish community so that the bais din would once again
be regarded as a viable alternative to civil remedies.6 6
Assuming both parties do eventually come before a bais din of
65. A number of communities do have standing batei din, as do a number of national
organizations. Examples are the various Chassidic groups (Lubavitch, Satmar, Belz) and
organizations like the Rabbinical Council of America. While these are highly respected
and do supply the vital element of procedural regularity, they still fall short of constitut-
ing a central authority for a discrete geographical area. As such, their decisions are
often flouted, and they in turn are reluctant to issue a k 'say siruv on the theory that to do
so would be a useless act.
66. See Irving Breitowitz, Book Review, 51 Jewish Action 78 (1991) (reviewing
QUINT, supra note 60).
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either the standing or the ZABLA type, the general procedure is
relatively simple and informal. The use of attorneys is generally dis-
couraged-the litigants and witnesses are questioned directly by the
judges. All evidence, including hearsay, is admissible, although its
weight may be appropriately discounted. Before deciding the case,
the bais din will normally ask the parties to sign the equivalent of a
binding arbitration agreement to ensure that the ultimate decision
of the bais din will be civilly enforceable. Thus, while it is extremely
difficult to bring a party before a bais din, it is far easier to enforce its
decision once made-at least no more difficult than enforcing an
arbitration award in general.
2. The Bais Din in Divorce Cases.-In the area of divorce, a bais
din may be involved at two different points. First, if both parties
have agreed to a divorce, the actual execution and delivery of the get
will be supervised by a bais din. Here, in universal acknowledgement
that the laws of writing a get are extremely complex, ZABLA invaria-
bly is not used. Rather, communities tend to have individual rabbis
who are experts in this area. These rabbis handle all gittin in the
community and choose two other people to assist them in their task.
A bais din also may be necessary to resolve a contested proceed-
ing. Here again, ZABLA raises the potential for serious abuse. As-
suming that a wife wants a get and the husband refuses to give it to
her, her only recourse is to go to a bais din; a secular court cannot
order a religious divorce (at least in the absence of a contract). The
bais din will determine whether grounds exist that would halachically
justify an order directing the husband to give a get.6 7 The bais din
would inquire into details concerning physical, mental, or emotional
abuse; support obligations; and all relevant aspects of marital and
family life. Medical and psychiatric testimony would be admissible
to aid the bais din in its determination, and for the most part, the bais
din would attempt to be fair and neutral.
For the reasons described above, however, it is fairly easy for
the husband to evade coming before a bais din. If the wife obtains a
summons from a standing bats din, the husband may invoke ZABLA
as a delaying mechanism and then not designate his judge. Even if
both parties agree on a bais din, the husband may fail to appear, or if
he appears and the bais din orders him to give a get, he may simply
fail to comply. It should be emphasized that there is a fundamental
distinction between the procedures of a bais din in monetary matters
67. See infra note 80.
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and in gittin. As noted, in monetary matters the parties sign an arbi-
tration agreement so that the decision of the bais din may be civilly
enforced through the courts. This device cannot readily be em-
ployed in get cases. As a general proposition, gittin issued pursuant
to the order of a civil court and under threat of fine or incarceration
for civil contempt are invalid.6" There are a wide variety of circum-
stances where the bais din might advise or even order the husband to
execute the get but, as a matter of Jewish law, could not allow the
courts to enforce their order.69
Thus, women are faced not only with the normal difficulties of
getting an adversary to respond to a summons and appear before
the bais din, but also with the additional problem of not being able to
civilly enforce the bais din's order, even where the husband has
appeared.
At that point, an agunah's only recourse is to capitulate to
whatever demands her husband might make concerning alimony,
child support, custody, or the like,7" or to mobilize community sup-
port in calling for sanctions such as boycotts, posting the husband's
picture in public places, having her husband branded as a disobeyer
of the bais din, or depriving him of synagogue honors. Although
there have been many calls for greater rabbinic and community ac-
tivism in this area,7 ' women historically have had to organize this
pressure by themselves.
68. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
70. Withholding a get is commonly done as a device to secure concessions in prop-
erty rights or custody. A recent case in New York may change the picture somewhat,
though its effect is uncertain. See Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987);
infra note 388.
71. In recent years, women themselves have organized support groups to exert pres-
sure on unwilling husbands. One organization known as GET (Getting Equitable Treat-
ment) uses volunteer "caseworkers." "We will do whatever we can without force-we
do not use brute strength-to convince the recalcitrant spouse." Dullea, supra note 5, at
40 (quoting Gloria Greenman, President of GET).
Occasionally, this pressure takes a more drastic form. See Blu Greenberg, Jewish
Attitudes Towards Divorce, in JEWISH DIRECTORY & ALMANAC 106, 111 (Ivan Tillem ed.
1984). A group of women in a Canadian city announced that none of them would co-
habit with their husbands until a friend of theirs received a free get from an ex-husband
who was holding out for $25,000. She received her get in short order. JEWISH PRESS,
Oct. 26, 1979 (Magazine), at M41. Occasionally, mass demonstrations or picketings,
either against the recalcitrant spouse or what is perceived as an overly passive Rabbinical
leadership, are organized with moderate success. Interview with David Farber, a self-
styled "agunah organizer," at Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations National Con-
vention, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 23, 1990). (The author appeared on a panel with Mr.
Farber.)
330 [VOL. 51:312
1992] HALACHA, CONTRACT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 331
D. Get Meusah: A Bill of Divorce Granted
Under Compulsion or Duress
A final introductory concept that needs to be explained is that
of get meusah-the invalidity of a bill of divorce executed under du-
ress or compulsion. In any attempt to deal with the unwilling, recal-
citrant spouse, this is a formidable obstacle that must be
surmounted. Whether and how the problem of meusah can be cir-
cumvented is central to any analysis of prenuptial agreements or
other possibilities of civil enforcement.
A get is effective only if it is executed and delivered with the
husband's consent.72 As a corollary, a get that the husband ostensi-
bly authorized, but as a consequence of duress, is invalid because it
was not a product of the unfettered exercise of his will. 73 One par-
ticular issue pertaining to gittin issued under duress involves the im-
pact of contractually assumed, self-imposed penalties. Assume, for
example, a husband agrees to divorce his wife and stipulates pay-
ment of a penalty in the event the divorce is not delivered by a cer-
tain date. The husband then later declares his unwillingness to
execute the get, but does so in order to avoid payment of the pen-
alty. On one level, such a get is a product of duress because the
decision to give the get was motivated by the desire to avoid the im-
position of a penalty. On the other hand, because the creation
of the penalty was entirely consensual, the get is arguably valid.74
The authorities are divided over this issue, 75 and, at least as an ini-
72. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 1 12b; RAMBAM, MISHNA
TORAH, supra note 47, ISHUT.
73. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, GririN, at 88b. The notion that transactions
entered into under duress are voidable is a familiar one to students of Anglo-American
law, but has not yet been entirely incorporated into halacha, which in general validates
conveyances made under duress unless they are gratuitous. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra
note 15, HOSHEN MISHPAT 205:1. This suggests that classical halacha was more con-
cerned with the fairness of the resulting exchange than the underlying defects in the
bargaining process. See generally 2 ISAAC HERZOG, MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW
130-31 (1977). The fact that duress is recognized as a basis for the invalidation of a
get-such a get is void, not merely voidable-underscores the crucial importance of con-
sent and the problematic nature of judicial coercion.
74. Under common-law principles, a "threat" to enforce a contractual right against a
debtor unless the debtor consents to some additional obligation or undertaking would
not be grounds for avoiding the resulting commitment; to the extent any "threat" was
made, its exercise will be entirely lawful. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 176, cmt. d (1981).
75. Rabbi Shlomo Ben Aderet (Rashba) (13th century Spain) took the position that
such a get was invalid even ex post facto. 4 RASHBA, TESHUVOT HARASHBA no. 40.
Rashba was the acknowledged preeminent halachic authority of his generation. See also
RABBI MENACHEM MEIRI, BEIT HABECHIRA 88b (Commentary to Gittin, 13th century
France). A contrary position is espoused in 2 RABBI SHIMON BEN TZEMACH, TASHBATZ
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tial matter, in order to avoid get meusah, no get should be issued un-
less and until there is a prior unconditional forgiveness of
indebtedness.76
Jewish law recognizes a variety of situations where a husband
may be compelled to divorce his wife.7 7 Although the notion of a
compelled get is contrary to the axiom that the get must be given
without duress of any kind, the Talmud responds laconically that the
person is forced until he declares, "I am willing."78 There must in-
deed be a formal expression of consent, but that formal expression
may be induced through virtually any form of psychological, finan-
cial, or even physical pressure including incarceration and threat of
bodily injury, or even threat of death.79
The acceptability of this type of formalistic, attenuated consent
is limited both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, it is
triggered only if a duly constituted bais din has issued a final judg-
ment directing the husband to give a get, so that as a technical mat-
ter coercion is directed to compliance with the mandate of the court
rather than the execution of the get per se. Substantively, such an
order must be predicated on the specific grounds enumerated in ha-
no. 68 (one who gives a get in order to avoid a penalty that came of his own accord is
acting willfully). An intermediate position is adopted by a number of authorities who
would distinguish between voluntarily assumed penalty clauses, where the promisor re-
tains the freedom to refuse to deliver the get and incur a penalty, and cases of solemn
oaths, which destroy freedom of choice because they are specifically enforceable. See,
e.g., TUR, EVEN HAEZER, ch. 154 (Standard ed. at 76b) (citing Rabbeinu Peretz); RABBI
YOSEF KARO, BAIT YOSEF, Comments (comments to TUR, EVEN HAEZER 134 (Standard
ed. at 26b)) (citing Rabbi Maimon Nager); see also id. (noting that even in the case ofaget
issued pursuant to an oath, the get is valid ex post facto, although it should not be deliv-
ered until the oath is halachically annulled). Arba Turim [The Four Rows], commonly
known as Tur, was authored by Rabbi Jacob Ben Asher (13th-14th century Spain). Un-
like Maimonides' approach, Tur traces its conclusions back to the Talmudic sources and
provides a digest of virtually all opinions ofJewish law. Tur is comprised of four books.
The book of Even Haezer addresses laws concerning marriage, divorce, and personal
status.
76. The final and generally accepted compromise ruling is recorded by Rabbi Moshe
Isserles (Rema) (16th century Poland) in SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER
134:5. Rema's commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, although ostensibly an independent
work, is incorporated as an inseparable part of the Shulchan Aruch.
77. See infra note 80.
78. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YEBAMOTH, at 106a.
79. The classic justification for this attenuated consent is stated in RAMBAM, MISHNA
TORAH, supra note 47, HILCHOT GERUSHIN 2:20. Maimonides states that it is assumed
that every Jew truly desires to comply with religious law and any refusal to do so is
merely the result of an "evil disposition" that temporarily overpowers or vanquishes his
free will. Duress is therefore applied not to overcome the husband's exercise of will but
to remove the impediment that prevents that true will from emerging.
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lacha as requiring the granting of a get."° The findings of fact of a
80. The Talmud enumerates a number of specified grounds that enable a woman to
petition for divorce, and later authorities have supplemented the list:
1. If her husband becomes afflicted with certain loathsome diseases after mar-
riage or even if the disease predated the marriage but, as of the date of the
marriage, its existence was unknown to her.
2. Impotence or sterility.
3. Failure to provide material support.
4. Refusal to cohabitate.
5. Physical or verbal abuse.
6. Husband forces wife to violate religious law.
7. Husband is engaged in certain occupations that are physically repulsive-
dung gathering, tanning hides.
8. Husband becomes an apostate.
9. Habitual infidelity.
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, KETUBOTH, at 77a; SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15,
EVEN HAEZER 154. With respect to some of these grounds, the woman's right to a di-
vorce carries with it the entitlement to the alimony settlement stipulated in the ketubah.
With respect to others, she gains her freedom only at the cost of forfeiting those rights.
See BEN ZION SHARESHEVSKY, DINAI MISHPACHA 285-300 (1967).
Many authorities maintain that the coercive power of a bais din is virtually unlimited
and includes the imposition of monetary fines, imprisonment, corporal punishment, a
ban of excommunication, and even threat of death. See RABBI YITZCHACK ALFASi, RIF,
KETUBOTH, ch. 7. Other authorities took a much more cautious and limiting view of
judicial enforcement and drew a distinction between two Talmudic terms. See BABYLO-
NIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, TOSAFOT, S.V. YOTZE, at 70a; RABBI ASHER BEN YECHIEL,
PIsKAI ROSH, YEBAMOTH, ch. 6. Any ground for which the Talmud states kofin ("we may
coerce") is deemed sufficiently grave that physical threats and force may indeed be em-
ployed. If, on the other hand, the less emphatic term yotzee ("he shall [or must] di-
vorce") is used, the court may issue the order but cannot impose any coercive measures
other than those that are purely psychological, such as moral suasion or public procla-
mation of disobedience.
The Mishna employs the term kofin for cases of repulsive occupations and loathsome
diseases, and uses the lesser term yotzee for refusals to provide material support or co-
habitation. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, KETUBOTH, at 77a; id., YEBAMOTH ch.
6. Whether impotence is grounds for a kofin order or only yotzee is a matter of considera-
ble disagreement. See GEVUROT ANASHIM, no. 42; TASHBATZ, no. 693 (both ruling that
compulsion may not be employed, at least where the condition is treatable). But see
BLEICH, supra note 12, at 102.
One undisputed instance where physical compulsion can clearly be employed is the
case of a prohibited union, such as a Cohen marrying a divorcee. SHULCHAN ARUCH,
supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 154:20; id. at 154:21 (comment of Rema). According to
Rosh, because the propriety of utilizing coercive measures in yotzee cases is a matter of
dispute, the correct procedure is to abstain from employing such measures except where
the term kofin is employed. He notes that the use of enforcement mechanisms that are
excessive or unauthorized may not only be an abuse ofjudicial power but would render
the resulting get a meusah (product of duress) and invalid, making any subsequent mar-
riage adulterous. Thus, to this day, a judicial decree of divorce may take one of two
forms: (1) a directive that the husband must divorce his wife; (2) a directive that the
husband may be compelled to divorce his wife. From the perspective of moral and reli-
gious obligations, both are equally binding, but only the latter may be enforced through
conventional mechanisms. The notion of a judicial order not subject to enforcement
must certainly strike the conventional legal mind as odd. At least since Holmes, it is
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bais din are entitled to great weight, and in the absence of fraud may
well be conclusive (because classical halacha did not provide for au-
tomatic appellate review). Yet, in the absence of findings amount-
ing to grounds for coercion, the decision of the bais din is nothing
more than advisory and hortatory and could not trigger a halachic
validation of a get executed in response to subsequent coercive
measures. To the extent such findings are made, however, there is
no halachic requirement that coercion be employed by the court sys-
tem itself. In effect, the victim and her friends or relatives have a
variety of self-help remedies ranging from invoking the secular
courts to posting the husband's name and picture all over town, or
in extreme cases, hiring a band of thugs to beat up the husband.8 '
commonplace to regard the very meaning of a right as the remedy available for its vindi-
cation. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 168-71
(1920). Thus, one could not state that a woman has a "right" to divorce unless she
could call upon the mechanism of the state to get it for her. Yet in a system where legal
courts are also religious and moral educators and where rights and obligations have
bases of authority that transcend human mechanisms of compulsion, such a concept is
entirely understandable.
It is particularly important to note that a woman's subjective dissatisfaction with her
marital relationship, even if it rises to the level of revulsion, does not constitute a kofin
ground according to the vast majority of halachic authorities. See SHULCHAN ARUCH,
supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 77:2. But see RAMBAM, MISHNA TORAH, supra note 47,
HILCHOT ISHUT 14:8.
Outside of the State of Israel, rabbinical courts have no power of compulsion in any
event, so the distinction between the two forms of decree may appear at first glance to
be merely academic. Such an impression would be erroneous. Even where batei din lack
their own enforcement powers, the kofin-yotzee distinction continues to be critical. See
infra text accompanying notes 246-256. Halacha generally permits the utilization of the
secular court system to enforce the dictates of the bais din, and the use of the system may
be obtained through the drafting of appropriate prenuptial agreements. It would seem,
however, that this would be halachically acceptable only for a decree of kofin and not
yotzee, because it is unlikely that halacha would allow a secular court to do what its own
bais din cannot. Thus, the efficacy of secular enforcement depends directly on the under-
standing of this dichotomy.
81. To clear up a possible point of confusion, under classical halacha, a bais din is
vested with the powers inherent in all courts to enforce compliance with their judgments
through processes similar to levy and execution on property, incarceration, the imposi-
tion of fines, and even corporal punishment. Outside of the State of Israel, however,
batei din are currently unable to exercise their enforcement powers as a matter of secular
law. Accordingly, modern day enforcement of decisions of batei din is accomplished
through moral persuasion, judicial enforcement, community pressure, or self-help. The
point that such self-help may even take the form of threats or physical violence should
not be taken to suggest that such measures are proper. Indeed, in the absence of any
authorization by a court, they are clearly tortious under both secular and Jewish law. To
the extent these unauthorized and unlawful measures are employed subsequent to a bais
din's bona fide determination that the granting of a get is mandatory, however, the get is
no longer viewed to be a product of coercion. See supra note 79; text accompanying
notes 78-80.
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Certain types of pressure are not deemed sufficiently coercive
to invalidate a get. For example, employing psychological pressure,
organizing boycotts (even with economic impact), and posting signs
apparently would not render the get meusah even in the absence of a
decision of a bais din, although prior to such a decision employment
of these measures is viewed as morally reprehensible.
Another category of pressure involves what might be termed
"coercive circumstances arising from reasons unrelated to the get
itself." This category was first recognized by the great Spanish au-
thority, Rivash.8 2 The case involved a person thrown into debtor's
prison for nonpayment of a debt. His wife's relatives offered to sat-
isfy the debt and obtain his release from prison on the condition
that he would execute a get and divorce his wife. He willingly com-
plied. In considering whether the get was a product of coercion,
Rivash concluded that because the man "was not seized in order to
divorce his wife but on account of his debt, the get is not coerced but
is the product of free will." 8
The theory appears to be that where the compelling event did
not arise for the purpose of inducing a get, although the granting of
the get will effectively remove the source of the compulsion, the get
retains its validity. A modem example of this distinction might be a
separation agreement where one spouse agrees to forego property
or custody rights in exchange for a get (admittedly a reprehensible
instance of blackmail). Although the execution of the get might in
some sense be viewed as a means of escaping the financial burdens
that would otherwise fall on the husband's shoulders, the get is seen
as conferring a benefit rather than removing a compulsion.8 4
82. See RABBI ISAAC BEN SHESHET (14th century Spain), TESHUVOT RIVASH no. 127
[hereinafter RIVASH].
83. Id.; see also id. at no. 132 (deciding that a violation of community ordinance
prohibiting marriage in the absence of a quorum of 10 carried sanction of imprison-
ment; a commutation of sentence contingent on the execution ofa get did not constitute
duress); RABBI YOSEF COLON (15th century France and Italy), TESHUVOT MAHARIK no.
123 (concluding that where a person is imprisoned for offenses unrelated to the grant-
ing of a get, a refusal of the community to intervene until a get is granted is not coercive,
but is simply a withholding of assistance). Whether this pressure could take the form of
affirmative statements requesting a denial of clemency is debatable. See infra notes 85-88
and accompanying text; see also 1 RABBI MOSES BEN YOSEF TRANI (16th century Greece
and Palestine), TESHUVOT MABIT no. 22 (invalidating a get where the Jewish community
offered to secure the release of a citizen of Safed imprisoned for criminal activity by civil
authorities if he would divorce his wife and leave the jurisdiction).
84. Indeed, this same result follows under common law. If I threaten to drown
someone unless she agrees to a contract, any contract resulting from such a threat is
voidable under duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 74, § 174.
If, on the other hand, someone is already drowning and I offer to save him if he signs a
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An interesting contemporary application arose in Israel, where
by operation of law religious tribunals still maintain exclusive juris-
diction over marriage and divorce.8 5 A young woman had married a
man who was serving a four-year prison sentence in Israel for drug
offenses. The wife petitioned for a divorce on the grounds of non-
support and loss of consortium. The bais din directed the husband
to execute the get, but did not find any grounds either under Israeli
or Jewish law that would mandate the direct imposition of coercive
sanctions such as additional imprisonment or fines.
The issue before the court was whether it was halachically
proper to recommend parole or reduction of sentence in exchange
for the husband's executing a get, and whether, conversely, the
rabbinic tribunal could submit a recommendation against parole un-
less the get is executed. On one hand, the get is the mechanism by
which the prisoner may obtain his freedom-if a person is told,
"Sign the get or stay in jail," this resembles duress. Yet because the
imprisonment was for an unrelated offense, the failure to give a get
does not in and of itself result in direct coercion, but simply
removes the extra privileges or benefits of parole that would other-
wise ensue. An additional complication arose from the fact that the
husband behaved abusively in the presence of the court, spitting
and cursing at the judges. The prisoner's behavior clearly consti-
tuted contempt of court and could properly be taken into account as
a factor bearing on "good moral character" in a parole hearing.
The issue before the bais din was whether it could "forgive" his con-
tempt and agree not to report it in exchange for a get.
In a two to one decision, the bais din ruled that it would be im-
proper to threaten the husband with an explicit recommendation for
denial of parole-such a recommendation would be tantamount to
the imposition of additional punishment for the failure to give a get.
Indeed, this would be so even if the recommendation were predi-
contract, the resulting contract would not be voidable. See id. The distinction is based
on the fact that duress renders a contract voidable only when the threat that induced the
assent was "improper." See id. at § 175(1). A threat is "improper" if what is threatened
constitutes a "crime" or a "tort." Id. at § 176(l)(a). Because Anglo-American law im-
poses no affirmative duty of rescue, threatening to "let" someone drown unless he con-
sents is not tortious. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1977). A fortiori, this
would be true where the promisor is not faced with loss of life, but simply imprisonment
or property forfeiture. The common law of contracts would probably come to the same
conclusion as Rivash, Maharik, and Mabit.
85. For a thorough discussion of the case, see 2 BLEICH, supra note 12, at 94-103. See
also 11 PISKEI DIN RABBONIYIM [DECISIONS OF RABBINIC TRIBUNALS], no. 10, at 300-08
(1978) (reporting case). The dissent by Rabbi Shlomo Dichovsky was published as a
separate article in I TECHUMIN 248 (1980).
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cated on the husband's abusive behavior rather than on the grounds
of "bad moral character" for noncompliance with a court order . 6
The dissent took the position that even an explicit recommendation
against parole constitutes only a denial of benefits.
One other major consideration applicable to indirect sanctions
is whether the sanctions are themselves legitimate-the debt must
be legally enforceable and the means employed must be legitimate.
The execution of a get in order to escape payment of a debt that is
not actionable at law is regarded as the product of duress even if the
compulsion arises from reasons unrelated to the granting or with-
holding of the get. 7 Therefore, only forgiveness of a legitimate
86. The bais din found possible grounds to distinguish between a recommendation
against parole and failure to make a positive recommendation for parole. The bais din is
certainly entitled to condition any positive intervention on the prisoner's compliance
with its decree. For the basis for this distinction, see RABBI COLON, supra note 83, at no.
123:
But if a person is imprisoned by gentiles because of taxes or some other matter,
we may say to him, "We will not attempt to have you released from prison
unless you divorce your wife with a valid get." This is not duress, because we
are not doing him evil but are simply withholding assistance. Withholding
assistance of a benefit is not considered duress.
Id. (author's translation).
The court's ruling, based on TESHUVOT MAHARIK, no. 123, that the granting of af-
firmative assistance may be made conditional on the granting of a get, has been followed
by other rabbinical courts as well. For example, under Israeli law contracting marriage
with a woman under the age of 17 is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment or a
fine. The rabbinical courts have routinely informed the violator that they will intercede
and recommend a commutation of sentence upon execution of the get. Since the viola-
tor is imprisoned because of a violation of the criminal statute, which is totally unrelated
to the granting of a get, the making or withholding of a clemency recommendation is not
an act of compulsion. See also TESHuvoT RIvAsH, no. 132 (violation of a local community
ordinance forbidding the celebration of marriages without the presence of a quorum of
ten; imprisonment subject to release upon execution of a get is a valid practice because
the imprisonment is a sanction for violation of the ordinance). See generally Benjamin
Rabinowitz-Teumin, Self-Imposed Constraints in Divorce, 1 NOAM 303 (1957-1958). Bleich
regards these precedents as inconsistent with the majority's ruling. See 2 BLEICH, supra
note 12, at 99-100. Somewhat confusingly, however, this assertion ignores the very dis-
tinction the court made-between the imposition of punishment and the denial of bene-
fit. The court's whole point-and one that is surely debatable-is that a negative
recommendation against parole (which would otherwise be granted) is closer to a new
punishment than a withholding of a privilege, at least where it is premised on failure to
grant a get. Bleich's point, however, may be cogent with respect to the report concern-
ing courtroom abuse, because that is totally unrelated to the get.
87. See I TASHBATZ, no. 1. This is how the ruling is generally understood, but it is
not entirely clear from TASHBATZ whether the basis for the holding is the inherent illegit-
imate nature of the means employed or the implication that the illegitimate threats were
undertaken to compel a get. Contra TESHUVOT RANACH, no. 43 (violating community ban
on marriages without a quorum did not justify the imposition of a prison sentence-
detention on such grounds is therefore illicit and tortious. Nevertheless, if such a sen-
tence has in fact been imposed, a commutation of sentence upon execution of get would
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debt constitutes a proper inducement for divorce.88
II. MECHANISMS OF CIVIL ENFORCEMENT:
THE USE OF CONTRACT LAW
The limited enforcement powers of a bais din make enforcement
through the secular judiciary an attractive alternative. Despite its
considerable appeal and notwithstanding the fact that courts have
been relatively sympathetic to the agunah's tragic plight, reliance on
the good will of courts can be legally problematic. Even worse,
court intervention is also halachically questionable because in many
cases gittin executed pursuant to court orders may be invalid as get
meusah. Well-meaning courts, in their attempts to be solicitous of
the needs of an agunah, often have simply been unaware of the inter-
face of halacha and law to be considered. Nevertheless, many of
these obstacles are surmountable, and the legal system can be re-
sponsive in a manner consistent with both constitutional principles
and halachic directive.
Obligations imposed by religious law are not directly enforcea-
ble in civil courts of the United States, nor could they be under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.89 Thus, the fact that
Jewish law requires a marriage to be dissolved through the execu-
tion and delivery of a get would not alone furnish any basis for legal
action to compel this result under secular law. There are a number
of cases, however, where courts have been called upon to assist par-
not render the get invalid as a meusah. The legitimacy of the sanction is irrelevant as long
as it does not stem from the nondelivery of the get.). See also TESHUVOT RIVASH, no. 132
(validating the get under these circumstances, but on the alternative theory that incarcer-
ation is in fact a legitimate communal sanction for violation of such an ordinance).
88. Here too there is a close common-law parallel. A promise to perform X in ex-
change for the forgiveness of debt Y may be an invalid product of duress if debt Y is a
clearly unenforceable claim. Nevertheless, the promisee need not establish that he
would have succeeded on the merits, but merely that the asserted claim that is being
forgiven has a reasonable basis and is not entirely frivolous. Moreover, even where the
"forgiven debt" is not actionable, a promise obtained in exchange for its release will not
necessarily be voidable if defending against the unenforceable claim constituted a "rea-
sonable alternative." See John P. Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation: 1, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 571 (1947); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 4.17, at 276 (2d ed. 1990); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 74, § 175, cmt. b (stating that even
where a threat is improper, it will not constitute duress if it allows the victim a reasonable
alternative). The ability to assert a defense against a frivolous claim normally constitutes
such an alternative unless particularly oppressive tactics are employed. From a Jewish
law perspective, it is not clear whether being put to the burden of litigating constitutes a
reasonable alternative. Nevertheless, the concept of "reasonable alternatives" negating
get meusah has been recognized by at least some authorities. See 2 TESHUVOT MABIT, no.
138.
89. See infra Subpart II.A.3.
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ties in vindicating their rights under Jewish law, usually on some
theory of express or implied contract.
A. Express or Implied Promises to Give a Get
1. Case Law.-Cases involving religious divorce disputes fall
into a variety of categories. The simplest group involves express
agreements to grant a get once the parties obtain a civil dissolution.
Typically, in this scenario, the husband fails to comply with his con-
tractual undertaking and the wife, alleging the inadequacy of dam-
ages, brings an equitable action for specific performance. Courts in
Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have refused to enforce these
agreements, either on the theory that judicially compelling a reli-
gious divorce would excessively entangle the state in sectarian mat-
ters, offending the Establishment Clause, or on the narrower
ground that such an order is beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the
court.90 One court indicated that compelling a religious divorce
90. See Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding by di-
vided court that a provision in a final decree of divorce ordering the husband to cooper-
ate with his wife in obtaining a Jewish divorce was unenforceable), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d
.233 (Fla. 1967); Steinberg v. Steinberg, No. 44125, 1982 WL 2446, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 24, 1982) (holding that a provision in a separation agreement and divorce decree
obligating the wife to obtain a Jewish divorce was unenforceable); Price v. Price, 16 Pa.
D. & C. 290, 291 (1932) (holding that court had "no right to order anyone to consent to
any kind of divorce-whether it be civil or religious").
Technically, in Turner, the court's holding rested on the narrow notion that the
Chancellor had no statutory authority to impose such a requirement in a divorce decree,
but arguably, such a requirement could be enforced as a simple contract. See Turner, 192
So. 2d at 788. Nevertheless, the language of the opinion strongly suggests serious First
Amendment concerns.
These concerns formed the explicit basis of the holding in Steinberg, a somewhat
unusual case. Steinberg involved a recalcitrant wife who refused to accept a get after a
separation agreement was incorporated into a divorce decree providing for alimony in
favor of her, but conditioning receipt of that benefit on her cooperation in obtaining a
religious divorce. See Steinberg, No. 44125, 1982 WL, at *1. The wife filed a motion to
vacate the part of the order that conditioned her alimony entitlement on compliance
with religious law. Id. at *2. The trial court granted her motion and ordered the hus-
band to pay alimony arrearages notwithstanding her lack of cooperation. The court's
order was affirmed on appeal. Id. at *5. The appellate court stated that it was obvious
that a court could not enforce through its contempt power any clause requiring a party
to participate in a religious ceremony and, therefore, a court may not do indirectly
(through the withholding of alimony) what it could not accomplish directly. Id. at *4-5.
The correctness of this last assertion is open to question, but it is abundantly clear that
the Ohio court would not sanction direct enforcement of a promise to give or receive a
get because such an order is violative of the First Amendment.
Finally, in Price, a Pennsylvania court denied, on Free Exercise grounds, a wife's
request for specific performance of a prenuptial agreement to give a get in the event of a
civil divorce. Price, 16 Pa. D. & C. at 291 ("The civil tribunals are certainly without
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may also violate the Free Exercise Clause. 9 '
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have enforced similar
contractual provisions to give a get.9 2 For example, in Koeppel v.
Koeppel,93 a wife brought suit to compel her husband to comply with
an agreement to execute a get upon the grant of a civil divorce.94
The husband moved for a dismissal on the grounds that enforce-
ment of such a provision contravened his First Amendment free-
doms.95 In denying the motion to dismiss, the court stated:
Defendant has also contended that a decree of specific
performance would interfere with his freedom of religion
under the Constitution. Complying with his agreement
would not compel the defendant to practice any religion,
not even the Jewish faith to which he still admits adherence
... . His appearance before the Rabbinate . .. is not a
profession of faith. Specific performance herein would merely re-
quire the defendant to do what he voluntarily agreed to do .96
Thus, the mere fact that a ceremony, procedure, or activity is gov-
erned by religious law does not preclude its civil enforcement by
way of a simple contract.97 Other cases in New York, at least at the
trial level, have reached the same result, though the holdings are
inconsistent.9 8
authority to order one to follow the practices of his faith. This is a matter dependent
entirely upon his conscience, or upon his religious belief.").
91. See Price, 16 Pa. D. & C. at 291.
92. See, e.g., Feuerman v. Feuerman, Civil No. 83-267188 (Mich. 6thJud. Cir. Aug. 1,
1984) (ordering specific performance of an agreement to obtain a Jewish divorce where
such agreement was embodied in settlement papers).
93. 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
94. Id. at 370.
95. Id. at 373.
96. Id. (emphasis added). After trial, however, the court ruled that the agreement
was too indefinite and therefore unenforceable. See Koeppel v. Koeppel, 161 N.Y.S.2d
694, 695-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957). Under the language of the agreement, the husband
was obligated to grant his wife a religious divorce only if "necessary." Id. Because the
wife remarried prior to obtaining the get, the court found that the requisite showing of
"necessity" could not be made. See id.
97. Cf. Gordon v. Gordon, 140 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (denying enforce-
ment of a get agreement because such a contract violated a state statute prohibiting pri-
vate agreements to void marriages).
98. See Waxstein v. Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (granting spe-
cific performance of a promise to give a get where the promise was part of an integrated
separation agreement, and the wife had complied with her part of the deal), aff'd, 394
N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 367 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1977); see also Rubin
v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973) (Rubin is a fictitious name used for
publication purposes; the opinion was authored by a judge who also happens to be an
ordained Rabbi.).
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In Waxstein v. Waxstein, 9 a wife sought specific performance of a
provision in the couple's separation agreement that required the
husband to execute a get.' 00 The court noted the inherent unfair-
ness of permitting the husband to receive the benefits of the agree-
ment without complying with its relatively light burdens.' While
Waxstein, unlike Koeppel, is an actual decision on the merits, its hold-
ing may be limited to cases where the party who desires the get has
already completely performed his or her part of the agreement.' 0 2
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of constitutional law, this distinc-
tion appears to be immaterial.
In another case, Rubin v. Rubin,'"° the parties had executed a
separation agreement that made support and alimony contingent
upon the wife's acceptance of a get.' 4 The wife refused to cooper-
ate in the get process, but nonetheless sued for alimony arrear-
ages.' 0 5 In denying her request, Judge Gartenstein noted that a
number of New York courts have enforced a contractual undertak-
ing to give a get.'° 6 Even under rulings that denied direct enforce-
ment of a get promise, however, Mrs. Rubin was not entitled to the
relief she sought. 1 7 The court sharply differentiated between a get
as a promise and a get as a condition:
[T]his court is not called upon to enforce this religious dis-
cipline against a recalcitrant party, but, rather, is being
called upon by the defaulting party to enforce other relief in
her favor at a time when she refuses to perform a condition
precedent thereto, which happens to be an act of religious
significance. The condition precedent could well have
been anything else made crucial by agreement of the par-
ties .... [W]here one party to an agreement calling for a
Get declines to perform, the court will either refuse any re-
lief to the defaulting party, or will hold any application for
the same in abeyance pending performance of the obliga-
tions assumed pertaining to the Get.'
99. 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aft'd, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div.),
appeal denied, 367 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1977)
100. See id. at 879.
101. See id. at 880.
102. See id. at 880-81.
103. 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1973).
104. See id. at 63.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 67.
107. Id.; see, e.g., Margulies v. Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 307 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1973).
108. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
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While the Rubin court did not expressly rule on whether
promises to execute a get are directly enforceable, failure to carry
out such undertakings may constitute the nonoccurrence of a condi-
tion precedent barring the recalcitrant party from asserting other
benefits under the agreement. Thus, a prenuptial or separation
agreement conditioning various benefits on the execution of a
get may well have the desired effect of indirectly inducing
compliance.' 09
The more problematic New York case is Margulies v. Margu-
lies,"o where the husband had agreed orally in open court to give a
get to his wife and the stipulation was entered as a court order."'
Based on his disregard of the order, the husband was held in con-
tempt twice, and fined subject to the provision that he could purge
himself of the contempt upon payment of the fines and appearance
before a rabbinical court to execute a get.' l 2 Upon his continued
refusal to comply, the husband was committed to jail for fifteen
days.'" The Appellate Division reversed the imposition of impris-
onment, but allowed the fines to stand." 4
Margulies is difficult because the court agreed with the hus-
band's contention that it was without power under the First Amend-
ment to order him to perform a religious act; yet, it allowed the fines
to stand. 1 5 Rabbi Irwin Haut suggests that by sustaining the fines,
the court demonstrated that it was in fact amenable to enforceability
through sanctions less drastic than imprisonment." 6 This reading
appears to be incorrect, as does the court's holding. The court ap-
parently would deny any enforcement of contracts to give a get, but
it sustained the fines exclusively on technical procedural grounds-
failure to appeal." 7 It must be said, however, that the reversal of
the imprisonment and affirmance of the fines are constitutionally
difficult to reconcile." 18
109. Accord B. v. B., N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1978, at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). But see Steinberg
v. Steinberg, No. 44125, 1982 WL 2446, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1982) (holding
that the use of the get clause as a condition precedent is an unconstitutional form of
indirect compulsion); supra note 90.
110. 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 307 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1973).
111. See id. at 484.
112. See id.
113. d.
114. See id. at 483-84.
115. See id.
116. See RABBI IRWIN HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 73-74 (1983).
117. See Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.
118. See id. at 485 (Nunez, J., dissenting) (arguing for reversal of all sanctions). The
sorry aftermath of this case may be seen in the fact that, over six years later, Mrs. Margu-
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A second line of cases has gone considerably further. Even in
the absence of an express agreement to give or receive a get, some
courts have been willing to infer such an agreement from the fact
that the parties solemnized their marriage in accordance with reli-
gious tradition, recited a formula at the ceremony that the marriage
was in "accordance with the laws of Moses and Israel," or executed
the traditional ketubah 119 or marriage contract. The first recorded
case of a spouse petitioning the court for an order compelling the
granting of the get on the basis of the ketubah alone occurred in Can-
ada. In Morns v. Morris,' 2 ° the trial court sustained the wife's con-
tention that the ketubah constituted a civilly enforceable contract to
grant a get upon civil dissolution and entered an order of specific
performance to that effect. 12  The decision was reversed by the
Manitoba Court of Appeals, and Mrs. Morris did not pursue further
avenues of review.' 22 Nevertheless, the ceremony-ketubah argument
has been accepted by various trial courts in Illinois, NewJersey, and
New York, all of which have entered get orders, even in the absence
of an express prenuptial agreement to that effect.' 23
The earliest such case in the United States, Stern v. Stern,' 2 4 in-
volved a couple who had been married in a Jewish ceremony during
which the groom gave the bride a ketubah in which he stated that she
was his wife in accordance with the laws of Moses and Israel. 125
Mrs. Stern later sued her husband for divorce; he countersued, al-
lies' motion for attorney's fees incurred in her still unsuccessful attempts to obtain a get
were denied. See Margulies v. Margulies, 418 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1979).
119. The ketubah (writing) is a standard document written in Aramaic setting out the
obligations of a husband toward his wife. Dating from before the Common Era, its pur-
pose was to discourage the husband from exercising what was originally his unilateral
power of divorce. See Solomon Zeitlin, The Origin of the Ketubah: A Study in the Institution of
Marriage, 24 JEwisH Q. REV. 1 (1933-1934). The Conservative movement utilizes a
slightly different text, while the Reform movement does not use a ketubah at all (though
the bridal couple may have one if they wish). The ketubah is executed and signed by two
witnesses immediately before the wedding ceremony and remains the wife's property.
The ketubah is also publicly read at the wedding ceremony, though usually left untrans-
lated, so that few in the audience know what they are hearing. For an extensive discus-
sion of the ketubah, see infra text accompanying notes 151-157.
120. 36 D.L.R.3d 447, rev'd, 42 D.L.R.3d 550 (1973).
121. See id. at 455.
122. See 42 D.L.R.3d 550 (1973).
123. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 544 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 555
N.E.2d 376 (Il1. 1990); Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987);
Minkin v. Minkin, 432 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); Stern v. Stern, 5 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1979).
124. 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1979).
125. Id. at 2811.
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leging adultery.' 26 On the basis of expert testimony, the court
found that under Jewish law the husband was obligated to give an
adulterous wife a bill of divorce and entered an order to that ef-
fect. 127 The court found no First Amendment barrier in imposing
such an obligation because rules in Jewish law that govern the rela-
tionship of human beings to each other are "secular" in nature
rather than religious.' 28
In Minkin v. Minkin,'29 the court held that compelling issuance
of a get is not a prohibited establishment of religion because such an
order has a "clear secular purpose" of completing the process of
dissolution. 3 ' Moreover, because the get does not involve a "pro-
fession of faith" and the court is simply requiring the husband to do
what he voluntarily agreed to do, there was no infringement of "free
exercise" rights. 3 '
Both Stern and Minkin may be limited to cases where divorce is
mandatory under Jewish law, and they do not stand for the proposi-
tion that the terms of the ketubah create an implied contractual obli-
gation to grant a get whenever there is a civil dissolution.
Nevertheless, constitutionally, whether a divorce is mandated by
Jewish law is irrelevant. Thus, the inescapable logic of Stern and
Minkin leads to the conclusion that an express agreement to give a
get would always be enforceable in court whether or not Jewish law
made a divorce mandatory.
The Stern-Minkin decisions were broadened by a later New
Jersey case, Burns v. Burns. 132 After obtaining a judgment for di-
vorce, Michelle Burns filed a post-judgment motion seeking an or-
der compelling her former husband to issue a Jewish bill of
divorce.' 3 3 The court, relying on Minkin, refused to limit that case
to adultery, and held that in every case of civil dissolution, the
ketubah imposes an affirmative obligation on the parties to dissolve
the bonds of matrimony in a religiously appropriate manner. 3 4
The court rejected Mr. Burns's free exercise claim based in part
on evidence that he was willing to give a get in exchange for a
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 434 A.2d 665 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
130. Id. at 668.
131. Id.
132. 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
133. See id. at 439.
134. See id. at 440- 41.
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$25,000 payment.'" 5 Noting that a "true religious belief is not com-
promised as the amount of money demanded is increased" and that
such an "offer" is akin to extortion and beyond the pale of the First
Amendment, the court concluded that no religious freedoms were
infringed."t 6 This is a fundamentally different approach than the
court took in Minkin when it flatly asserted that the giving of a get is
not a religious act at all.' 7 On the other hand, because Burns does
cite Minkin extensively, and approvingly, it may very well be that the
Burns court would have come out the same way, even if Mr. Burns
were not acting for pecuniary gain.
Unlike the courts in Stern and Minkin, however, the Burns court
did not directly order the husband to execute a get, but ordered him
to submit to the jurisdiction of a rabbinical court and initiate the get
procedure. 3 ' While the Burns opinion makes a number of errors
concerningJewish law-for example, it describes a get as evidence of
a divorce, and it misinterprets the ketubah-its amended order is
much more consistent with the dictates of halacha than the Stern-
Minkin analogue. 139
The most recent case in this area, and especially significant as
the first appellate case to construe the ketubah as an implied contract
to give a get, is In re Marriage of Goldman.'40 Kenneth and Annette
Goldman were married in a Reconstructionist Jewish ceremony.' 4 '
During the ceremony, a standard Orthodox ketubah purchased in a
Jewish bookstore was signed.' 42 Neither party was an Orthodox Jew
at the time of the marriage, but Annette became Orthodox during
the course of her marriage. "4 Kenneth later petitioned for dissolu-
135. See id. at 440.
136. Id.
137. See Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667.
138. See Burns, 538 A.2d at 441 ("The ultimate decision of whether a 'get' is to be
granted is that of the 'Bet Din' and not of this court.").
139. See id. at 439-41.
140. 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 376 (Il. 1990).
141. Id. at 1018.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1019. A crucial point that the court simply glosses over is that the get is
required for dissolution only in the Orthodox and Conservative traditions and not in the
Reform or Reconstructionist traditions. See supra note 5. If the marriage were solem-
nized pursuant to Reconstructionist rites, therefore, there could not be an implied un-
derstanding that halacha would govern the dissolution. See infra text accompanying
notes 151-152. The court did note, however, that Kenneth had given his prior wife aget
and had told Annette thatJewish marriage requires ajewish divorce. See id. at 1019. He
had never specifically told Annette that he would give her a get in the event of civil
dissolution. See id.
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tion of the marriage and custody of their two children. 44 Annette
counter-petitioned for divorce, custody, and specific performance of
the ketubah as a premarital contract that stipulated that the existence
and dissolution of their marriage would be governed by Orthodox
Jewish law. 145 Kenneth refused to give her a get, and some evidence
was introduced that he was using the get as leverage to obtain joint
custody of the children. 146 The trial court found that the parties'
intention at the time they signed the ketubah was to "have the mar-
riage recognized by the Orthodox branch ofJudaism"; based on ex-
pert testimony, "the ketubah clearly and unequivocally obligates the
husband to proceed with the get procedure"; and Kenneth's extreme
dislike for Orthodox Judaism did not rise to the level of a religious
belief entitled to free exercise protection. 147 The court ordered that
Kenneth comply with his contractual obligation to give Annette an
Orthodox get.148
On appeal, Kenneth raised three arguments: the ketubah is not
a legally enforceable contract, its terms were too vague to support a
decree of specific performance, and the order violated the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses.' 49 The Illinois appellate court re-
jected all of these contentions in a two to one decision and allowed
the circuit court's ruling to stand.' 50
Cases like Stern, Minkin, Burns, and Goldman pose problems
from a number of perspectives. In particular, as a matter of con-
tract, constitutional law, and halacha, their reasoning is somewhat
deficient.
2. Contract Law Issues.-Halacha requires that a ketubah be exe-
cuted at or before a marriage ceremony.' 5 ' To this day, all Ortho-
dox and Conservative weddings utilize a ketubah in substantially the
same form it traditionally had been used, while in Reform and Re-
constructionist ceremonies, it is regarded as optional. 52 The
ketubah is a document written in the form of a series of promises or
commitments that resemble what would be termed "contracts."
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1020.
147. Id. at 1020-21.
148. Id. at 1021.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1021-25.
151. See supra note 119.
152. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct.) (employing
an Orthodox ketubah although their ceremony followed the Reconstructionist rite), ap-
peal denied, 555 N.E.2d 376 (Il1. 1990).
346 [VOL. 51:312
1992] HALAcHA, CONTRACT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
These promises, all of which are made by the husband to the
wife, ' include:
(1) a declaration that he has betrothed his wife in accordance
with the laws of Moses and Israel;
(2) a promise that he will honor, support, and work for his
spouse in accordance with the custom of Jewish husbands;
(3) an obligation to provide food, clothing, and intimacy in ac-
cordance "with universal custom";
(4) an agreement to pay an alimony lump sum of 200 silver
zuz 154 in the event of divorce or death;
(5) an agreement to pay a stipulated monetary value for prop-
erty that the wife brings into the marriage;
(6) a promise to pay an additional alimony sum in excess of the
statutory minimum; and
(7) the creation of a lien on all real or personal property,
whether presently owned or after-acquired, to secure payment of all
obligations under the ketubah.
The ketubah is then signed by two witnesses, who affirm that the
groom agrees to be bound. There is no requirement that the bride
or groom sign, although it has become customary in many circles for
them to do so.
Significantly, the ketubah is written in a difficult Aramaic, fre-
quently without a translation. Even where some English words do
appear, the legal portions of the ketubah are rarely reproduced in
English. The "translation" may say, for example, that the parties
pledge mutual affection and love or other generalized sentiments
that do not even appear in the traditional text.
Among many, if not most couples, there is substantial igno-
rance as to what the ketubah says, and even officiating rabbis, particu-
larly if they are not Orthodox, regard the ketubah as part of a
religious ceremony, but not as something generating legally en-
forceable relationships."' 5 Thus, although the ketubah is in the legal
form of a contract (at least a unilateral one), in many cases it could
153. The ketubah does state, however, that the bride has agreed to become the
groom's spouse, which may suffice as a recital of consideration. See supra note 119.
154. The "dowry of the virgins" mentioned in the Bible is stated as 50 shekels or 200
zuz or dinar. This is the sum that is currently stipulated in the Orthodox ketubah. See infra
note 260.
155. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1020. In Goldman, the parties'
own officiating Rabbi stated that "as a liberal Jew, he viewed the ketubah in a symbolic
rather than literal sense." Id. Kenneth himself testified that he regarded the ketubah as
art or poetry. Id. While this may have been a self-serving statement, it probably accu-
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give rise to no civilly enforceable rights because of a clear absence
of contractual intent.' 56 While this factor alone would not necessar-
ily preclude enforcement, at the very least it could and should im-
pose a heavy burden of proof on the party seeking enforcement. t 57
Even assuming that in a given case the terms of the ketubah can
be regarded as giving rise to an enforceable contract, the question
becomes: Contract for what? Certainly, the ketubah contains legally
ascertainable commitments with respect to alimony and property
settlements, 158 but it mentions nothing with respect to the granting
rately reflects the widespread ignorance by the American Jewish community about its
religious traditions.
156. Although actual subjective intent to be bound is not an essential element to en-
force an otherwise valid contract if the other party reasonably believed there was con-
tractual intent, no contract is formed where neither party intended to be bound, or each
party was aware that the other party lacked such intent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 74, § 201. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 88, §§ 7.7-7.13
(discussing the interpretation of contract language); E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in
the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967) (examining the conflicting assumptions
courts make in interpreting contract language).
While the absence of intent to be bound would preclude civil enforcement, it has no
bearing on the obligatory nature of the ketubah under halacha. Although the ketubah is
phrased in the form of a consensual undertaking, in reality its obligations are largely
statutory. Even in the absence of a written ketubah, a husband is still obligated to pro-
vide spousal support and the designated alimony and property settlements. See
SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 66:9. Thus, for the most part, the ketubah
as a document is a confirmation or memorial of religious law, rather than a source of
consensual obligation. Additionally, under Jewish law mental reservations or lack of
intent normally do not avoid expressions of commitment. See generally BABYLONIAN TAL-
MUD, supra note 4, KIDDUSHIN, at 49b; RAMBAM, MISHNA TORAH, supra note 47, HILCHOT
ISHUT 8:6.
157. In In re Marriage of Goldman, the trial court placed heavy reliance on Annette's
recollection of conversations with Kenneth in which the ketubah was described as a con-
tract. See Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1019. Kenneth denied these conversations. See id. In
affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court simply noted that it was well
within the trial court's discretion to determine the credibility and weight of opposing
testimony. Id. at 1021. In most cases, however, there will be virtually no evidence to
support a finding of contractual intent.
158. As early as 1917, the Supreme Court of NewJersey ruled that the property settle-
ment provisions of the ketubah were enforceable as separation agreements despite their
"unusual" terminology. See Goldstein v. Goldstein, 101 A. 249, 249-51 (NJ. 1917). A
more questionable interpretation of the ketubah appears in Wener v. Wener, 301
N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969), aff'd, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). In
Wener, a wife filed for divorce and sought support for a child whom the couple had taken
into their home during their marriage, but had never formally adopted. Id. at 238. In
holding that the husband was primarily liable for the child's support, the court relied in
part both on the agreement in the etubah to perform all "obligations 'as ... prescribed
by [Jewish] religious statutes'" and on Jewish law, which holds the head of a household
who takes a child into his home liable for the child's support. Id. at 240-41.
The Wener decision poses problems on two grounds. First, it is not at all clear that
Jewish law compels support of stepchildren in the absence of an express contract to that
effect. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 114:1. Second, even if it did,
1992] HALACHA, CONTRACT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
of a divorce. Language to the effect that the husband betroths his
wife "in accordance with the laws of Moses and Israel" can hardly
mean a blanket agreement that all aspects of their family life shall be
conducted in accordance with the dictates of Jewish law. No one
would suggest, for example, that if one party failed to observe the
Sabbath or ate nonkosher food, the other party could bring an ac-
tion for damages, or even worse, a suit for specific performance.
Indeed, even an express agreement to this effect arguably could not
be enforced because of the First Amendment.
Apparently, cases like Minkin, Burns, and Goldman employ the
following syllogism:
Major premise: An agreement to marry in accordance
with the laws of Moses and Israel, while imposing no obli-
gation on how the parties will live, does mean that the par-
ties will comply with all halachic obligations pertaining to
the creation and dissolution of their marriage.
Minor premise: In order to dissolve a marriage ac-
cording to halacha, a get must be executed and delivered.
Conclusion: Therefore, the husband must execute a
get whenever the marriage is civilly dissolved because that
is what he agreed to do.
This syllogism is seriously flawed. First, the basis for the major
premise appears to be incorrect. A "marriage in accordance with
the laws of Moses and Israel" is not understood by Jewish law to
connote any type of advance commitment to comply with Jewish di-
vorce procedures. While the requirement to obtain a get does in-
deed apply, it is not because of any agreement to that effect; it is
simply self-executing. It is difficult to see how a court can construe
a clause as requiring compliance with Jewish law, ifJewish law itself
does not so interpret it.
Second, the minor premise is flawed because of a confusion in
the term "obligation." Even if the ketubah constitutes an agreement
to comply with all halachic obligations pertaining to the creation and
dissolution of the marriage, strictly speaking the execution of a get is
normally not an obligation. It is true that no marriage may be
halachically dissolved unless a get is granted, and in that particular
there is no mention of such an obligation in the ketubah and thus, civil recognition of a
halachic imperative cannot be based on contract. Although WVener was affirmed, the Ap-
pellate Division specifically disapproved of the court's reliance on the ketubah. See We-
ner v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); see also Hurwitz v. Hurwitz,
215 N.Y.S. 184, 188-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (enforcing property settlement based on
ketubah).
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sense a get is an "obligatory" step in the process of dissolution. The
get itself, however, is not "obligatory" because the husband in many
cases is under no obligation to dissolve the marriage."' While such
an obligation does exist in cases where the wife is suspected of adul-
tery, in many other cases it may not. The question of whether it
does poses extraordinarily difficult issues of Jewish law that would
invariably entangle the court in complex religious issues beyond its
competence, and indeed, beyond its constitutional authority.'
60
3. First Amendment Concerns.16 1'The First Amendment pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 162 Because the
granting of a get occurs at a ceremony, the validity of which derives
from the strictures of Jewish law, recalcitrant parties have argued
that judicial intervention in securing a get violates their free exercise
rights, which above all require "that religion must be a private mat-
ter,"' 16 3 or alternatively, that judicial intervention constitutes an im-
permissible establishment of religion.
In a pluralistic society, persons with religious beliefs may suffer
various disabilities, disadvantages, or restrictions as compared to
persons not sharing those beliefs. Facially neutral laws of general,
across-the-board applicability may have a significant, varying impact
on the adherents of certain religions, imposing special costs or bur-
dens on their practitioners.' 6 4 What government may or must do
about this situation has long been a conundrum of constitutional
law, a problem arising from the conflicting messages of two portions
of the First Amendment.' 65 The Establishment Clause seems to re-
quire an impenetrable "wall of separation between church and
State"166 necessitating a strictly "hands-off" attitude. 67 The dic-
159. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
160. See infra note 308 (discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
161. The text in this section applies the traditional constitutional standards that have
been employed by the Supreme Court in analyzing establishment and free exercise
claims. These standards are in the process of undergoing reexamination. Current de-
velopments and speculations as to the future are discussed infra Part V.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
163. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
164. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601, 605 (1961) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Sunday closing laws as applied to Sabbath-observingJews who would lose an
extra day of business).
165. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has strug-
gled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other.").
166. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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tates of free exercise, on the other hand, seem to compel the gov-
ernment to structure its programs in a manner that will not
adversely affect or inhibit religious practice.' 68 The inescapable
conflict between the prohibition of establishment and the necessity,
or at least permissibility, of reasonable accommodation-the most
difficult issue of church-state law-has never been definitively
resolved. 169
Scholars have attempted to propose their own analytic
frameworks in reconciling the two clauses, though none of their ap-
proaches has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court.' 70
At one extreme, Professor Philip Kurland has argued that the First
Amendment compels a government stance of strict neutrality; 171 the
government may not use religious criteria "either [to] confer a ben-
efit or to impose a burden" upon individuals. 71 Under Kurland's
approach, it would be constitutionally impermissible to grant reli-
gious exemptions from otherwise valid general legislation. At the
other extreme are commentators who take the position that govern-
mental action to remove barriers or costs associated with religious
exercise is a permissible accommodation.' 73 Yet a third school of
Whether Jefferson himself meant for the wall of separation to be absolutely impregnable
is open to question. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238-56 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that both Jefferson and Madison were in favor of
allowing prayers and religious education on the publicly funded campus of the Univer-
sity of Virginia as long as no activities were compulsory).
167. See Tanina Rostain, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York
Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1152 (1987) ("In situations where government must
choose between infringing upon or facilitating religious exercise, the free exercise
clause requires that ... government choose the latter course.").
168. See id. at 1149.
169. The recent case of Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith
11), 494 U.S. 872 (1990), discussed at length infra Part V, does resolve part of this his-
toric dilemma. It is no longer constitutionally necessary for federal or state legislation
of general applicability to carve out a religious exemption or accommodation. Never-
theless, even after Smith II, such accommodations may be permissible. See Smith, 494
U.S. at 890. It therefore still is necessary to determine at what point reasonable accom-
modation turns into impermissible establishment. Smith 11 partially reformulates the
question but does not dispel it entirely.
170. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 96 (1961) [hereinafter Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court]; see also Paul
A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969); Philip B. Kur-
land, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978).
171. See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, supra note 170, at 96.
172. Id.
173. See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Con-
flict, 41 U. PIr. L. REv. 673 (1980); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1; see also Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
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thought would differentiate based on the type of barrier the govern-
ment is trying to remove, arguing that while the Free Exercise
Clause may indeed compel the removal or mitigation of barriers that
are the products of the government's own laws, the Establishment
Clause prohibits attempts to alleviate religious burdens arising from
societal disadvantage because to do so would impermissibly elevate
religion to a preferred position vis-a-vis the State.' 74
With the exception of some individual justices, no majority
opinion of the Supreme Court has ever adopted an absolute stance
of neutrality. Virtually all would acknowledge that in some cases
free exercise compels, or at least permits, some sort of religious ac-
commodation, either in the form of exemption or even through af-
firmative action.' 75 And when it does, it overrides sub silentio
Establishment Clause concerns.' 76 Moreover, the Court has inti-
mated that even accommodations not constitutionally required by
the Free Exercise Clause may nevertheless not be violative of the
Establishment Clause.177 As one moves further away from an abso-
lutist position, however, line drawing becomes progressively more
difficult. To make matters even more confusing, the establishment
and free exercise cases are analyzed by the Supreme Court under
two different tests with little recognition that both issues are simply
mirror images of each other.1
7 8
a. The Establishment Clause.-In Lemon v. Kurtzman,' 79 the
Supreme Court construed the Establishment Clause to require that
Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260 (1969); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1977).
174. See Rostain, supra note 167, at 1147.
175. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
176. See Rostain, supra note 167, at 1150 n.19.
177. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith 11), 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (indicating that a state or federal legislature may create exemptions
to accommodate individuals whose religious beliefs would not allow them to comply
with a generally applicable law).
178. A notable exception has been Justice O'Connor, who has pointed out that when
evaluating whether legislation that benefits religion is violative of the Establishment
Clause, a key question should be the extent to which it furthers free exercise by remov-
ing government imposed burdens on religion. See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-84
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing to invalidate moment of silence statute for
public schools in Alabama). The Establishment Clause cannot be properly applied with-
out taking into account the concerns and values of free exercise. See id.; infra Subpart
III.B.I.
179. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Although Lemon is still applied in Establishment Clause
cases, there is doubt as to its continuing validity. See infra Subpart V.B.
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any law or judicial order have a secular purpose, have a primary ef-
fect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and not lead to ex-
cessive governmental entanglement with religion. 80 While the
meaning and application of these standards is at best uncertain and
wavering,18 1 they do appear to support the enforceability of agree-
ments to give a get. Whether they would similarly permit implica-
tion of such an obligation from the terms of the ketubah, however,
may be another matter.
Courts have already recognized that Jewish law is in essence a
total legal system rather than a collection of religious dogma.18 2
Thus, halacha is classically divided into commandments "between
man and God" and commandments "between man and man."'l 83
Some courts have enforced get agreements on the somewhat tenu-
ous ground that because the get affects the relationship between
husband and wife, the rule requiring a get is in itself nothing more
than secular law.'8 4 Characterizing as secular the presence of im-
pediments to remarriage that arise solely because a spouse sub-
scribes to a certain set of religious beliefs seems forced.'8 5 In fact,
from the standpoint of Judaism itself, there is no such distinction
between "secular" and "religious" components of the law because
the obligatory nature of both ultimately derives from Divine revela-
tion and belief in the authenticity of Mosaic law and Rabbinical in-
terpretation. Judaic law is "secular" only in the very limited sense
180. Id. at 612-13. For a more thorough discussion of the Lemon test in the context of
its application to a particular statute, see infra Subparts III.B.2; III.B.3.
181. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 817, 826-31 (1984); David F. Schwartz, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.: The Burger
Court and the Establishment Problem, 21 Hous. L. REV. 179 (1984).
182. See, e.g., Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981);
supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
183. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, YOMA, at 85b.
184. This was the stated rationale in Stem v. Stern, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1979); see supra text accompanying notes 124-128; see also In re Marriage
of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ill. App. 1990), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 376 (Ill.
1990) (quoting Rabbis Schwartz and Rackman: "Marriage and divorce are secular, con-
tractual undertakings"); supra text accompanying notes 140-150.
185. Another problem is that if the Jewish laws governing marriage and divorce are
nothing more than secular laws, they should be totally preempted by the forum state's
own laws governing marital dissolution. See EUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 15.4, at 475 (1982). After all, if parties in Maryland were to contract that the
dissolution of their marriage was to be governed by the laws of Missouri, it is clear that
their agreement would have no legal effect in Maryland. See id. There is no particular
reason why the "secular" law of a religious denomination should be accorded any
greater deference. If anything, the Establishment Clause cuts the other way. See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971).
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that it deals with many of the subjects that are commonly dealt with
under nonreligious systems such as contracts, torts, and agency, and
thus bears aspects of similarity that could facilitate comparative
analysis. The real question is not how Judaism within its own inter-
nal value system characterizes a given law or proceeding, but
whether enforcement of that law serves a legitimate secular purpose
as defined by the secular institutions whose assistance is being en-
listed. In short, whether a law serves a "religious" or "secular" pur-
pose must be answered exclusively by secular law standards and
definitions.
Examined in this context, it would appear that agreements to
execute a get may indeed be enforceable. The purpose of such en-
forcement, from the perspective of the judicial system, is secular.
Indeed, for purposes of applying the first factor in Lemon, one may
identify three distinct secular purposes. First, the state has a legiti-
mate interest both in assuring adherence to contracts and in afford-
ing remedies to those aggrieved by a breach. The fact that the
contract itself is concerned with a ceremony that coincidentally has
religious significance to one or both of the parties is immaterial. In
the absence of unconscionability or other public policy restraints,
the parties may agree to do whatever they want. Indeed, it could be
argued that a refusal to enforce such a contract on the grounds that
its content is "religious" constitutes a denial of both free exercise
and equal protection.
Second, the state has a legitimate secular interest in enabling its
citizens to remarry following a decree of dissolution, and in facilitat-
ing the removal of barriers that prevent the exercise of this funda-
mental right. As will be discussed, this interest has furnished the
basis for various legislative attempts to ameliorate the plight of the
agunah even in the absence of a prenuptial agreement.' 8 6 At the
very least, this interest should enable such agreements to be en-
forced. Enforcing such agreements encourages marriage, stabilizes
family life, and protects fundamental rights of privacy and
association.
Third, a deliberate refusal to deliver a get knowing that the
other will be unable to remarry may often constitute intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. Whether that factor alone would jus-
tify state intervention in the form of a tort remedy will be discussed
186. See infra Part III.
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below.187 Suffice it to say, however, that the fact that religion hap-
pens to be the source of the divorcee's belief that she needs a get is
irrelevant. It is well established that taking knowing advantage of
even the irrational or delusional fears of another may be actionable
in tort, 8 8 and religious beliefs should certainly not be on an inferior
footing. By the same token, where one party in the context of an
intimate, confidential relationship has created legitimate expecta-
tions that he will not behave in a manner calculated to cause pain or
distress to the other, the state has a legitimate interest in compelling
him to live up to that expectation. This is essentially the same inter-
est it has in protecting any of its citizens from emotional or dignitary
harms.
In addressing the second prong of Lemon, whether enforcement
of such agreements has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, consider the following example:'8 9 A and B enter into an
agreement in which A agrees to observe the Sabbath in exchange for
a payment of $100 by B. If A reneges on his deal, can B bring an
action for damages or specific performance? Although the ostensi-
ble purpose of state enforcement is secular-promotion of freedom
of contract as a facilitator of social exchange and protection of rea-
sonable expectations-it is fairly certain that awarding damages or
specific performance would indeed constitute an impermissible es-
tablishment of religion because the invariable effect of enforceabil-
ity (even if not the state's purpose) would be the promotion of a
religious ritual or observance.190
An agreement to give a get, however, stands on a different foot-
ing. While it would be inaccurate to characterize a get as "secular"
in the same way as a divorce decree, it does not require a profession
of faith or any act of homage to a Deity, nor does it even necessitate
the personal participation of the spouses. '' The only "effect" of a
get is that recipients who were formerly prohibited from remarrying
within their faiths are now permitted to do so. As such, the effect of
187. See infra Part IV; see also Barbara J. Redman, Jewish Divorce: What Can Be Done in
Secular Courts to Aid the Jewish Woman?, 19 GA. L. REV. 389 (1985).
188. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, § 46, cmt. f, illus. 9-10.
189. The example, with some modifications, is borrowed from Steven F. Friedell, The
First Amendment and Jewish Divorce: A Comment on Stern v. Stem, 18J. FAM. L. 525, 530
(1980).
190. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-10, at 1214 (2d ed.
1988).
191. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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enforcing get agreements is not a promotion or endorsement 92 of a
particular set of beliefs or practices, but a removal of the societal
disabilities and impediments to remarriage that women who sub-
scribe to such beliefs would otherwise suffer. Equalizing the post-
dissolution status of women who hold Orthodox Jewish beliefs with
the status of women who do not puts all persons on an equal footing
by removing these impediments.
The third factor considered in Lemon, excessive entanglement,
regardless of purpose or primary effect, poses a bit more difficulty.
Often described as the most basic and fundamental element in
Lemon's tripartite test,' 93 it has been sharply criticized as "superflu-
ous." 194 Nevertheless, the "entanglement" criterion remains very
much alive. 195
The "excessive entanglement" criterion has been used in two
types of cases. The first involves legislative or administrative pro-
grams that necessitate continual monitoring and interchange be-
tween governmental authorities and religious institutions.' 96 The
two-fold dangers present here include governmental meddling with
the internal operations of religious institutions and the inadvertent
imprimatur of approval that such involvement may suggest to an
outsider. The second category involves cases where courts are
called upon to decide questions of religious practice or doctrine that
are beyond its competence. 97
A court order directing specific performance of a single act that
typically takes less than an hour certainly does not constitute the
type of "excessive entanglement" that the Supreme Court has con-
demned, nor, in the abstract, does it require any court to consider
complex areas of Jewish law.' 98 Here, however, the second concern
of entanglement may lead to a distinction between express agree-
192. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (ad-
vocating the use of an "endorsement" test in analyzing Establishment Clause cases).
193. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 190, at 865.
194. See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring) ("As long as there is a secular legislative purpose, and as long as the pri-
mary effect of the legislation is neither to advance nor inhibit religion, I see no reason
... to take the constitutional inquiry further.").
195. See, e.g., County of Alleghany v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (acknowledging
use of entanglement criterion to address issues surrounding governmental display of
religious symbols); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 695-97 (1989) (applying
entanglement criterion to hold payments made to Church of Scientology for "auditing"
sessions not deductible as charitable contribution under the Internal Revenue Code).
196. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607-11 (1971).
197. E.g. ,Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
198. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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ments and agreements implied from documents such as the ketubah.
To predicate an obligation to give a get on a generalized commit-
ment to effect a marriage in "accordance with the laws of Moses and
Israel" requires the court to engage in sustained investigation as to
what the "laws of Moses and Israel" are and what they require.
Among some of the questions to be considered are the following:
What is the halachic meaning of the vague incantation--"in accord-
ance with the laws of Moses and Israel"? Is it intended to have any
legally binding significance? What are the grounds under which a
husband is obligated to divorce his wife? What methods of compul-
sion are authorized? And from the standpoint of Jewish law, what
actions may a court take in inducing a recalcitrant spouse to act in
accordance with his or her obligation without producing a get
meusah?
Each of these issues is a subject of controversy within the Or-
thodox camp and is addressed in voluminous halachic literature of
hundreds of volumes spanning thousands of years. When one adds
the input of other denominations, it is apparent that a true resolu-
tion of the scope of the obligation of the ketubah is precisely the type
of issue that civil courts should not be called upon to resolve. The
complexity of this type of determination does not seem to have been
appreciated by the courts that summarily decided these matters.
While enforcement of a specific nonliturgical undertaking should be
allowed even where it is an act of religious significance, courts
should avoid inferring and enforcing agreements based on nothing
more than generalized commitments to obey Jewish law.
b. Free Exercise.-Spouses unwilling to grant a get have also ar-
gued that any judgment ordering them to give or receive a get, at a
religious ceremony, conflicts with their free exercise rights. 99
While this argument is occasionally accepted, for the most part free
exercise guarantees should not preclude enforcement. One can
suggest four possible reasons that support this conclusion. First,
civil enforcement is predicated on an express or implied contract
that presupposes freely given consent. Compelling a party to do
nothing more than what that party has already promised hardly of-
fends the spirit of individual autonomy that lies at the root of the
First Amendment. 200
199. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. See also Tribe, supra note 190, § 12-
19, at 841. The free exercise analysis presented here is made in passing and is further
developed infra Part V.
200. See also TRIBE, supra note 190, § 14-3, at 1158-66 (discussing voluntarism and
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Second, in many cases a refusal to participate in the get cere-
mony has nothing to do with either religious belief or moral princi-
ple, but is motivated by either malice or attempted blackmail.2 0 '
Admittedly, this methodology is somewhat risky because it necessi-
tates an inquiry into the sincerity of belief and leads into the morass
of defining "religion" for purposes of the First Amendment. It is
obvious, however, that at least in some cases this does not pose any
great difficulty. 2
0 2
Third, because the get is not a liturgical activity that involves
worship, a profession of faith, or acknowledgement of a Deity, it is
secular rather than religious in character and does not constitute an
infringement on religion.2 °3 Indeed, even those parties who do not
separation as primary values). In theory, this might mean that the Free Exercise Clause
never bars enforcement of a contract against a consenting party, regardless of the reli-
gious nature of the undertaking. Insofar as the Free Exercise Clause is concerned,
therefore, even a contract to pray or to eat Kosher might be enforceable. To the extent,
however, that the promised activity is overtly religious, the agreement could not be en-
forced because of establishment concerns, particularly under the "primary effect" test.
As noted earlier, get agreements do not implicate the Establishment Clause. See supra
notes 179-198 and accompanying text.
201. Thus, the court in Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987),
refused to recognize a free exercise claim where the evidence showed that the husband
was willing to give a get if the price was right. See id. at 400; supra text accompanying
notes 132-136.
202. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (Ill. App. 1990), appeal
denied, 555 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. 1990) (dealing with a husband's free exercise claim by find-
ing that his "intense dislike for Orthodox Judaism . . . did not rise to the level of a
religious belief"). To the extent the Goldman court holds that the individual's belief
system must somehow constitute a "formal religion" to be protected, the holding ap-
pears incorrect. It is well established that honestly held religious beliefs are entitled to
free exercise protections, even if the claimant is not a member of an established religion
and has views that are at odds with his own church. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
Indeed, it is possible that even an atheist may be able to invoke the Free Exercise Clause
though the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue. See Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1975) (stating in dicta that "the individual freedom of con-
science protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious
faith or none at all"). Indeed, simple logic should dictate that just as ajew could not be
compelled to participate in a Christian ceremony, neither should an atheist be com-
pelled to participate in a Jewish one.
Because of these considerations, I find Goldman a much more difficult case than
Burns. In Burns, the husband was clearly playing the extortionist, while in Goldman there
was at least some evidence of ideological opposition to the institution of a get. Compare
Burns, 538 A.2d at 440-41, with Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1021. While the trial court was
free to disbelieve the husband's contentions in Goldman-after all, he had given a get to
his first wife-it seems problematic that the judge can believe him nonetheless and hold
that such ideas do not rise to the level of constitutional protection.
203. A number of courts have in fact characterized the get as a secular, rather than
religious document. See, e.g., Stern v. Stem, 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 7, 1979). Admittedly, however, this line of argument standing alone is hardly coin-
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believe in the institution of get merely consider it superfluous. They
rarely have an ideological or theological belief that is offended by
their participation. Rarely, if ever, does recalcitrance have a princi-
pled, religious basis.
A final rationale is a bit more complex. The Free Exercise
Clause does not exempt a party from undoing the harms caused to
another by the very religious restrictions that the party himself in-
voked, but now repudiates. Agreeing to a religious ceremony im-
poses from the standpoint of halacha certain disabilities and
restrictions on remarriage. It would be inequitable to invoke free
exercise as a protective, exonerating shield against the very harms
that the party had previously created. Just as the First Amendment
cannot be used as a defense to acts that are otherwise criminal or
tortious, °4 so too it cannot be employed as a device for the erection
or maintenance of barriers against the exercise of another's funda-
mental freedoms.
4. Halachic Problems.-Civil enforcement of an agreement to
give a get, whether express or implied from the terms of the ketubah,
while undoubtedly motivated by benign intentions, may ultimately
be a self-defeating proposition. Under Jewish law, a get executed
under duress or compulsion, which includes the order of a non-
rabbinical court, is invalid. The recipient of such a document is still
halachically unable to remarry20 5 and any children born from a sub-
sequent, illicit union will be tainted with the heavy stigma of
mamzeirus. 206 Although the basis of enforceability is ultimately trace-
able to an agreement, the consensus of authority is that even self-
imposed duress precludes execution of a get, particularly when such
pelling. I have previously argued that because both the need for, and effectiveness of, a
get stem from the same unitary halachic-religious system that is the source of all religious
beliefs ofJudaism (i.e., Divine revelation), the execution of a get should not be regarded
as "secular" for the purpose of the Establishment Clause. The mere fact that the get is
nondevotional in nature would not in itself be sufficient to sustain a get agreement from
attacks based on establishment, unless it could be established that enforcement of such
covenants serves distinct secular purposes (which indeed it has). Nevertheless, the
nontheistic nature of the ceremony, while perhaps immaterial with respect to Establish-
ment Clause concerns which focus on state endorsement and entanglement, may be
highly relevant on the issue of free exercise, which above all is designed to protect in-
fringements on religious conscience.
204. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For a more recent treat-
ment, see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith H), 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
205. See supra Subpart I.D.
206. See supra note 48.
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duress could culminate in high fines, and even incarceration, 20 7 well
beyond the scope of the sanction voluntarily chosen.
One possible way around this problem is for a court to struc-
ture its judgment not as a directive to give a get, but rather as an
order to submit to the jurisdiction of the rabbinical court, leaving to
that court the issue of whether or not the get should be executed.
This was the procedure followed in Burns v. Burns,208 and it success-
fully avoids halachic questions. The difficulty with this approach,
however, is that it imposes an obligation that does not follow the
actual language of the agreement (which promises to give a get), and
that language cannot be readily implied from the terms of the
ketubah. In addition, getting the parties to go to the bais din is little
guarantee that they will obey the decision of the bais din once it is
rendered.2 °9
The foregoing conclusion-that judicial enforcement of get cov-
enants may result in an invalid get-is subject to one major qualifica-
tion. An important distinction must be drawn between judicially
ordering affirmative relief against a recalcitrant spouse based on a
promise to grant a get and denying that spouse relief when he or she
seeks benefits under a separation agreement. A negotiated separa-
tion agreement designating the allocation of marital assets may pro-
vide that a spouse's entitlements are conditional on the execution of
a religious divorce. Failure to comply with that condition would bar
any attempt by the violator to enforce judicially the terms of the
agreement, even in those jurisdictions that would not directly order
the execution of a get. To the extent that a spouse is "pressured" to
grant a get in order to secure additional benefits under a separation
agreement, the resulting divorce would not be a get meusah, because
halacha recognizes a clear distinction between acting to avoid physi-
cal or financial harm (where the rules of get meusah apply) and acting
to obtain benefits (where they do not).2 t °
This is true, however, only if the agreement provides a comply-
ing spouse with more benefits than he or she would receive under
207. See In re Morris & Morris, 42 D.L.R.3d 550, 574-75 (Matas, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing the anomaly of a get being invalid precisely because a court ordered that it be
given); Margulies v. Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), appeal
dismissed, 307 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1973) (Nunez, J., dissenting); see also H. Patrick Glenn,
Where Heavens Meet: The Compelling of Religious Divorces, 28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 21 (1980)
("[W]here it is clear that such recognition would not be forthcoming civil courts should
naturally not engage in a pointless exercise .... ").
208. 538 A.2d 438, 440-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
210. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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the jurisdiction's law of equitable distribution absent express agree-
ment and, conversely, where failure to grant a get leaves the recalci-
trant party in no worse a position. To the extent that failure to
execute a get leaves the violator with less than he otherwise would
have had under state law, such an agreement appears indistinguish-
able from any other self-imposed penalty clause, and the execution
of a get under such circumstances would appear to be improper.
The key problem in the prenuptial agreement, therefore, is ha-
lachic rather than secular in nature, and there is little the current
legal system can do to resolve it.
B. Express or Implied Promises to Submit to Rabbinic Jurisdiction
In 1954, Professor Saul Lieberman of the Jewish Theological
Seminary (Conservative) proposed that a new clause be added to the
ketubah.2t t The clause provided that in the event of marital diffi-
culty, the couple would recognize the authority of the bais din of the
Rabbinical Assembly of the Jewish Theological Seminary to "coun-
sel them in the light ofJewish tradition," to "summon either party at
the request of the other," and to impose such terms of compensa-
tion as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to carry
out its decision.2" 2 The Rabbinical Assembly quickly approved this
addendum, although the change has not found favor with the
Orthodox rabbinate-particularly the clause that stipulates a
penalty. 2
13
The theory behind the clause is that even if there are halachic or
constitutional impediments in judicially compelling parties to give
or receive a get, those concerns would not apply where parties are
ordered to submit to the jurisdiction of a freely chosen rabbinic tri-
bunal. Such an agreement is no different in kind than any other
agreement to submit disputes to binding arbitration, which may be
specifically enforced absent fraud or duress. Nor would sanctions
imposed to force someone to go to a bais din constitute compulsion
that would invalidate the get from the standpoint of halacha.
The test of the clause's legal enforceability arose in the cele-
brated case of Avitzur v. Avitzur, 214 the only case to date in which a
211. See ISAAC KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 293 (1979).
212. See id. for a discussion of the proposal from the perspective of the Conservative
movement.
213. For criticism of the Lieberman proposal, see Norman Lamm, Recent Additions to
the Ketubah, 2 TRADITION 93 (1959); A. LEO LEVIN & MEYER KRAMER, NEW PROVISIONS IN
THE KETUBAH (1955).
214. 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983), revg 449 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), cert.
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state's highest court has addressed the validity of prenuptial agree-
ments associated with religious divorces. Boaz and Susan Avitzur
were married in a religious ceremony on May 22, 1966.215 They
signed a ketubah that contained Lieberman's suggested clause.2 16 A
civil divorce was granted to Boaz in 1978.217 In 1980, Susan, who
had not yet received a get, brought an action for specific perform-
ance to compel Boaz to appear before a Rabbinical tribunal to initi-
ate the get process .21  Boaz filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that enforcement of such an agreement constituted an impermissi-
ble and excessive entanglement in religion and violated his own free
exercise rights. 21 9 The Special Term denied the motion, but the
Appellate Division reversed, though not wholly on Boaz's
grounds.22 0 In a four to one decision, the Appellate Division held
that because the agreement was entered into as part of a religious
ceremony and was "liturgical" in nature, there was no legitimate
secular interest that would warrant its enforcement. As far as the
state was concerned, the marital bond was already dissolved. 22 '
Noting that a number of New York cases have enforced a get prom-
ise, the court pointed out that in virtually all of these cases the pro-
vision was incorporated in a civil agreement with no reliance placed
on the ketubah itself.222
The New York Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision,
reversed the Appellate Division and ruled that the Lieberman clause
was enforceable and that Susan's action for specific performance
should be allowed to proceed.223 Writing for the court, Judge
Wachtler stated that there was nothing in law or public policy to
prevent judicial recognition and enforcement of the secular terms of
denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983). Two excellent articles exploring the implications of Avitzur
are Linda S. Kahan,Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise ofAvitzur, 73 GEo. L.J.
193 (1984), and Elizabeth R. Lieberman, Avitzur v. Avitzur: The Constitutional Implications
of Judicially Enforcing Religious Agreements, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 219 (1983).
215. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Avitzur, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
219. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137.
220. See id.
221. Avitzur, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
222. Id.; see Koeppel v. Koeppel, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957); Waxstein v.
Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973); supra notes 90-123 and accompanying text. The only exception
was Stern v. Stern, 5 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1979), a trial
judge's opinion, of which the Appellate Division specifically disapproved in Avitzur. See
449 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
223. See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 139.
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the ketubah (though it was a question of fact whether there was actual
contractual intent).2 24  Characterizing the Lieberman clause as
closely analogous to a typical arbitration agreement, the court con-
cluded that the religious context in which the ketubah was executed
should not deprive it of the same dignity and deference accorded to
any other civil contract, as long as its enforcement violated neither
the law nor public policy of the state.225 While the Establishment
Clause precludes judicial resolution of questions pertaining to reli-
gious law, this type of clause could be enforced "solely upon the
application of neutral principles of contract law" without entangle-
ment in doctrinal or liturgical questions.226
Avitzur is a significant victory for those who seek the help of the
legal system to alleviate the agunah's plight. Indeed, even the Or-
thodox rabbinate who find the Lieberman clause unacceptable could
easily draft a halachically valid substitute that would be equally en-
forceable. 227 The extent of Avitzur's significance, however, should
not be over-exaggerated. The analysis is a bit flawed, or at least
incomplete, and in a four to three decision, there are distinct pos-
sibilities of future reversal on the state or even the federal level.
Furthermore, the court's reliance on the so-called "neutral
principles of contract law" proves too much. The same analogy
could be made about an agreement to pray or observe the Sabbath,
yet it is inconceivable that any court of law would compel a person
to perform an "act of Divine worship" merely because he promised
224. See id. at 138-39.
225. See id. at 138.
226. Id. Although there was a vigorous three-member dissent, it is uncertain whether
their objection was based on the fact that: (1) the ketubah is a religious, rather than
secular document; (2) the obligations of the Lieberman clause are not self-explanatory
and would in fact necessitate in-depth examination ofJewish religious law and doctrine;
(3) the parties lacked true contractual consent; (4) the very notion of ordering someone
to submit to an ecclesiastical authority even under the guise of neutral contract enforce-
ment is offensive to the First Amendment (a proposition that would cast serious doubt
on a whole group of New York cases, not just Stern); or (5) after dissolution, the state no
longer has a legitimate interest in the defunct marital relationship. See id. at 139-42
(Jones, J., dissenting).
227. From the Orthodox perspective, there are two problems with the Lieberman
proposal: it designates a particular bais din that the Orthodox movement considers inva-
lid, and it stipulates an indeterminate monetary penalty that runs afoul of the principle
of asmakhta. Asmakhta is the halachic principle holding that monetary agreements whose
indefiniteness leads only to vague, contingent, or indeterminate commitments do not
give rise to halachically binding obligations. Both of these problems can be eliminated
by drafting an agreement that designates an Orthodox bais din and deletes any reference
to financial penalties. For an agreement drafted along these lines, seeJ. David Bleich, A
Suggested Antenuptial Agreement: A Proposal in the Wake of Avitzur, J. OF HALACHA & CON-
TEMP. Soc'v, Spring 1984, at 25, 38-39.
363
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to do so. A possible demarcation point may lie in the difficulties of
enforcement. While ordering someone to pray may indeed not be
violative of free exercise because the person had agreed to do so, a
court would be unable to determine compliance with its order (and
impose follow-up sanctions) without extensive involvement in reli-
gious doctrine. As such, issuing an order that entails in-depth doc-
trinal inquiry "excessively entangles" the judiciary in religious law, a
violation of the Establishment Clause. By contrast, the court may
have thought that ordering parties to submit their disputes to a bais
din does not necessitate such an inquiry. Alternatively, the court
may have reasoned that while prayer and Sabbath observance are
"religious acts," going to a bais din is not.
Both of these distinctions are open to question. It is true that
no court should issue an order that it will not subsequently be able
to enforce without excessive involvement in the resolution of reli-
gious doctrine. Such difficulties, however, may be equally present
under the Lieberman clause. Assume that the court directs the par-
ties to respond to the summons of the bais din by treating the ketubah
as an arbitration agreement. Assume further that at a later point in
time, Susan files a motion to have Boaz declared in contempt for
failure to appear. The trial court will then presumably issue a notice
to show cause why Boaz should not be held in contempt. At any
later contempt hearing, a number of issues can be raised: the mean-
ing of "responding" to a summons (personal appearance or through
writing), the necessary content of such a response, evidentiary stan-
dards, or allegations of disqualification due to bias. Presumably, be-
cause the parties agreed to a bais din, these matters would be
determined by Jewish law, and yet the court, in the exercise of its
contempt function, would have to consider them. If, in lieu of hala-
cha, the court applies secular standards in judging the propriety of
the internal procedures of a Rabbinical court, the interference and
entanglement with religious institutions are even greater. While or-
dering the parties to "respond" to the summons of a bais din may
not in itself be an "establishment of religion," the follow-up en-
forcement procedures may well raise severe constitutional conflicts.
There is little sense in issuing orders that the court may not consti-
tutionally be able to enforce. 28
228. The notion that at least some arbitration agreements invite excessive entangle-
ments with religion underlies an earlier case, Pal v. Pal, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974). In Pal, a husband had obtained a civil divorce from his wife. Id. at 672. In
an open-court stipulation later incorporated into the judgment of divorce, the parties
agreed to submit to a rabbinical tribunal on the question of whether the husband should
[VOL. 51:312
1992] HALACH., CONTRACT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The assumption that responding to the summons of an ecclesi-
astical court is not a "religious" act is equally questionable on free
exercise grounds. Submitting to the authority of a tribunal is a tacit
declaration that the tribunal is empowered to resolve particular mat-
ters. If the source of the tribunal's empowerment is a religious law,
it follows that submission to its authority is an acknowledgement of
the binding force of the religion. At least on one level, then, while
no act of overt worship is required, enforcement of rabbinical arbi-
tration clauses touches at least the periphery of free exercise
concerns.
On balance, however, I do not disagree with the court's holding
in Avitzur. Certainly, the fact that an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment appears in a document commonly associated with a religious
ceremony should be of no constitutional significance, though it may
go to the issue of contractual intent, a question not susceptible to
summary resolution. As far as the First Amendment is concerned,
the substance rather than the form of the undertaking should be
controlling. Moreover, as noted earlier in connection with get
agreements, there are a number of arguments that can be made to
sustain the constitutionality of enforcing a Lieberman-type ketubah.
Nevertheless, by placing primary reliance on "neutral principles of
contract law," the court in Avitzur failed to explore, and thereby ad-
dress, the establishment and free exercise concerns that may be ad-
versely affected. As is evident from the case of the person who
contracts to pray, it is just not true that as long as the court orders a
person to do no more than he promised, there are no constitutional
difficulties. In enforcing undertakings that have some religious
initiate the get process and abide by a Lieberman-like clause. Id. at 672-73. The agree-
ment did not specify a particular bais din, but stated that the tribunal would be chosen by
each of the parties designating a rabbi of their choice and the two rabbis then choosing a
third-a well-recognized halachic alternative. Id. at 672; see SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note
15, HOSHEN MISHPAT 13:1. The stipulation further provided that if either of the parties
failed to choose a rabbi within one week or if the two rabbis failed timely to choose the
third, the court would select a competent rabbi as the third member. Pal, 356 N.Y.S.2d
at 673 (Martuscello,J., dissenting). A bais din was initially assembled without the aid of a
court, but the husband's designated rabbi later withdrew. Id. Upon the wife's applica-
tion, the Special Term designated the "neutral" member as the husband's representa-
tive and directed the two to choose a third. Id. at 672-74. This order was reversed by
the court's summary holding that the Special Term had no authority to convene a
Rabbinical tribunal. See id. at 673.
While Avitzur makes no reference to Pal, in all probability Pal continues to be good
law. Allowing a court to enforce a rabbinical arbitration agreement is a far cry from
giving the court the authority, even in cases of deadlock, to determine a bais din's com-
position. Nevertheless, the same entanglement concerns that justify reversal of the trial
court's decision in Pal apply, at least in some degree, to Avitzur.
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overtones, it is not enough to ask whether the parties agreed. A
comprehensive approach necessitates the examination of a number
of factors: the substance of the agreement; the level of potential
entanglement in religious doctrine, both in the formulation of the
order and in follow-up enforcement measures; possible intrusions
into religious autonomy and self-governance; the appearance of ac-
cording religious institutions or religious law favorable, preferred
status; and infringements of religious liberty. While contractarian
analysis is one useful strand in formulating criteria for enforcement,
these other factors must be considered as well. As noted, compel-
ling submission of disputes to a bais din implicates concerns of both
entanglement and autonomy, neither of which the Avitzur court fully
addresses. As an exposition of constitutional law, the Avitzur opin-
ion leaves much to be desired.229
A second observation is that the Avitzur case fails to address the
monetary penalties aspect of the Conservative ketubah. Assume, for
example, that one party refuses to appear after being summoned
and the bais din imposes a monetary fine. If we accept the analogy to
arbitration agreements, in all probability the fine would not be re-
coverable in a court of law. Arbitrators are normally not authorized
to impose their own penalties for failure to submit to their jurisdic-
tion or to obey their rulings.23 0 Nor can the parties agree in ad-
vance to the payment of such penalties under basic principles of
contract law. The exclusive remedy for breach of a contract to arbi-
trate is an action for specific performance, which in turn would be
enforceable by imprisonment or fines to be determined by a court of
law. It is the judiciary, therefore, rather than the bais din, that deter-
mines the ultimate penalties for noncompliance.
A crucial question raised by Avitzur is where we go from here.
Technically, Avitzur only requires the parties to respond to the sum-
mons of a bais din. 2 3 1 Presumably, if a party fails to respond, the
court may then impose sanctions for civil contempt. Responding to
229. The court was preoccupied with dispelling the notion that the ketubah was a "li-
turgical" document, whose terms were not enforceable in civil court-the basis for the
Appellate Division's decision. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138-39 (N.Y.
1983), rev' 449 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983). This,
however, is a "red herring" argument based on form rather than substance, and is the
least significant of the constitutional issues that could be raised. Unfortunately, the
terms of the debate were largely set by the Appellate Division's reliance on this formal-
ity, which then determined the direction of the appellate court's opinion. See id. at 137.
230. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1173 (1965); MARTIN
DOMRE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 37.00, at 493 (1984).
231. See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 139.
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a summons, however, is not the same as carrying out the bais din's
order. The Avitzur court pointedly left open the question of whether
the wife may go back to court and compel compliance with the bais
din's decree, if the husband has ignored the bais din order to execute
the get.2 3 2 A number of commentators take the view that Avitzur per-
mits nothing more than forcing the parties to appear before the bais
din, and that the decision would not compel enforcement of either
an express agreement to give a get or the order of a bais din to give a
get entered after submission of a dispute. 33 They argue that the
execution of a get is a ceremony of religious significance that no
court can directly order.2 34 This is probably an overly narrow read-
ing of the court's holding, for several reasons. In the first place,
although admittedly Avitzur did not directly address the question,
there is at least some lower court authority to support the argument
that even agreements to execute a get may be specifically en-
forced,23 5 at least when such agreements are explicit.
Second, under the court's own contract analysis, as incomplete
as it may be, there is no relevant distinction between agreements to
give a get and agreements to submit to rabbinic arbitration.23 6 In
both cases, a party is simply being forced to do what he agreed to
do. Indeed, mandating appearance before a bais din for purposes of
dispute resolution on the issue of a get may be considerably more
invasive than directly ordering the execution of a get. A get typically
can be executed in less than an hour, while a contested proceeding
before a bais din may take several days and involve numerous inquir-
ies into intimate details of marital life.23 7
Third, because the court characterizes the bais din clause as akin
to an arbitration agreement, not only will specific performance be
granted to compel the parties to submit their dispute to the arbitra-
tor, but the arbitration order may be specifically enforced as well.238
Thus, insofar as state law is concerned, the same mechanisms that
can be employed to bring the parties before the bais din may then be
utilized to secure the get.
Once again, however, as was true with direct agreements to give
232. See id. at 141.
233. See, e.g., NEWSLETrER OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, Fall 1983, at 1, 2.
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 92-150 and accompanying text.
236. See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39.
237. For a good informal description of how a bais din conducts its examination of the
parties, see EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 39-46.
238. See DOMKE, supra note 230, § 30.01, at 441. Technically, the court will judicially
confirm the arbitration decision, and then order that it be carried out.
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gittin, serious halachic concerns are raised. 239 A get issued pursuant
to the order of a secular court that provides sanctions for noncom-
pliance is invalid as a get meusah, or coerced get. 2"° There is one ma-
jor exception to this rule, however. If a secular court does nothing
more than compel obedience to the preexisting decision of a
rabbinic tribunal, the get is valid.24 1 On its face, this renders the
Avitzur approach a seemingly perfect solution to the problem. Com-
pelling the parties to go to a bais din certainly raises no meusah prob-
lem, and enforcing the bais din's order to give a get is similarly
acceptable under the rule cited above. This makes the Avitzur ap-
proach far more preferable than the expedient of direct agreement.
Unfortunately, the matter is a bit more complicated and can
only be understood in the context of the overall powers of a bais din
as defined by halacha. In an ideal halachic system, a bais din is able to
compel compliance with its orders through a variety of sanctions in-
cluding fines, imprisonment, corporal punishment, and even threats
242 Miof execution. The Mishna makes abundantly clear that these gen-
eral enforcement powers apply to get orders as well.243 The early
rabbinic commentators noted that permitting a bais din to compel
the granting of a get is ostensibly inconsistent with the principle that
a get must be given willingly. These commentators provided a vari-
ety of solutions, the most well known of which is suggested by Mai-
monides. 244 However this inconsistency may be resolved, it is clear
that compulsion pursuant to a valid order of a bais din does not con-
stitute an invalidating cause.245
Upon what grounds a bais din can order the execution of a get is
a matter of great dispute and considerable uncertainty. Certain
cases are described as "kofin" ("we force"), and certain cases are
described as "yotzee" ("he must divorce").246 According to many
authorities, the extensive enforcement powers of a bais din, includ-
ing corporal punishment and incarceration, may be employed only
in the comparatively few circumstances that are described as kofin-
type cases.247 With respect to yotzee cases, while the husband is in-
239. See supra notes 205-210 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Subpart I.D.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
242. See, e.g., SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, HOSHEN MISHPAT 11:1, 97:15; id., YORE
DE'AH 334:43.
243. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, GrrriN, at 88b.
244. See supra note 79.
245. See supra note 80.
246. For an explanation of the terms, see supra note 80.
247. See supra note 80.
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deed under a religious and moral obligation to give his wife a get,
and the bais din may issue an order directing him to do so, such an
order may not be enforced by physical or financial sanctions, but
only by moral suasion and appeals to conscience (which, in a halachic
society, may be considerably more potent than they are today). 248
According to these opinions, any use of force or coercion even for
the purpose of enforcing the order of the bais din will still render the
get invalid if the order was only on the level of yotzee. 249 The notion
of a court issuing an order that cannot be effectively enforced may
strike us as strange, but makes perfect sense if we remember that
halachic judges were also the religious and spiritual leaders of their
communities and, as such, could issue directives reflective of moral
commitment and aspiration.
Moreover, there is indeed a principle that states that a non-Jew-
ish court may enforce the decision of a Jewish court without invali-
dating the get.250 This last principle, however, must be read in light
of the preceding rules. Where a secular judicial system is acting as
the surrogate enforcer for the bais din, the scope of permissible coer-
cion that may be employed may not exceed that degree which is per-
mitted to be exercised by the bais din itself in an ideal halachic world.
Assume, for example, that a bais din issues an order directing a hus-
band to divorce his wife, but the grounds established would only
justify a decree of yotzee, rather than kofin. In such a case, were the
bais din itself to fine or imprison the person to compel his compli-
ance, the get would be rendered invalid.2 5 ' It is obvious that resort-
ing to secular enforcement would produce the same result.
In short, Avitzur is an imperfect solution. Assuming its constitu-
tional validity, it does assure that the parties may be forced to go to
a bais din.252 For parties who are religiously indifferent, once they
are brought in front of a bais din, the bais din may in fact be able to
exercise moral suasion, or generate community pressure. The de-
termined get resister, however, may simply refuse to obey the bais
din's order; unless the circumstances would permit the entry of
a kofin directive, specific performance would be halachically
impossible.2
53
248. See supra note 81.
249. See supra note 80.
250. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, GrrrIN, at 88b.
251. See supra note 80.
252. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. 1983), revg 449 N.Y.S.2d 83
(App. Div. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
253. Furthermore, Avitzur works only if the parties have executed an agreement to
that effect. There has been widespread reluctance to execute this type of prenuptial
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The Avitzur case can aid the plight of women only in tandem
with a halachic re-examination of the grounds that permit judicially
ordered divorces. A number of studies suggest the possibility of ha-
lachic expansion,2 54 though the authors rarely make clear whether
they are expanding the kofin category or only the yotzee category. 55
If they seek to do the latter, their proposals accomplish very little. It
should be noted that this is an area that demands rabbinical consen-
sus; individual courage, resourcefulness, and ingenuity play little or
no role. If individual rabbis or batei din were to execute gittin that
were unacceptable to other segments of the religious community,
this would create a catastrophe of divisiveness-where Jews who
have been divorced in accordance with views of one bais din are still
deemed halachically married according to the views of another bais
din. As a result, their children and all future issue from a second
union would be tainted irrevocably with the status of mamzer. Whole
segments of religiously observant Jews would be unable to inter-
marry with each other.256 As a matter of common sense, no ques-
tionable procedure in executing a get or in seeking civil enforcement
should ever be employed until it achieves broad-based consensus
within all segments of the knowledgeable halachic community.
agreement based on the belief that discussing divorce mars the joys of the wedding.
Suffice it to say, however, that the ketubah itself contains alimony provisions, and as Ethics
of the Fathers reminds us, "Who is wise? He who anticipates the future." ETHICS OF THE
FATHERS 4:1. Couples should be encouraged to sign such agreements; it may avoid
much grief later. Nevertheless, Avitzur is not a panacea, and a determined get resister
can always find a way out.
254. The best of these is SHLOMO RISKIN, WOMEN AND JEWISH DIVORCE: THE REBEL-
LIOUS WIFE, THE AGUNAH, AND THE RIGHT OF WOMEN TO INITIATE DIVORCE IN JEWISH
LAW: A HALAKHIC SOLUTION (1989). See also HAUT, supra note 116. Riskin's conclusions
are criticized in two articles: Tzvi Gartner, Problems of a Forced Get, J. OF HALACHA &
CONTEMP. SOC'Y 118 (1985); Tzvi Gartner, Book Review, JEWIsH ACTION, Spring 1990,
at 70.
255. Riskin fails to address this issue at all. None of his arguments support expansion
of kofin orders.
256. To some extent, this has already occurred in the Reform movement, which no
longer requires a get. See supra note 5. As a result, intermarriage between Reform and
Orthodox Jews has been curtailed because some marriage, perhaps of a great-grandpar-
ent long ago, was not terminated with a get, thereby resulting in the children of a second
union being labelled illegitimate. This result is especially heartbreaking when a descen-
dant from this union is desirous ofjoining Orthodoxy and then discovers, to his chagrin,
that he bears the stigma of mamzer. As a result, many Reform Rabbis counsel their con-
gregants to obtain a get to avoid later complications for offspring. There is also a na-
tional organization, KAYAMA, based in New York, whose goal is to educate the general
Jewish public about the need for a get (even for irreligious nonbelievers) and to arrange
gittin at low cost. See Toby Bulman Katz, Jewish Divorce and Jewish Unity, AMIT WOMEN
(Jan.-Feb. 1989). Indeed, I am personally aware of KAYAMA arranging a get within two
hours.
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C. The Use of Prenuptial Support Agreements
Another relatively simple device of indirectly encouraging the
granting of a get is the drafting'of a prenuptial support agreement.
Under Jewish law, a husband is obligated to provide his wife with
support either in kind or in money.25 7 Although this general obliga-
tion is spelled out in the ketubah, it is also halachically mandated and
exists independent of any written document. 258 Claims for spousal
support are enforceable during the life of the marriage based on the
bais din's determination of custom, the standards to which the par-
ticular woman is accustomed (both pre- and post-marriage), and the
cost of living in that particular locale.259 Once a marriage has been
terminated by divorce, however, halacha recognizes no continuing
support obligations outside of the relatively paltry one time ketubah
payment of 200 zuz 26 and any other additional sums voluntarily as-
sumed. Alimony in the sense of continuing support is an institution
unknown to the halacha.
In the State of Israel, as part of their broad authority over ques-
tions of personal status, rabbinic courts today still have jurisdiction
to adjudicate support claims.2 6 1 A common practice employed by
these courts when faced with the specter of a recalcitrant husband
refusing to give a get is to enter a money judgment for an unusually
high level of support, sometimes as much as $250 a day. Because
the only way the support obligation can be terminated is through
dissolution of the marital bond, this judgment creates significant
pressure to execute a get.262
This approach appears questionable for a number of reasons.
First, it is unclear that the imposition of a money judgment has a
significant deterrent or channelling effect because of exemption
laws, concealment of assets, and like factors. Especially if the judg-
ment is clearly beyond the husband's capacity to pay, it may not
257. SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 70:1.
258. Id.
259. RABBI BEN ZION SHARESHEVSKY, DINAI MISHPACHA [FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL) 117-25
(2d ed. 1976).
260. See supra note 154. The zuz was a silver coin that contained approximately 0.2
ounces of pure silver. Two hundred zuz today equals the market price of 40 ounces of
silver-approximately $320.
261. See SHARESHEVSKY, supra note 259, at 10-15.
262. See Getzel Ellinson, Siruv Latet Get, 69 SINAI 135 (1971). For earlier precedents
utilizing the imposition of support obligations as a mechanism to indirectly compel a get,
see RABBI MEIR POSNER [BAIT MEIR] (19th century Germany), EVEN HAEZER 154:1;
RABBI SHMUEL HALEVI, NACHALAT SHIVA 9:14. A more recent endorsement of this ap-
proach appears in 2 OTZAR HAPOSKIM, supra note 54, at 8-16 (opinions of Chief Rabbis
Herzog and Uziel); Tzvi Gartner, For the Benefit of Agunas, 16 MORIAH 79 (1988).
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carry any weight. Second, because only husbands are responsible
for the support of their wives and not vice-versa, the proposal does
nothing to alleviate the plight of the small, but significant, number
of men who are unable to remarry because of their wives' refusal to
accept a get.
Most critical of all, there is a distinct possibility that a get exe-
cuted in order to escape an unreasonably exorbitant support obliga-
tion would be halachically invalid as a get meusah. An inordinately
high support obligation not based on need, prevailing custom, or a
prior standard of living appears to be nothing more than a disguised
penalty for the nonexecution of a get. Although batei din do have the
authority to impose coercive sanctions, this is true only in specially
defined circumstances.263 When these conditions are not present,
even court-imposed penalties render the get invalid. While there is
considerable disagreement over what those circumstances might be,
by definition the "support obligation" theory is utilized when coer-
cion is no longer an halachically acceptable option. By taking into
account factors that are extraneous to the general determination of
support, the support order itself becomes a de facto penalty,
thereby rendering it halachically invalid. This is true especially
where the order conditions the amount payable on compliance with
a bais din, makes specific reference to a get, or increases the amount
for every week the husband refuses to give a get.
Finally, under halacha, the husband is entitled to his wife's earn-
ings in exchange for supporting his wife. 26 While the wife has the
exclusive option to forego support and elect to keep her earn-
26ings, 65 she cannot press a support claim and at the same time hold
on to her own money. 66 In effect, then, any support claim asserted
by the wife would have to be reduced by the amount of earnings she
collected that rightfully belonged to her husband. In other words,
the husband would assert his rights by way of set-off or counter-
claim. In the event the wife's earnings exceeded her support claim,
she would have no claim at all and would simply forego support.
The basic structure of this proposal, however, can be easily
modified to satisfy at least some of these objections. While halacha
mandates a certain minimum level of support, there is nothing that
prevents the parties from agreeing to a higher level. Furthermore,
263. See supra note 81.
264. SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 80:1 (codifying the rule of BABY-
LONIAN TALMUD, supra note 4, KETUBOTH, at 59b).
265. Id., EVEN HAEZER 69:3.
266. Id.
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halacha recognizes the power of the husband to renounce any claim
to his wife's earnings.267 The parties could enter into a prenuptial
agreement stipulating a high level of marital support for the periods
of time that they do not share "bed and board" coupled with a
waiver of the husband's claim to earnings. The agreement should
further stipulate that it remains in effect only as long as the parties
are halachically married; the designated amount is not designed to
function as post-dissolution alimony but as spousal support. Be-
cause the agreement would be limited to marital support, it auto-
matically ceases to be operative upon the granting of a get; therein
lies its effectiveness as an incentive. To avoid characterization as a
penalty, the stipulated amount should also be high enough to create
an incentive to grant a get, but nonetheless bear some reasonable
relationship to support. The husband must have the alternative of
payment in lieu of a get ;268 and in no event should the amount be
increased with the husband's continued recalcitrance.
This scheme ensures that the agreement is halachically accepta-
ble and removes the taint of coercion from any resulting get. Not all
men will respond to indirect monetary sanctions, but undoubtedly
some will. Moreover, on some level support agreements may be
more effective than other types of penalties because the benefits
flow directly to the aggrieved spouse. While a truly spiteful hus-
band might well prefer incarceration or a large fine to granting his
wife a get, it is doubtful that he would regard paying his wife a large
sum of money in the same favorable light. Admittedly, this type of
agreement does not assist the victimized husband whose wife re-
fuses to accept a get. At best, he is relieved of his contractual sup-
port obligation, but has no affirmative claim against his wife.
Nevertheless, victimized husbands are a small part of the problem
and in many cases have alternatives not available to women. 69
This proposal is as easily adaptable to the United States as it is
in Israel. Anglo-American law, however, poses two unique difficul-
ties. First, in most states, divorced spouses may obtain judgments
for alimony. 270 To the extent that a recalcitrant husband would be
267. SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 15, EVEN HAEZER 80:18.
268. Technically, because separation agreements are specifically enforceable, the hus-
band has three options-payment, get, or imprisonment. Execution of a get to escape
incarceration does not qualify as an "execution under duress" where payment is a rea-
sonable alternative. Where payment is an unreasonable alternative, however, the get is
considered executed under duress. The concept of "genuine choice" is developed in 2
MosEs BEN YOSEF TRANI, supra note 83, at no. 138. But cf. 1 id. at no. 22.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56.
270. Texas remains the only state whose statutes do not permit the award of alimony.
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required to pay his wife alimony even after he grants her a get, the
contractually assumed support obligation entered prior to the get
would have little effect on his decision. In order to generate incen-
tives for the granting of a get, the stipulated sum applicable for the
period prior to the granting of a get must be considerably larger
than any anticipated alimony award. This may create difficulties. As
noted, if the sum is too large it may constitute a disguised penalty
affecting the validity of a get; if no larger than the alimony (which in
itself is based on support needs), it no longer serves as an incentive.
Presumably, however, some amount in the middle could satisfy all
requisite criteria, particularly in jurisdictions where alimony awards
are parsimonious, where the wife's economic situation is favorable
enough so that her alimony award would be low, or where alimony
would be awarded in favor of the husband. 271
The second problem is a bit more difficult to resolve. Essen-
tially, the agreement is tantamount to a prenuptial separation agree-
ment specifying a fixed sum for spousal support for a designated
period until the execution of a religious divorce. The period in
question may cover time before the granting of the civil divorce as
well as afterward, in which case the agreement also covers alimony.
Separation and support agreements, however, are always reviewable
by the court to determine fairness.2 72 The net result is that the stip-
ulated amount may be regarded by a common-law court as a penalty
and therefore not enforceable.273
If a financial obligation turns out to be unenforceable, it of
course can no longer operate as an inducement to act. Neverthe-
less, such an agreement may still serve a useful purpose. An other-
wise recalcitrant party may well prefer to grant a get immediately
rather than face the prospect of a large civil liability that he may or
may not be able successfully to challenge. Thus, the very existence
of the agreement, whether it ultimately proves enforceable, may be
sufficient to produce the desired result.
But see Byrick v. Byrick, 601 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (holding that although
the court may not award alimony, it may approve and enforce an agreement for such
support executed by the parties).
271. For a general discussion of the factors courts consider in setting alimony awards,
see 3 FAMILY AND LAW PRACTICE §§ 35.01-35.06 (Arnold Rutkin, ed. 1985).
272. See HOMER CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 16.13,
at 557 (2d ed. 1988).
273. The court may also consider the factors enumerated above that negate a get as
meusah when determining whether the award is truly a penalty, but this is not certain. See
supra text accompanying notes 262-263.
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III. THE NEW YORK GET LAW: PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATION OR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT?
A. General Operation of the Statute
In 1983, responding to the strong urgings of the Orthodox Jew-
ish Community, 74 New York added section 253 to its Domestic Re-
lations Law.2 75 Popularly known as the "get law," it is designed to
ensure that persons who do not give or receive gittin will be unable
to receive the benefits of a civil divorce.2 76 Applicable only to mar-
274. See infra note 276.
275. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986). Section 253 was amended exten-
sively by the New York legislature in 1984. See 1984 N.Y. Laws, ch. 945, § 1.
The enactment of the statute aroused considerable furor in both the legal commu-
nity and the media. Representative articles in a somewhat polemical vein include a
three-part series: Nat Hentoff, The Day Mario Cuomo Shortened the First Amendment, ViL-
LAGE VOICE, Sept. 6, 1983, at 6; Hentoff, supra note 6, at 6; Nat Hentoff, Mario Cuomo
Flunks Introductory Constitutional Law, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 20, 1983, at 5 [hereinafter
Hentoff, Cuomo Flunks]; Madeline Kochen, Constitutional Implications of New York's Get Stat-
ute, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 27, 1983; Nathan Lewin, The Constitutional Validity of New York's Get
Statute, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 16, 1983, at 1.
276. The dominant force in getting this legislation passed was the Agudath Israel or-
ganization, a political action and social service group under the auspices of the Ortho-
dox movement. Aware of the so-called agunah crisis for a number of years, Agudath
Israel sponsored an all-day conference in 1980 at which rabbis, attorneys, and legal aca-
demics discussed ways in which the problem could be addressed in a manner that was
both halachically and constitutionally sound. The central concept of the get law, that the
removal of barriers to remarriage following a get was a legitimate secular interest worthy
of government protection, emerged from that meeting.
An earlier draft of the bill authored by Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law
School-containing provisions for compulsory arbitration on the issue of compliance-
was introduced in 1981. Correspondence with Agudath Israel, and conversations with
Nathan Lewin, Esq. (principal draftsman of the Act). Mr. Lewin was also kind enough to
make available his voluminous correspondence concerning the bill, which provided use-
ful and enlightening background material, on file with author [hereinafter Lewin File].
The bill was overwhelmingly approved by both houses of the New York State Legisla-
ture. Nevertheless, Governor Carey expressed strong reservations regarding the consti-
tutionality of the bill and, to avoid an anticipated veto, the sponsors withdrew their bill
for further study. See Lewin File.
A revised bill authored by Nathan Lewin was introduced in 1983, and eliminated the
arbitration panels, relying instead on a verified affidavit. See Lewin File. It again sailed
through both houses of the legislature and was signed by Governor Cuomo in August
1983. See Lewin File. While aware of the constitutional objections raised by the New
York Civil Liberties Union, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform),
and the American Jewish Congress, Governor Cuomo stated that he found "no impel-
ling precedent" to indicate that the bill was unconstitutional. See Cuomo Signs Law To
Block Misuse ofJewish Divorce, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 10, 1983, at 1. " 'If there was such a prece-
dent, I would defer to it . . . [but] [gliven the clarity of the need, the efficiency of this
statutory solution and the uncertainty of the constitutional objection, I approve the mea-
sure.' " Id. (quoting Governor Cuomo). He then concluded somewhat disingenuously
that if there is a constitutional impediment he was sure that "our excellent courts will
make that clear in due time"--an approach that some critics maintained was an abdica-
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riages solemnized by a religious ceremony, the statute provides that
no party to a marriage may obtain a judgment of annulment or di-
vorce unless the party alleges in the verified complaint that to the
best of his or her knowledge, the party has taken, or prior to entry of
judgment will take, all "steps solely within his or her power to re-
move any barrier to the defendant's remarriage following the annul-
ment or divorce," or that the defendant has waived in writing the
need for such steps to be taken.277 In the event the verified com-
plaint merely contains a statement of intention concerning future
compliance, the court must defer entering final judgment until the
plaintiff files with the court and serves on the other party a sworn
statement of actual compliance.2 78 The court rendering the divorce
judgment has no authority to inquire into the truth of any declara-
tion made in the sworn statement or complaint, but the submission
of a knowingly false declaration may give rise to a criminal prosecu-
tion for perjury. 279
Because the operation of the statute is somewhat complex, it
may be helpful to illustrate its workings through the situation it was
designed to address. Assume a husband desires to obtain a civil di-
vorce from his wife, but out of spite or blackmail he refuses to give
her a get. Under her beliefs as a Jew, the wife will be unable to re-
marry. The husband will not be able to obtain the benefits of a civil
divorce without filing a sworn statement that he has already re-
moved any "barriers to remarriage" the other spouse faces. 28 0 Be-
cause "barriers to remarriage" includes "religious or conscientious
restraints or inhibitions, ' 2 8' the failure to execute a get clearly quali-
fies as such a "barrier" and the husband cannot truthfully file such
an affidavit until a get is granted.28 2
The statute is very limited, covering a narrow category of cases
and providing a fairly limited protective remedy. Under the statute,
a court never directly orders the husband to comply with religious
tion of the executive's legal responsibility to uphold the constitution. Id.; see Hentoff,
Cuomo Flunks, supra note 275. Since 1983, model get bills have been introduced in Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, and NewJersey, though none of these propos-
als have been enacted. Telephone Interview with David Zweibel, Esq., General Counsel
of Agudath Israel (Dec. 1991).
277. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(2) (McKinney 1986).
278. See id. § 253(3)(i).
279. Under New York law, making a sworn "apparently false statement" is a "Class E"
felony punishable by a prison term not to exceed four years. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 70.0 2 (e), 210.40 (McKinney 1986). But see infra note 339.
280. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(4).
281. Id. § 253(6).
282. See id.
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law. It merely tells the husband that he will be unable to obtain a
civil divorce until he complies, or at least alleges under oath that he
has complied with religious law. If the husband is willing to forego
the option of a civil divorce, he is perfectly free to leave his wife
stranded. Indeed, even if the wife were to seek a civil divorce
against a recalcitrant husband, the affidavit requirement would not
be triggered; the obligation is imposed only on the plaintiff, not the
defendant.283 Assuming a stranded wife would eventually want to
take some steps to protect her legal rights, therefore, the dictates of
section 253 could be avoided by a recalcitrant husband simply bid-
ing his time.
Even when the husband is the divorce plaintiff, he will still be
able to obtain relief by filing a false affidavit. Under subdivision 9 of
section 253, the court may not inquire into the truthfulness of the
allegations contained in the affidavit except in the context of a per-
jury prosecution under subdivision 8.284 While the relationship of
subdivisions 8 and 9 is not clear, the apparent meaning is that the
court may not withhold the granting of a divorce on the grounds of
evidence that the affidavit is fraudulent.2 83 The court's only re-
sponse is to forward such evidence to the district attorney for crimi-
nal prosecution.286 While it is difficult to imagine a court permitting
an obvious fraud, it is clear that the defendant cannot seek an evi-
dentiary hearing on the merits. Thus, whatever protective force the
statute has depends on the in terrorem effect of the criminal justice
system and the vigilance of victimized spouses invoking that system.
Furthermore, the statute only applies where the original mar-
riage was solemnized through a religious ceremony. It has no appli-
cation to marriages that were effected civilly. 28 7 Moreover, by
defining "barriers to remarriage" as those barriers that exist "under
the principles held by the clergyman or minister who has solem-
nized the marriage, ' 288 the statute requires the plaintiff to allege a
granting of a get only when the original marriage ceremony was per-
formed by an Orthodox or Conservative Rabbi.289 In most cases,
this poses no problem because if the wife is still an adherent of Re-
283. See id. § 253(2).
284. See id. § 253(8), (9).
285. See id. § 253(9).
286. See id. § 253(8). But see infra text accompanying notes 292-294.
287. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(1).
288. See id. § 253(6).
289. See Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253, at 860-
61 (McKinney 1986) (explaining difficulties presented by § 253(6) relating to an individ-
ual clergyman's beliefs and availability).
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form, the absence of a get imposes no disability to remarriage.2 90 It
is not uncommon, however, for a change of religious affiliation or
commitment in the course of a marriage-often in the direction of
greater adherence to traditional beliefs-and women who do
change their theological positions and now find themselves unable
to remarry without a get are simply unprotected.29 '
In the event the plaintiff does file a false affidavit, the victimized
spouse may invoke what is popularly termed the "clergyman's
veto."'292 Even if the plaintiff files a sworn affidavit which states that
to the best of his knowledge all "barriers to remarriage" have been
removed, the court still may not enter a final judgment of divorce if
the clergyman or minister who solemnized the marriage certifies in a
sworn statement that the plaintiff has not accomplished this. 29' This
"clergyman's veto" is a back-up guarantee to the veracity of an affi-
davit. In the event the plaintiff seeks to obtain a divorce by filing a
false affidavit, the defendant may defeat his petition by submitting
an opposing one from the officiating minister.294
What the legislature intended to happen if this opposing affida-
vit is submitted is not at all clear. It is possible that the court will
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine what the clergyman's be-
liefs were and whether the requirements of those beliefs were met.
This procedure is difficult to envision because it would involve the
court in a direct inquiry concerning compliance with religious law,
an entanglement with religion that the legislature carefully tried to
avoid. What would probably happen-and the legislature should
290. See supra note 5.
291. Another limitation, though one easily surmounted, is that the affidavit need only
allege that "to the best of plaintiff's knowledge" such barriers have been removed. N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 253(3)(i). Theoretically even parties married by the Orthodox clergy
may not always know their clergyman's principles-specifically, that a get is required to
dissolve a marriage. The statute also emphasizes that the plaintiff is under no duty of
investigation or inquiry. See id. § 253(6). Nevertheless, this defect can be easily reme-
died by the defendant contacting the officiating clergyman, who can send a letter to the
plaintiff informing him or her of his religious beliefs, or through invocation of the cler-
gyman's veto. See id. § 253(7).
292. The term "veto" is a misnomer with potential constitutional overtones. The
clergyman is not vetoing governmental action but simply apprising the court of a fact.
See id. § 253(7); infra text accompanying note 343.
293. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(7). "[N]otwithstanding the filing of the plaintiff's
sworn statement," a final judgment will not be entered "if the clergyman or minister
who has solemnized the marriage" files an affidavit that essentially contradicts the plain-
tiff's affidavit. Id. The sworn affidavit must state first, that the clergyman or minister
solemnized the marriage, and second, that the plaintiff has failed to take the necessary
steps to remove any barriers to marriage. See id.
294. See id.
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clarify this-is that the court could not enter a judgment of divorce
until the clergyman files a second sworn statement verifying that the
plaintiff has now complied with the statute.2 9 5 In the event the cler-
gyman is no longer alive or competent to testify, the "veto" power
of his earlier affidavit can be cancelled by the plaintiff's affidavit
alone,2 96 and the court will issue a judgment of divorce.
Allowing the clergyman's affidavit to control even after he be-
comes unavailable to testify would place the plaintiff in an untenable
position by permanently disabling him from obtaining a divorce
even if he later complied with religious dictates. The only alterna-
tive to cancellation would be to permit the plaintiff to rebut or show
compliance by submitting the affidavit of some other clergyman, but
such a procedure could embroil the court in inquiries concerning
clergy competence and affiliation, denominational belief, and other
religious issues, all of which are avoided when only the officiating
clergyman is allowed to speak. 297 Admittedly, however, it would
make more sense to require the plaintiff to file a new verified affida-
vit, rather than relying on the old, discredited one.
Some other peculiarities in the statute are also worthy of note.
For example, "barrier to remarriage" does not include restraints or
inhibitions that cannot be removed by the plaintiff's voluntary
act.29" Thus, if a Catholic husband files for divorce, he will be enti-
tled to civil relief even though neither spouse is able to remarry be-
cause the barrier is not removable by action of the parties. The law
further makes it clear that the plaintiff is not required to remove
barriers to remarriage by application to ecclesiastical tribunals. 299
Presumably, ajewish divorce proceeding does not constitute "appli-
cation to a tribunal," for although a bais din is required, the function
of the bais din is supervisory rather than judicial, with the actual di-
vorce effected by the acts of the spouses rather than the declaration
of the court.3 0 0 To the extent that removal of barriers can be ac-
companied only by the plaintiff incurring expenses, the plaintiff
need not remove such barriers unless and until the other party reim-
295. An earlier proposal would have made this explicit, but this version was never
enacted into law. See Lewin File, supra note 276.
296. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(7).
297. An earlier proposal would have allowed another clergyman, who certifies that he
holds the same religious principles as the officiator, to testify if the officiator is not avail-
able. See Lewin File, supra note 276.
298. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(6).
299. See id.
300. See supra note 2.
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burses or agrees to reimburse those expenses.3 0 '
Finally, in theory the statute is self-executing. Where "barriers
to remarriage" exist under the principles of the officiating clergy-
man, the plaintiff may not obtain a civil divorce even if neither party
desires a get. ° 2 Read literally, the statute imposes the need for a get
even in cases of divorce by mutual consent of a Reform couple who
happened to have been married by an Orthodox Rabbi.303 As cur-
rently worded, however, this should no longer be a problem. If
neither party wants a get, the requirement of a complying affidavit by
the plaintiff can be waived by the defendant.3 0 4
B. Constitutional Issues: The Traditional Tests 305
It was well understood by the drafters of the New York law, its
sponsors, and Governor Cuomo that the get law posed serious con-
stitutional problems under the First Amendment, though the prece-
dents were not definitive one way or the other.30 6  To date,
however, no successful constitutional attack has been launched
against the main features of the law.30 7
301. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 253(6).
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id. § 253(4), (5).
305. The text in this Subpart applies the traditional constitutional standards that have
been employed by the Supreme Court in analyzing establishment and free exercise
claims and that were in effect when the get law was first enacted. These standards are in
the process of undergoing reexamination. Current developments and speculations as to
the future are discussed infra, Part V. It is the view of this author that these
developments will not affect the basic conclusions stated herein. See infra Subpart V.C.
306. See supra note 276.
307. Rostain, supra note 167, at 1149. Thus far Chambers v. Chambers, 471 N.Y.S.2d
958 (Sup. Ct. 1983), is the only case to address the constitutionality of the get statute.
Rostain, supra note 167, at 1149 n.15. New York opinions, to date, have generally been
supportive of the bill's provisions. See, e.g., Friedenberg v. Friedenberg, 523 N.Y.S.2d
578, 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (Until a plaintiff complies with the affidavit requirement,
he may not receive any benefits under the divorce judgment, and transfers of money or
property to plaintiff are stayed.). The only issue of controversy-an issue now rendered
moot with the passage of time-was the application of § 253 to actions already pending
at the time of its enactment. Compare Chambers v. Chambers, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958, 961
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding that applying § 253 to a written separation agreement
entered into before the effective date of the get statute would be an unconstitutional
impairment of contract) with Pinkesz v. Pinkesz, reported in N.Y. LJ., Dec. 5, 1984, at 13
(holding that § 253 does apply to pending actions, at least to the extent there is no
antecedent separation agreement). Another area of potential conflict arose under an
earlier version of the statute that required both parties to submit affidavits in uncon-
tested proceedings. This meant that there were cases where a plaintiff could not obtain
a civil divorce unless a defendant filed an affidavit. The Chambers court intimated in dicta
that conditioning a plaintiff's relief on the responses of a defendant may well be a denial
of due process. Chambers, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 960. Under the present version of the law,
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1. The Inescapable Conflict Between Establishment and Free Exer-
cise .- The get law poses the constitutional problem of whether it per-
missibly accommodates free exercise or impermissibly establishes
religion. On one level, the affidavit requirement is a reasonable ac-
commodation of the religious needs of those who would otherwise
be unable to remarry. At the same time, however, conditioning the
receipt of a civil remedy on the performance of an act prescribed
exclusively by religious law seems to be equivalent to state-com-
pelled religious obedience. And while compelling a get, albeit indi-
rectly, is presumably not a violation of free exercise where
recalcitrance is not based on religious commitment, it nevertheless
seems to approach closely those concerns of neutrality that are mir-
rored in the Establishment Clause.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 308 the Supreme Court announced a tripar-
while there is still a double affidavit requirement in uncontested proceedings, the plain-
tiff would be able to waive the defendant's duty to file and would thus be able to secure a
divorce on a single affidavit-his own. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 253(4) (McKinney 1986).
The Chambers issue is thus not likely to arise again.
308. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This pivotal case marked a turning point, departing from a
permissive stance in the area of aid to parochial schools. Prior to Lemon, the Court had
upheld state statutes that provided reimbursement of transportation costs for parents of
students attending public and private schools, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), as well as programs providing parochial schools with textbooks for secular stud-
ies, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), on the grounds that the funds were
used for a nonreligious purpose. Lemon, on the other hand, invalidated a state program
that provided salary supplements for teachers in parochial schools, even though the sup-
plements were limited to hours spent teaching secular subjects. According to the major-
ity opinion, teacher salary supplements differed from textbooks: instructors may
advance religious doctrines even in the course of teaching secular subjects, and through
salary subsidies, the state would effectively be funding the religious part of the curricu-
lum. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. The only way to prevent this would be to institute an
on-going surveillance program that in turn would constitute excessive entanglement.
See id.
Since Lemon, the Court has invalidated virtually any type of public aid to private
schools other than transportation and textbooks, which it grudgingly permits, more for
reasons of precedent than principle. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ., 413
U.S. 472, 482 (1973) (invalidating New York program that granted private schools reim-
bursement for services mandated by state law, such as record keeping and testing);
Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973) (invalidating financial
aid programs for private elementary and secondary schools); Sloan v. Lemon (Lemon II),
413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973) (invalidating parental tuition reimbursement programs in the
forms of tax credits); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (invalidating program
of lending instructional materials to nonpublic schools and providing auxiliary testing
services by public school personnel).
Recognizing that instructional materials were fundamentally the same as textbooks,
the Meek court allowed Allen to stand on the basis of stare decisis, but refused to extend
it any further. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (invalidating
"shared time" programs where public school employees teach secular subjects in private
schools); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (prohibiting use of federal funds to
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tite test for determining an impermissible establishment of religion,
a test that it still applies today. 30 9 A law accommodating or benefit-
ting religious practice is valid only if it has a "secular purpose," if its
"primary effect.., neither advances nor inhibits religion," and if its
operation does not lead to "excessive government entanglement"
with religious doctrine or the internal administration of religious af-
fairs.31 0 The Lemon formulation has been sharply criticized as essen-
tially meaningless and infinitely malleable.3 ' Furthermore, its
application has yielded sharply inconsistent results, often in five to
four decisions.31 2 Taken literally, Lemon would invalidate nearly any
statutory accommodation of religion because the primary purpose
and effect of all religious provisos are to benefit a particular reli-
gious group.
Justice O'Connor has advocated a useful restatement of the
Lemon test substituting the term "endorsing" in place of "advanc-
ing. '"513 According to this test, the fact that particular legislation
proves "beneficial" to a religious group would not invalidate it as
long as such an accommodation does not carry with it the implica-
tion or appearance of endorsement of one religion at the expense of
another, or the endorsement of religion over nonbelief. While a
pay salaries of public school teachers who provided nonreligious instruction on prem-
ises of private schools). The Court has been more sympathetic to programs extending
aid to universities, on the theory that the potential for indoctrination is considerably
reduced. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973) (upholding state statute
that authorized issuance of revenue bonds benefitting a religiously affiliated college).
309. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-04
(1988) (applying Lemon test). But see infra Subpart V.B (discussing whether Lemon is
likely to survive).
310. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
311. For in-court criticism, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91, 108-12 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For critical commentary, see generally Johnson, supra note
181; Schwartz, supra note 181, at 179; Nancy Blyth Hersman, Lynch v. Donnelly: Has the
Lemon Test Soured?, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 133 (1985) (an especially useful review of incon-
sistent lower court opinions struggling to apply Lemon to various situations); Yehudah
Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986).
312. Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (invalidating publicly
funded auxiliary testing services to private schools) with Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980) (upholding state financing of
achievement tests). See also the wavering lines of distinction drawn in cases like Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-48 (1977) (differentiating between diagnostic or ther-
apeutic tests and those designed to promote or improve educational achievement).
313. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon .. .is whether the government
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 76, 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementations of the stat-
ute, would perceive it as a state endorsement ....").
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majority of the Court has never accepted her precise verbal formula-
tion, the cases do suggest that the concept of "endorsement" may
be a useful touchstone to differentiate those accommodations that
are prohibited from those that are permitted to stand.3 14
Normally the opposite question is presented when legislation is
challenged on free exercise grounds. When legislation or a regula-
tion of general applicability makes no provision or exclusion for
religion, often the objection is raised that the failure to provide such
an exemption is an infringement of religious liberty.315 While a
number ofjustices, particularly Justice Stevens,3" 6 had rejected this
contention outright (as would Professor Kurland"l 7), the prevailing
test had been, at least until quite recently, that religious exemptions
must be recognized unless there is a compelling state interest that
could not be adequately served by less restrictive means.31 8 Thus,
in responding to a free exercise challenge, the Court analyzed both
314. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (citing Lynch, 465
U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 ("In applying the
purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion.' " (footnote omitted) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690
(O'Connor, J., concurring))).
315. See, e.g., Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith 11), 494
U.S. 872, 919 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that respondents sincerely be-
lieved that the peyote plant embodies their deity, and "[w]ithout peyote, they could not
enact the essential ritual of their religion"). The respondents in Smith H argued that
their religious freedom was infringed upon through the application of Oregon's drug
laws. See id. at 878.
316. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(5-4 opinion holding no constitutional right to wear yarmulke for air force officer);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra
note 336. There are strong indications that Stevens's views have prevailed, at least tem-
porarily in the narrow context of criminal prosecution. See infra Subpart V.A.
317. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
318. The basic standard is set down in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
Ironically, over a spirited dissent by Justice Stewart, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of Sunday closing laws as applied to Sabbath-observing Jews, who would lose an
extra day of business. See id. at 608-09. The need for a uniform day of rest was an
"overriding" secular goal that justified the indirect burden on free exercise. Id. at 607.
The term "compelling" was introduced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 409-10
(1963) (holding that state could not deny unemployment compensation to a Seventh-
Day Adventist who lost her job for refusing to work on Saturdays; the state interest in
not paying persons who voluntarily terminate their employment could be adequately
served through less restrictive means). Sherbert's holding was recently reaffirmed in
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1987) (holding that
Florida's refusal to award unemployment compensation benefits violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment). The Smith H case, discussed infra Part V, may have
sounded the death-knell for the type of strict scrutiny envisioned under Sherbert. I never-
theless discuss the application of Sherbert to the get law because first, that was the test in
effect when the law was enacted and second, even after Smith there may be discrete
contexts in which the "compelling state interest" test survives. See infra Part V.
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the importance of the governmental end and the reasonableness of
the means employed to attain that end. Although the magnitude of
the state's interest did not have to be as significant as is required for
other areas where the term "compelling" is used, and although the
Court's application of its own test often appeared flawed or ques-
tionable, 319 the familiar "ends-means" analysis was still the vehicle
most commonly employed, at least until Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith II).32
Yet, the establishment and free exercise tests have never been
brought together. Under Lemon, any explicit religious exemption
seemed to constitute an impermissible establishment, because its
purpose and effect is to aid religious observance. On the other
hand, in the absence of a compelling state interest, the very thing
the Establishment Clause prohibits the Free Exercise Clause re-
quires. The Court's tacit assumption was that free exercise con-
cerns predominated in cases of conflict, but the Court offered no
principled explanation for that position32. Once again, however,
Justice O'Connor's insight was particularly helpful in resolving this
apparent dilemma. If the accommodation in question did not con-
stitute an endorsement placing the state's imprimatur on religious
activity, or conveying a message to the populace favoring religion
over nonreligion, it was not an establishment at all. As such, the
conflict between free exercise and establishment was largely illu-
sory. Put in the language of Lemon, the facilitation of free exercise
was in itself a legitimate secular purpose that justified governmental
intervention. 22
319. In cases involving racial discrimination, requiring an interest to be "compelling"
tends to obliterate that legislative program. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1967) (holding that statute prohibiting interracial marriages involving whites violates
Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). No interest is ever important enough
to allow such discrimination to proceed. See id. In free exercise cases, however, the
Court has been quite willing to declare relatively trivial interests "compelling." See
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 510 (1986) (5-4 opinion denying air force officer the right to wear a yarmulke).
320. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith H essentially abrogated any constitutional need to
accommodate religious observance, at least in the context of criminal prosecution, and
severely curtailed the scope of free exercise claims. See infra Subpart V.A.2.
321. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230, 247 (1963) (Brennan,J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe logical interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses may produce situations where an injunction against an apparent establish-
ment must be withheld in order to avoid the infringement of rights of free exercise.").
322. Indeed, O'Connor's analysis provides a useful analytical framework even after
Smith II. Although accommodation of free exercise is no longer a constitutional require-
ment, it is nevertheless a permissible step, and legislation attempting such facilitation
should be deemed to have a secular purpose. See generally infra Part V.
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2. Applying the Establishment Test to the Get Law.-In applying
the Lemon criteria to the get law, a number of points should be kept
in mind.323 First, the purpose of the New York legislation can be
defined clearly in secular terms as a viable means of attaining legiti-
mate state interests. Indeed, a number of discrete, although related,
interests may be identified. First, the state has a legitimate secular
interest in ensuring the integrity and efficacy of its judgments. The
policy of the New York divorce law is that a marriage that is dead in
fact should no longer exist and that the parties should have the free-
dom to rebuild their lives anew. Maintaining barriers to remarriage
following ajudgment of divorce frustrates the policy behind divorce
statutes and the integrity of the judicial system.
Second, without such a law, women practicing the Orthodox
faith would be under additional burdens or disadvantages following
a civil divorce compared with other women not holding such beliefs.
In its attempts to equalize the status of all women following the
granting of a civil divorce, the state is merely accommodating the
practice of religion by removing its disadvantages, rather than estab-
lishing it in a preferred position. As Justice O'Connor notes, the
facilitation of free exercise is in itself a legitimate secular state inter-
est that the legislature may address.3 24 The state has a legitimate
interest in facilitating marriage and a stable family life. The ability
to marry and raise a family is also an aspect of the fundamental con-
stitutional right to privacy protected and recognized by Roe v.
Wade. 3 25 The state has a legitimate state interest in facilitating the
ability of its citizens to exercise and enjoy their constitutional rights.
Although the deprivation in question arises from private rather than
public or governmental action, states should as a matter of principle
have the authority, if not the obligation, affirmatively to protect
those rights even from private infringement. 326
323. Whether the Lemon test is likely to survive, and what may take its place, are dis-
cussed infra Subpart V.B.
324. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
325. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding
that state statute conditioning freedom to marry on showing that support obligations to
minor children have been met violates due process). Indeed, the right to marry has
been regarded as a fundamental right even prior to the recognition of a general consti-
tutional right of privacy. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down misce-
genation statute because it interfered with the fundamental right to marry, which is
protected by the Due Process Clause).
326. As a general proposition, constitutional rights may be asserted only against the
government or its agents. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This limitation is
commonly termed the "state action" doctrine, though it should more properly be called
the "governmental action" requirement, because its standards are met by federal as well
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Where a get is withheld out of malice or spite or for reasons of
extortion, the state has an additional interest in protecting its citi-
zens from being victimized by unfair, coercive practices. Many
states have recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as
an independent tort.3 7 The alleviation of human suffering caused
by another is a proper goal of state legislation.
In short, the justifications for the New York law appear to be
secular in purpose: the furtherance of the state's divorce policy, the
validation of the integrity of the judicial system, the facilitation of
religious liberty, the encouraging of remarriage and a more stable
family life, the protection of fundamental rights of privacy, and the
curbing of victimization and extortion all appear to fall within the
traditional ambit of general legislative competence. On balance, the
"secular purpose" prong of Lemon can be easily satisfied.
The second prong of Lemon requires that the primary effect of
the law must not be the "advancement" of religion. Undoubtedly,
in a literal sense the act advances religion in two distinct ways: it
makes the observance of Orthodox Judaism less burdensome to
some of its adherents by eliminating the peculiar disabilities they
would otherwise suffer; and it indirectly encourages persons to com-
ply with religious law who otherwise would not-recalcitrant
spouses who seek a civil divorce. As noted, the "effect" of making
the practice of Judaism less burdensome on its willing practitioners
is probably nothing more than a permissible accommodation of free
exercise and does not offend Lemon's "primary effect" criterion.
The second aspect, however, is more problematic. A law that indi-
as state activity. The notable exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits
involuntary servitude of any nature, whether public or private. Id.; see also Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, guaranteeing
citizens the right to purchase and convey property, prohibited even private discrimina-
tion in housing; such prohibition was constitutional because private discrimination was a
"badge of slavery" that Congress was empowered to eradicate under the Thirteenth
Amendment). It remains an open question whether Congress, in its attempts to protect
constitutional freedoms other than those arising under the Thirteenth Amendment,
could outlaw purely private discrimination without relying on some plenary power like
the Commerce Clause, though in many cases expansive interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the concept of "badges of slavery" may furnish the requisite peg. See
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (where six justices expressed in dicta that
Congress could prohibit private infringements of constitutional rights); see also
Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) applicable to private acts of violence; a conspiracy to kill constituted a depri-
vation of rights of due process and equal protection); cf. Bellamy v. Mason's Store, Inc.,
508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that while § 1985(3) does not apply to private
acts, Congress would be fully within its power to enact a statute that did).
327. See infra note 390.
(VOL. 51:312386
1992] HALACHA, CONTRACT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 387
rectly compels an unwilling party to perform a religious act, even if
there are legitimate secular purposes for doing so, seems to have
the "effect" of advancing religious observance. Yet the mere fact
that the law has such an "effect" is not yet sufficient for its invalida-
tion; the impermissible effect must be "primary."
Determining what a "primary" effect is and how it is to be dis-
tinguished from a "purpose" are difficult definitional questions that
have never been clearly addressed. 28 One possibility emerging
from the cases is that "primary" is synonymous with "direct and im-
mediate," as opposed to "indirect and attenuated. '3 29 Thus, to take
one example, secular textbook loans by school boards to parochial
schools are constitutionally permissible even though they indirectly
advance the cause of religion by freeing additional resources for
religious study, because the purpose of the program is secular and
the benefit is indirect.3 3 0 By contrast, teacher-salary supplements,
even to cover the salary of teachers of secular subjects, are not con-
stitutionally permissible, because all teaching may contain religious
elements and government money cannot be used to directly fund
religious education. 3
If "primary" is defined as "direct and immediate," one would
have to conclude that the New York get law's "primary effect" is the
advancement of religion, for the granting of the get is precisely the
328. The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of applying the "primary ef-
fect" inquiry in Establishment Clause cases. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604
(1988).
329. One district court adopted this definition of the "primary effect" inquiry. See
Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). The
district court stated that "the Supreme Court instructs us to examine whether the statute
has a 'direct and immediate' effect, or a 'remote and incidental' effect, of advancing
religion." Id. at 1560. Although the Supreme Court reversed the district court's deter-
mination of unconstitutionality, it utilized the same inquiry. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 607 (1988) (federal statute in question had "at most" an "incidental and re-
mote" effect of advancing religion).
Moreover, characterizing the effect as "direct and immediate" as opposed to "inci-
dental and remote" has been implicit in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (holding that statute granting
absolute right not to work on Sabbath "goes well beyond having an 'incidental or re-
mote' effect of advancing religion"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (hold-
ing that endorsement of religion effected by creche is merely "indirect, remote, and
incidental"); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973) (holding
that New York statutory scheme for financial aid to nonpublic schools had "primary
effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities" of non-
public schools).
330. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 607 ("Nothing in our previous cases prevents
Congress from making such a judgment or from recognizing the important part that
religion or religious organizations may play in resolving secular problems.").
331. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
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result that the operation of the statute produces. The law, albeit for
secular purposes, directly provides that no civil divorce can be ob-
tained until the remarriage barrier is removed. 3 2 The performance
of the religious act is not an incidental by-product of the operation
of the statute, but rather the very consequence that is intended to be
produced, although for nonreligious reasons.
If, however, the notion of "advancing" religion is equated with
affirmative promotion or endorsement, the analysis takes a different
turn. The statute carries no implication that Orthodox Judaism is a
preferred way of life that should be encouraged, nor even that a get
is a preferred method of dissolution of a marriage. In the first place,
the language of the statute is facially neutral, speaking of removal of
any barriers, whether religious or conscientious.33 3 Second, the
statute does not require that barriers to remarriage be removed un-
less the other party feels constrained by them.3 3 4 Thus, the statute
is not promoting compliance with religious divorce law as some-
thing intrinsically desirable, but only as a means of releasing some-
one else's bind, which itself was generated by the recalcitrant party's
own choice of solemnization. Third, while the delivery of a get is a
religious act in the sense of being mandated by religious law, it is a
nonliturgical act that requires no profession of faith or overt expres-
sion of belief.3 3 5 It is not clear that encouraging the performance of
a Jewish law ceremony constitutes an endorsement or promotion of
Jewish values, where that ceremony is under Jewish law akin to the
dissolution of a partnership, and is largely devoid of theological sig-
nificance. After all, parties who are nonobservant or non-Jewish al-
ready have the rights and benefits that the statute attempts to secure
for the Orthodox woman. The statute hardly places an observant
Jew or his or her beliefs on a pedestal. Indeed, most crucial of all,
because the statute does no more than assure that Orthodox women
following a civil divorce will enjoy the same rights and privileges as
anyone else-and no more-such an equalization effort is far more
likely to be perceived by the citizenry as an accommodation of the
free exercise beliefs of the wife rather than an endorsement or pro-
332. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986).
333. The New York statute defines "barrier to remarriage" broadly, including "with-
out limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition." Id. § 253(6). The
statute is captioned by the heading, "Removal of barriers to remarriage." Id. § 253.
334. The statute only requires that barriers to remarriage be removed when the de-
fendant in a divorce proceeding has not "waived in writing the requirements" of the
statute. Id. § 253(2)-(4). The necessary implication is that if the defendant has waived
the protection of the statute, there is no feeling of constraint.
335. See supra note 2.
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motion of the wife's beliefs.3 3 6
The final element of the test is whether the law in question ne-
cessitates "excessive entanglement" in religious affairs.33 7 Entan-
glement exists if the legislative scheme necessitates continual
monitoring or administrative supervision over religious institutions
or programs or requires the court to resolve doctrinal matters.3 3,
At least under the present version of the statute, neither of these
factors seems to be present. While the statute does require that the
plaintiff submit an affidavit that he or she has removed all religious
barriers to remarriage, the court need not hold evidentiary hearings
or make particularized findings. Upon receipt of the affidavit, the
court must enter a judgment of divorce, and may not inquire into
the truthfulness of the allegations.3 39 Issues concerning the techni-
cal validity of the get, the qualifications of the executing Rabbis, and
whether the principles of the officiating clergyman have or have not
been met and what those principles are-questions that could in-
deed entangle the court in complex doctrinal matters-pose matters
that the court simply does not and may not address.
The only way plaintiff's affidavit can be contested is by the offi-
ciating clergyman filing an opposing affidavit. 340 The statute is not
clear as to what happens after this filing. If the court is then sup-
posed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there
has been compliance with religious law, there may indeed be entan-
glement problems in at least some cases, though not all. If, for ex-
ample, a plaintiff has given a get under the supervision of a left-wing
Orthodox group and the officiating clergyman alleges that such a
group is not truly Orthodox, it would certainly not be constitution-
ally desirable for the court to determine the religious scope of a de-
nomination. Where, on the other hand, the contested issue boils
336. The perception that the public has regarding the nature of a particular legislative
program is material to an Establishment Clause analysis. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (emphasizing political divisiveness and polarization as an evil
that the Establishment Clause attempts to minimize). Cf.JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTI-
TUrIONAL LAW 1039, 1054-60 (3d ed. 1986) (criticizing the "political divisiveness" test as
largely superfluous, but acknowledging that the Court continues to invoke it).
337. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
338. See id. at 619.
339. A necessary precondition of a final judgment of annulment or divorce under the
statute is the filing of a sworn statement to the effect that all barriers to remarriage have
been removed. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(2)-(4) (McKinney 1986). However, "[t]he
truth of any statement submitted pursuant to this section shall not be the subject of any
judicial inquiry." Id. § 253(9). Therefore, the affidavit is conclusive, and a final judg-
ment will be entered upon its filing. Id. § 253(2)-(4).
340. See id. § 253(7).
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down to a simple question of fact-whether there was any get given
at all-there would be no objection to a judicial resolution of a non-
doctrinal issue.
It is plausible, however, that in the event of an opposing clergy
affidavit, the statute does not contemplate a judicial hearing at all.
Rather the clergyman's affidavit must be accepted as conclusive until
the clergyman can file a supplemental affidavit of compliance. Thus,
at no time does the court ever examine any question ofJewish law or
doctrine; it simply responds automatically to the verified statements
submitted.3 4 ' Moreover, because the only clergyman authorized to
contest the plaintiff's affidavit is the one who actually officiated,
tricky definitional questions regarding denominational affiliation are
avoided.
A number of commentators have objected to the "clergyman
veto" provision.34 2 Although under the terms of the statute, a court
never makes its own findings on the existence of barriers to remar-
riage, they argue that because the judicial power to issue a civil di-
vorce is conditioned on the consent (or at least failure to object) of a
member of the clergy, giving religious authorities a veto on the ex-
ercise of governmental authority is in itself an impermissible entan-
glement with religion. 4 In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,34 4 for example,
the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning law that granted schools or
churches a veto power over the issuance of a liquor license for any
establishment within a 500 foot radius of their premises.345 Because
such a law "enmeshe[d] churches in the exercise of substantial gov-
ernment power," the Court held that the law violated the constitu-
tional strictures against establishment.3 46
Reliance on Larkin, however, appears misplaced. Larkin dealt
with a state procedure that conferred unbridled discretion on eccle-
341. The statute expressly forbids judicial inquiry into religious matters and into the
truth of any affidavits submitted under the statute:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any court to inquire
into or determine any ecclesiastical or religious issue. The truth of any state-
ment submitted pursuant to this section shall not be the subject of any judicial
inquiry, except as provided in subdivision eight of this section.
Id. § 253(9). The statute nevertheless imposes criminal penalties on one who makes a
false sworn statement under the statute. Id. § 253(8).
342. See Kahan, supra note 214, at 206; Lawrence C. Marshall, Comment, The Religion
Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and Constitutional Separations, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 204, 254 (1985); Redman, supra note 187, at 411.
343. See Kahan, supra note 214, at 206.
344. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
345. See id. at 126.
346. Id.
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siastical authorities to dictate the operations of government.3 47 In
effect, zoning decisions became a shared responsibility of church
and state, at least under the conditions specified in the zoning ordi-
nance. Such a sharing of authority is clearly inimical to the ideals of
the First Amendment, whether it is condemned under the rubric of
"entanglement" or that of "endorsement." By contrast, despite its
description as a "clergy veto"-a phrase that invites superficial com-
parison to Larkin-the provision in the get law for an opposing affi-
davit does not confer any element of judgment, discretion, or
decision-making authority on religious functionaries. The only
means by which they can prevent the issuance of a civil divorce is by
alleging a fact that is already legislatively defined and specific: that
the party failed to remove barriers to remarriage (whether or not a
get was executed).3 48 Assuming the state could designate that fact as
a relevant criterion for the withholding of a divorce-and it appears
that it could for the reasons stated above-using the clergy as mere
conduits of information may in fact be the only constitutionally per-
missible way to proceed.
A final potential entanglement problem may arise when a plain-
tiff is criminally prosecuted for filing a false affidavit. Theoretically,
one could imagine situations where some form of a dissolution cere-
mony occurred that allegedly was not in consonance with the princi-
ples of the solemnizing clergyman. Where that clergyman is no
longer available, it will be necessary to establish those principles
through expert testimony. In such a case, there may be doctrinal
disagreements between denominations, or within a denomination,
that the court might have to resolve.3 49 Even in these marginal
cases, however, the court is not called upon to resolve doctrinal is-
sues, but simply to determine as a matter of fact what the beliefs of
the officiating clergyman were, regardless of their ultimate truth or
validity. Because the inquiry is phrased not in terms of the beliefs of
the denomination, but those of the actual clergyman, the potential
347. See id. at 127.
348. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986).
349. Consider the following example: The officiating rabbi was ordained in an Ortho-
dox seminary, took a position in a Conservative temple, but retained his membership in
Orthodox rabbinical associations. The couple in question were divorced through the
delivery of a get prepared by the Conservative rabbinate. The husband obtained a civil
divorce by filing the affidavit. In a criminal prosecution alleging that the affidavit was
false for failure to execute an Orthodox get, where the officiating clergyman is not avail-
able to testify, the court would be required to make findings concerning the denomina-
tional affiliation of the officiating rabbi and whether, based on his hybrid status, he
would subscribe to the Conservative or the Orthodox method of get.
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for doctrinal embroilment is slight. If the clergyman is available, he
should simply be taken at his word. If the clergyman is not avail-
able, the court should be able to take testimony concerning a dis-
puted state of mind. What religious beliefs a person in fact
entertained (as opposed to whether those beliefs are valid) is funda-
mentally no different than any other question of fact a judge or jury
is called upon to resolve, and should fall within the ambit of judicial
competence.
Finally, in the run-of-the-mill criminal prosecution there will be
no serious entanglement question at all; it is generally safe to
surmise that no get was given. Because the basic meanings of affilia-
tions are well understood, establishing the Conservative or Ortho-
dox credentials of the officiating rabbi would automatically mean
that the affidavit was false without the need to proceed any further
in fine analytical distinctions. The ability of a fertile imagination to
conjure up cases where the court will have to choose between the
competing readings of the Shulchan Aruch on the basis of conflicting
rabbinical opinion should not obscure the fact that this event will be
so rare as to be practically nonexistent. If in rare cases such entan-
glement is present, the solution would be to stay a particular prose-
cution in a given case, rather than striking down the law in its
entirety.350
While, as Governor Cuomo remarked, the matter is not free of
doubt, the New York get law appears to meet all three of the Lemon
criteria for validity. The purpose of the law is to advance purely
secular interests, including the facilitation of free exercise by those
who otherwise would be burdened because of their religious beliefs.
The primary effect of the law is not the "endorsement" or promo-
tion of religion; the law simply equalizes the rights of women hold-
ing certain beliefs with those of women who do not. Nor does the
law invite excessive entanglement into religious affairs because the
court is prohibited from inquiring into the truth of any matters al-
leged in the affidavit. While rare instances of criminal prosecution
may implicate establishment concerns, the potential for constitu-
tional infringement is so insignificant that it should have no effect
350. In any event, these constitutional objections apply only to criminal prosecutions,
not to the affidavit requirements. A version of the bill prepared by Agudath Israel con-
tained a severability clause, perhaps to address the concerns expressed in the text. See
Lewin File, supra note 276. For some unknown reason, however, such a clause was de-
leted from the enacted legislation. See Lewin File, supra. Even in the absence of a sever-
ability clause, the impermissibility of state prosecution under the general penal law
would presumably not taint the get legislation.
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on the overall validity of the law. As such, section 253 should with-
stand attacks based on the Establishment Clause.
The foregoing analysis, building on Justice O'Connor's in-
sight,35  assumes that legislation designed to remove disadvantages
suffered by religious adherents does not "advance" religion (in the
sense of "endorsement") because it simply equalizes the benefits
enjoyed by all-in this case, the ability to remarry following a di-
vorce. As noted earlier, this assumption is not universally shared. 52
Some construe the second prong of Lemon as validating religious
exemptions or removal of barrier legislation only where the state
has imposed the disability or restriction. 5 3 Under this view, where
the disadvantage arises from the religious practice itself, govern-
mental attempts to alleviate it constitute impermissible efforts to ad-
vance religion. The inability of Orthodox Jewish women to remarry
without a get may be a serious disability, but it is one that has noth-
ing to do with any rule of the state. Because it is not a state-imposed
burden, the argument goes, it cannot be ameliorated by legislative
action.3 54
Even accepting the premises of this approach, which conced-
edly reflect the thinking of at least some justices on the Supreme
Court, 55 it still may be argued that section 253 of the New York law
is constitutional. It all depends on how one defines the burden.
While it is true that the inability of a spouse to remarry without a get
is not a state-imposed burden, the particular problem the statute
addresses-the post-dissolution agunah-is. The ability of a recalci-
trant spouse to obtain a civil divorce exacerbates and magnifies a
problem that already exists under Jewish law. If spouses did not
have the ability to obtain civil divorces, then they would be required
to give gittin to acquire their own freedom. Because the ability to
obtain dissolution of a marriage is a right granted by the state and it
is the existence of that right that adds to the cost of religious obser-
vance, even a narrow reading of the Lemon criteria would justify leg-
islative assistance. 56
351. See supra text accompanying notes 313-314.
352. See supra notes 316-317 and accompanying text.
353. See Claire Zerangue, Comment, Sabbath Observance and the Workplace: Religion
Clause Analysis and Title VI's Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 46 LA. L. REV. 1265, 1274
(1986); Kristen L. Boyles, Note, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117, 1145 (1991).
354. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
355. See id.
356. Moreover, following a divorce, a woman may have many legal disadvantages in
terms of securing credit, filing a joint return, or obtaining economic support. The bur-
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3. The Get Law and Free Exercise .- Section 253 of the New York
law does raise problems from the perspective of free exercise. By
conditioning the grant of a civil remedy on the performance of a
religious ceremony, the statute arguably infringes the free exercise
rights of the otherwise unwilling spouse.
A careful examination of the get law, however, demonstrates
that the unwilling spouse's free exercise rights are not truly im-
paired. First, by the statute's terms, a court does not directly order
the plaintiff to do anything; it simply conditions obtaining relief on
the removal of barriers. Conceptually, noncompliance with reli-
gious law imposes no additional burdens, but simply leaves the par-
ties where they were by continuing the status quo. Second, because
the statute requires the giving of a get only in cases where a marriage
was solemnized by a clergyman whose presence was sought by the
parties themselves, it is arguable that the acquiescence in the per-
formance of a religious ceremony carries with it an implied under-
standing that the existence of the marriage and its dissolution will
be governed by religious law. 357 Even if this implication cannot rise
to the level of an independently enforceable contract,3 58 the exist-
ence of such tacit consent certainly dilutes the presence of coercion
that the First Amendment proscribes.
Even legislation that burdens religious observance may never-
theless withstand scrutiny if it serves a compelling state interest that
could not adequately be protected through less restrictive means.359
Although the facilitation of the wife's free exercise rights would
dens on a woman who cannot remarry following a civil divorce are or may be considera-
bly greater than the burdens on the woman before the civil divorce is granted. The state
law of divorce is thus a contributing factor to the overall burden of religiously observant
Jewish women.
357. See supra notes 288-290 and accompanying text.
358. See generally supra Part II (discussion of the theory of implied contract).
359. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith 11), 494 U.S. 872
(1990), does not undercut the essential point in the text. Prior to Smith H, general legis-
lation that adversely impacted on religious observance would be sustained only if it
served a "compelling state interest." Smith H seems to have abrogated this requirement,
at least in the narrow context of criminal law. The New York get law, because of its
neutrally worded requirement of removal of "barriers to remarriage," may qualify as a
"generally applicable law" within the meaning of Smith H. If it does so qualify, it is
constitutionally permissible even in the absence of interests that are deemed "compel-
ling." At worst, therefore, the enumeration of such interests may be superfluous. Con-
versely, if one were to argue that because of its intended focus, the statute is specifically
targeted toward directing the performance of a religious act, i.e., the execution of a get,
the "compelling state interest" standard should nevertheless be available as a validating
mechanism. The fact that Smith II no longer necessitates this test for generally applica-
ble law should not preclude its utilization to validate statutes that do not directly fall
under the rubric of Smith I. But see infra Subpart V.A.2.
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probably not constitute a sufficiently important state interest in and
of itself (because it makes no sense to infringe the free exercise
rights of A in order to enhance the free exercise rights of B), there
are a number of other vital interests that section 253 serves.
3 60
These policies may constitute precisely the type of vital state interest
that overrides a free exercise claim. 6 ' If, in addition, the affidavit
requirement also has the effect of enhancing the religious liberty of
the victimized spouse, this further tips the balance in the statute's
favor.3 62
The unwilling spouse's claim that the get law violates his free
exercise rights is further refuted in the vast majority of cases, where
a refusal to give a get is not motivated by religious beliefs, but out of
spite, or as a means of obtaining valuable concessions. 363 Indeed, it
is precisely because the husband knows that a get is needed that he is
able to use it as a bargaining chip. 36' The withholding of a civil
divorce where the failure to give a get is not religiously based is cer-
tainly not a First Amendment violation.36 5 Moreover, even if a
plaintiff claims that his refusal to grant a get is based on a religious
belief, at most he would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing where
the veracity of his claim could be examined. While no court may
determine the ultimate truth or validity of a religious belief, 66 the
360. These interests include ensuring the integrity of the state's divorce procedure,
facilitating marriage and family life, protecting rights of privacy, and curbing extortion
and victimization.
361. See supra notes 324-327 and accompanying text.
362. It must be conceded, however, that application of a "compelling state interest"
standard to something like the New York get law goes beyond Supreme Court precedent.
Prior to Smith II, the test was used to uphold legislation of general applicability that had
a negative impact on religious observance. See supra text accompanying notes 315-318.
Here, on the other hand, New York has enacted a law that directly requires a halachic
ceremony to be performed. The giving of a get is the very purpose the law is trying to
achieve. It is not entirely clear that even the existence of compelling interests would
suffice.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
364. Remember that if a couple were married in a Reform ceremony, the husband
may obtain his civil divorce without a section 253 affidavit regardless of any change in
religious commitment the wife may have undergone. See supra notes 290-291 and ac-
companying text. By definition, then, the statute deals with persons who invoked a reli-
gious system that required a get for marital dissolution.
365. As its language suggests, the constitutional privilege of the free exercise clause is
limited to belief or conduct that is predicated on religious rather than secular considera-
tions. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Em-
ployment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). It seems obvious that otherwise-Orthodox
individuals who withhold a get for financial purposes are not acting out of religious
convictions.
366. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (mail fraud conviction of
religious cult leaders could not stand unless the government could show not only that
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court may certainly conduct an inquiry into whether the alleged
"religious" objections are sincerely held, as is routinely done in
cases of conscientious objectors to military service.3 67 Finally, even
if a religious objection could in fact be established, it may well be
overridden by the compelling state interests enumerated above. 68
Once again, the nondevotional nature of the get ceremony, and
the fact that in the eyes ofJewish law it is nothing more than a legal-
istic dissolving mechanism, may mean that indirectly compelling its
execution is not a significant curtailment of religious liberty. Even
Reform Jews who do not require a get as a matter of religious law do
not regard the granting of a get as a violation of religious con-
science; indeed, for various reasons they are often encouraged by
their Rabbinate to grant gittin.3 69 At worst, the granting of a get is a
superfluous, useless act. Thus, if a husband asserts that he no
longer believes that a get is necessary, he should be required to jus-
tify a free exercise claim by showing that it is offensive to his sin-
cerely held religious principles-a showing that would be quite
difficult to make.
C. Halachic Considerations
Any get executed under the compulsion of a secular court order
is halachically invalid. 7 Therefore, enlisting the assistance of the
legislature and the judiciary in confronting the agunah problem is of
no avail unless the resulting get is halachically acceptable.
Before submission of its draft proposal to the legislature,
Agudeth Israel circulated the bill among leading Talmudic scholars
for their views as to its halachic acceptability. While none of them
authored a detailed analysis, the unanimous consensus was that sec-
tion 253 of the New York law posed no halachic problems. 37 ' By the
the representations were false but also that they were not honestly held; to hold other-
wise would essentially be subjecting religious beliefs to heresy trials); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state could not deny unemployment compensation to a per-
son who refused to work on Saturday for religious reasons although he was not a mem-
ber of a church; the sole touchstone for free exercise claims is an honest conviction that
such work was forbidden by one's religion).
367. While the guarantees of the free exercise clause preclude judicial inquiry into the
ultimate truth or falsity of a religious belief, they do not prevent a court or government
agency from ascertaining whether the asserted religious belief is honestly held. See supra
note 366 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 321-327 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 5.
370. See supra Subpart II.A.4.
371. See Letter from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein to Agudath Israel (June 21, 1981); Letter
from Rabbi Yaakov Kaminecki to Agudath Israel (1981); Letter from Rabbi Shimon
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statute's terms, a court never orders the execution of a get, nor is
any sanction, punishment, or fine levied on a recalcitrant husband.
The only "sanction" is that a failure to grant a get precludes the
truthful filing of an affidavit and the obtaining of a civil divorce. At
least in halachic terms, it is well established that, for purposes of get
meusah, a denial of a benefit-a civil divorce-is not the same as the
imposition of a cost.372 A law that in effect tells the husband, "If
you give your wife a get, you will get a civil divorce," is identical to
his wife stating, "If you give me a get, I will give you $100." Both
are also distinguishable from cases where the husband is told that if
he does not give a get, he will suffer financial loss.
373
IV. TORT LAW THEORIES
A. The Possibility of Recovery in Tort
Occasionally, it is suggested that women unable to remarry be-
cause their husbands refuse to give them a religious divorce may
have a remedy under tort law.3 74 The most likely basis for potential
tort recovery would be the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.3 75 Traditionally, tort law was concerned with the protec-
tion of a fairly narrow range of interests-bodily integrity, security
Schwab to Agudath Israel (May 5, 1981); Letter from Rabbi Moshe Stern to Agudath
Israel (May 5, 1981); Letter from RabbiJ. Roth to Agudath Israel (May 5, 1981); Letter
from Rabbi D. Cohen to Agudath Israel (Summer 1981) (copies of letters on file with
author).
372. See supra Subpart II.A.4.
373. See supra Subpart I.D.
374. See Friedell, supra note 189, at 532; Redman, supra note 187. Judicial acknowl-
edgement of potential tort remedies is sparse. In the one case where a tort remedy was
specifically sought, it was denied. Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987);
see infra note 388. One unreported decision suggests in dicta that tort recovery may
sometimes be available. Roth v. Roth, Civil No. 79-192709 (Mich. 6thJud. Cir. Jan. 23,
1980) ("[A] refusal to give his wife a get, knowing she would not be able to remarry
without the distress of violating her deep beliefs, constitutes the intentional infliction of
emotional harm. Under some circumstances, the law allows damages for such an injury
if the defendant's conduct was outrageous.").
375. Within the fertile soil of the common-law system there is the potential for devel-
opment of additional tort theories as well. Given the fact that marriage is a fundamental
right and without a religious divorce a spouse is disabled from exercising that right, the
maintenance of barriers to the exercise of a civil liberty may in itself be tortious, irre-
spective of the magnitude of emotional distress. See supra note 325. Alternatively, a
court may invoke the occasionally cited theory of prima facie tort where any significant
harm caused to another imposes liability in the absence of reasonable justification. See
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 130, at 1010-11
& n.50 (5th ed. 1984). While such theories have been favorably received by European
courts, the American judiciary has been less enthusiastic in applying them. See Dan B.
Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 345-46
(1980).
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of property, and protection of reputation.376 While it was true that
if any of those interests were invaded, damages could include com-
pensation for nonpecuniary elements such as shame, embarrass-
ment, or fright-one could, for example, recover damages for
emotional distress incident to a battery-nonetheless the common
law was slow to recognize that causing emotional distress without
personal or property injury could by itself be tortious.3 7 7 Today,
however, virtually every state recognizes the existence of such a
tort. 3 78
As formulated in the Second Restatement,379 the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress applies when a person "by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another. ' 380 The test focuses on both the ex-
tremity of the defendant's conduct and the severity of the emotional
impact on the plaintiff. With respect to the defendant's conduct, the
comments indicate somewhat graphically that it must be "so outra-
geous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized community. "381 The comments also
indicate that conduct may become outrageous by an abuse of a posi-
tion of power and control, or through an individual's special knowl-
edge that a given plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to being severely
distressed, even if such conduct would not elicit this reaction if done
to someone else.382
With respect to the magnitude of the distress, once again the
comments use a picturesque stream of nouns-the distress may be
"fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin,
disappointment or worry," but must be more than mere "inconven-
ience, annoyance, regret, vexation, emotional suspense, trivial in-
sults, and hurt feelings. 383 Reminding us that we still live in a
world with many rough edges, the comments note that it would be
an intolerable burden on the legal system and a clog on human in-
teraction to allow routine social slights to be legally actionable.
384
Finally, the comments emphasize the necessary elements of "intent"
376. See KEETON et al., supra note 375, § 54, at 359.
377. See id. § 54, at 361.
378. See generally id. § 54, at 364-65 & nn.57-61; id. § 122, at 901-05.
379. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, § 46.
380. Id.
381. Id. cmt. d.
382. Id. cmts. e & f.
383. Id. cmt. j.
384. Id. cmt. d.
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or "recklessness"; in order to be liable, an individual must either
desire to inflict this magnitude of distress or know that such distress
is certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. 385
It is entirely possible that in some cases of agunah, a tort remedy
may be appropriate. While the failure to give a get is an omission
rather than a commission, there is authority that even a failure to act
may give rise to tortious liability, at least when there was a pre-ex-
isting intimate or confidential relationship that generated special
understandings and expectations.3 86 The magnitude of emotional
distress a woman undergoes will naturally vary from case to case;
the feelings of an intensely Orthodox woman who desires to have
children and is approaching the end of her childbearing years and
held in a state of limbo are obviously more intense and deserving of
legal protection than those of a Reform divorcee who wants a get
"just to be on the safe side." Undoubtedly, in some cases, if not
most, the anxiety, pain, and humiliation will be considerable. More-
over, even if the withholding of a get would be of no concern to the
average married woman, the husband's knowledge of the particular
sensitivities and susceptibilities of his former spouse charges him
with a duty to be responsive. Finally, the element of "intent" is nor-
mally fairly easy to meet; if the husband's motives are spite or mal-
ice, the requisite intent is present by definition.
The more difficult case arises where the husband's motives are
not malicious per se, but rather are economic. For example, the
husband may be using the get as a trading chip to obtain conces-
sions, such as reduction in alimony, joint custody, or extra visitation
rights. Driving a hard bargain, or even an unconscionable one, is
not clearly conduct of such outrageous or extreme character as to
"go beyond all possible bounds of decency," and therefore proba-
bly should not be regarded as tortious.387 Indeed, in the one case
where this contention was raised it was rejected, albeit on a different
ground.3 88 Thus, while a tort theory might be available in the cases
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., United States Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869, 872
(D. Conn. 1972) (noting that failure of an insurer to settle within policy limits may con-
stitute the intentional infliction of emotional distress).
387. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, § 46 cmt. d.
388. See Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372, 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (holding that a one-
sided inequitable property settlement granted to secure a get may be invalidated on the
grounds of duress). In Perl the court dismissed the wife's claim for damages on the
grounds of intentional infliction of emotional distress, applying the somewhat dubious
reasoning that the husband's motives were purely economic, and the component of
mental distress only a "regrettable by-product." Id. Technically, the court is incorrect.
As the Restatement of Torts notes, intent to inflict emotional distress exists not only when
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of spite, it is less clear that it precludes a threatened withholding of
the get in the context of settlement negotiations, even where the de-
mands being made are inherently unreasonable.3 89
There may be other impediments to this action as well. As a
minor point, not all states recognize the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, though the overwhelming majority do.3 9o
Moreover, although interspousal immunities have largely been abol-
ished, at least in the context of intentional torts, a number of states
have been reluctant to allow suits between spouses based on emo-
tional distress, fearing this would flood the courts with excessive liti-
gation. 9 ' One might assume this obstacle could be surmounted by
simply deferring the filing of a complaint until after the grant of a
civil divorce. 92 Yet case law suggests that courts will refrain from
an individual desires to inflict harm, but also when he knows that such harm is certain to
result from his actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, § 46 cmt. 1.
Nevertheless, while the economic context of the refusal does not negate intent, it does
diminish the "outrageous" and "extreme" character of the recalcitrance-at least to the
extent that it no longer may be regarded as tortious. Id.
The impact of Perl is not yet clear. On one hand, it may allow women to promise
their husbands the world in order to receive their get, and afterward have the agreement
set aside. (This is probably already the case with child custody agreements, where any
prior concession as to custody is reviewable or modifiable under the "best interests of
the child" test. See In re Custody of Neal, 393 A.2d 1057, 1059-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).)
On the other hand, the ability to apply such a strategy may backfire. It may mean that,
notwithstanding concessions, the husband will refuse to act in the absence of a guaran-
tee that the concessions will not be overturned by a court at a later date. As such, Perl
may aggravate the agunah problem rather than diminish it.
389. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, § 46 cmt. g (insisting on
legal rights is not tortious).
390. See Daniel J. Givelbar, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even-
handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 42, 43 n.9 (1982) (listing jurisdictions that recognize the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress).
391. See KEETON et al., supra note 375, § 122, at 903; see also, e.g., Browning v. Brown-
ing, 584 S.W.2d 406, 407-08 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (disallowing husband's claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm based on wife openly consorting with another);
Weicker v. Weicker, 237 N.E.2d 876, 876-77 (N.Y. 1968) (denying relief to ex-wife who
claimed that a Mexican divorce was invalid and sued for emotional harm caused by for-
mer husband and new wife holding themselves out as validly married); Haldane v. Bogy,
25 Cal. Rptr. 392, 392-93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (denying relief to plaintiff-husband
who sued defendant for harboring plaintiff's wife and paying an attorney to file a
groundless divorce action); Hafner v. Hafner, 343 A.2d 166, 169-70 (NJ. Super. Ct.
1975) (denying recovery to widow who was prevented from seeing her husband during
his last illness by husband's son from a previous marriage); Friedman v. Friedman, 361
N.Y.S.2d 108, 109-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (denying recovery of damages by one par-
ent against another for conduct in the course of a child custody battle).
392. Ironically, in New York that would be difficult to do because under the get law,
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986), at least where the husband is a plaintiff,
there will be no judgment for civil divorce until the get is granted. Id.
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entertaining such suits even where the alleged tortious acts took
place after divorce, as long as their genesis lies in the marital
relationship. 93
A close examination of the cases denying recovery shows, how-
ever, that all of them involve either the potential for repetitive,
harassing litigation, or the presence of a third party interfering in
the marriage, 394 making the complaint tantamount to an action
based on alienation of affection.395 Because alienation of affection
actions have been abolished, it stands to reason that courts will not
allow their resurrection under the guise of "infliction of emotional
distress."' 96 Neither of these factors is present in an action predi-
cated on failure to give a get. These cases do not involve the pres-
ence of an officious third party, and they are not actions to restore
or compensate for the impairment of a marriage, but to ensure that
a marriage that is legally dead no longer poses any marital disabili-
ties. Moreover, the potential for repetitive litigation appears slight
because unlike child custody cases, where by definition the feuding
parents must remain in frequent contact, the get controversy could
be resolved by a single act done in less than an hour. The prece-
dents denying recovery for interspousal claims of distress in general
do not rule out recovery here.397
B. Purposes Served
In formulating responses to the agunah problem, the principal
purpose should be to create mechanisms that maximize the chances
393. Thus, for example, in Friedman, the court denied recovery for emotional distress
incident to a custody battle even though the parties were already divorced. See Friedman,
361 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
394. Friedman involved a scenario that was likely to repeat itself often, where hard
feelings and animosity were to be expected. But see supra note 391 (discussing cases
involving third parties who were allegedly interfering with a spousal relationship).
395. While the right to bring such an action was originally limited to husbands, virtu-
ally all states that allow the action at all currently grant wives the same protections. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, §§ 683-685; KEETON et al., supra note
375, § 124, at 915-31.
396. Because of their great potential for abuse and harassment, these actions have
been abolished or at least severely curtailed in the great majority of the states, either by
statute or judicial decision. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, bringing such an action is a
criminal offense. For a listing of statutes abrogating this tort, see KEETON et al., supra
note 375, § 124, at 930 n.93. The policies behind these statutes, often called "Heart-
Balm Laws," are analyzed in two articles by Nathan Feinsinger. See Nathan P.
Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935); Nathan P.
Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, Alienation of Affections, and
Related Actions, 10 Wis. L. REV. 417 (1935).
397. See supra note 391.
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that victimized spouses will receive their gittin. Because a tort claim
generally involves the right to obtain a money judgment, tort law in
and of itself does not accomplish this goal. The true value of a com-
mon-law remedy is its deterrent effect. Consequently, for a tort
remedy to be effective, parties who would otherwise be unwilling to
give gittin must in effect be forced to do so in order to escape the
imposition of civil liability. As a secondary form of inducement, in
the event a judgment is obtained, the wife has a bargaining chip of
her own-agreeing to release or reduce the debt in exchange for the
execution of the get. Yet another incentive on the part of the de-
fendant-husband to execute a get after being found liable for a judg-
ment is the possibility of being subject to successive lawsuits.
Because each withholding of a get is arguably a new "act" of harass-
ment, the wife can continue to bring successive actions even after
recovering in an earlier suit.3 9 8
If the principal utility of a tort remedy lies primarily in its deter-
rent effect, however, its usefulness may be somewhat limited. The
uncertain contours of the common-law remedy-its questionable
application to interspousal suits, possible difficulties in proving ma-
levolent intent, the uncertain measure of damages, and the high cost
of litigation, particularly unreimbursed attorney's fees-combine to
make a significant tort recovery so difficult to obtain that a recalci-
trant husband may well be willing to take his chances. In any event,
if his wife loses her case, he would be free of any restraint
whatsoever.
At least one commentator has suggested legislation specifically
providing that the maintenance of a barrier to remarriage subse-
quent to the grant of a civil divorce, after receiving notice of such
barrier from the other spouse, constitutes the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.3 99 The statute would specify that damages
are to be calculated at a specified dollar figure for every day of delay
and would provide for the award of attorney's fees and costs.400 By
eliminating troublesome, difficult-to-prove issues, such as malice
and the amount of damages suffered, and by reducing plaintiff's ul-
timate costs in pursuing the action, the likelihood of an unwilling
398. This last proposition may be somewhat debatable in light of the role of res judi-
cata, which precludes "splitting" causes of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS §§ 24-26 (1982); FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 11.6-11.13, at 536-56 (2d ed. 1977).
399. Letters from Nathan Lewin, Esq., to David Zweibel, Esq., General Counsel of
Agudath Israel (July 24, 1985 and Aug. 2, 1985) (on file with author).
400. Id.
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husband giving in to his wife's demand is greatly enhanced. To
date, however, no state has acted on this proposal.
Assuming such a tort remedy could be statutorily codified, pro-
viding the necessary certainty and specificity to make it an effective
deterrent, it would be superior to the alternative statutory approach
of section 253 of the New York law40 1 in a number of respects. For
example, while the New York law ensures that a plaintiff in a divorce
action will not be able to obtain a civil divorce without giving a get, it
provides no protection to spouses who have already been di-
vorced.4 °2 The tort remedy specifically addresses this problem. Ad-
ditionally, the New York law applies only where the plaintiff is the
party maintaining the barrier. If, for example, a woman whose hus-
band refuses to give her a get is the divorce plaintiff, there is no
pressure on the husband to come forward and give a get. The tort
remedy would allow recovery against the recalcitrant party regard-
less of the identity of the divorce plaintiff.
Tort recovery would also afford women relief irrespective of the
principles under which the original marriage was solemnized. If, for
example, the couples were married by Reform clergy, but in the
course of the marriage, the woman embraced Orthodoxy and is now
unable to marry without a get, section 253 of the New York law
would not apply, but the tort action would.4 3 Finally, one of the
constitutional objections to section 253 of the New York law is that
it links the power of the state to issue a civil divorce with compliance
with a religious ceremony and the officiating clergyman's concur-
rence. Giving clergy a veto in the exercise of governmental func-
tions arguably excessively entangles the church and state in
violation of the Establishment Clause.40 4 Whatever the merits of
this criticism-and I have argued that there are none-it has no ap-
plication to tort liability, a theory that is totally independent of the
granting of a civil divorce. Indeed, it would not even be triggered
until after a civil divorce was granted. Thus, even the states that
have been reluctant to enact an analogue of section 253 of the New
York law might consider a tort statute as an alternative.
401. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986).
402. For example, the proposed legislation would apply to spouses divorced prior to
1983, pursuant to the wife's complaint, or where the wife for some reason waived the
husband's affidavit requirement.
403. The draft statute prepared by Nathan Lewin, however, does track the New York
statute by limiting tort liability to cases where barriers exist "under the religious or con-
scientious principles under which the former spouses solemnized their marriage." See
Lewin File, supra note 276.
404. See supra text accompanying note 343.
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C. Constitutional Problems 4 05
As noted, at least with respect to the Larkin problem of involv-
ing clergy in the exercise of government functions, recognition of a
statutory or common law action for damages poses fewer constitu-
tional objections than a procedure that compels the state to delay
the entry of a divorce judgment.4 °6 On the other hand, because the
imposition of a monetary sanction might be regarded as substan-
tially more coercive than a mere denial of a benefit, allowing recov-
ery in tort may constitute a greater infringement of religious liberty
in the event the husband has a free exercise claim. In any case, how-
ever, the possibility of a legitimate free exercise claim is slight and
would likely be overcome by a variety of compelling state
interests. °7
With respect to the Establishment Clause, it is difficult to see
any particular endorsement, promotion, or advancement of religion
where recovery is based on judicial application of tort law by pige-
onholing a refusal to give a get into the recognized category of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Victims of emotional distress
or turmoil arising from their religious beliefs should be entitled to
at least the same protection as those whose distress arises out of any
other sensitivity, proclivity, or even eccentricity, of which the de-
fendant is aware. °8 In both cases, the court is protecting the free-
405. This section presupposes the continued validity of the tripartite standard of
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). There is a distinct possibility that the test will
be replaced. Probable alternatives are discussed infra Subpart V.B.
406. See supra notes 344-348 and accompanying text.
407. Interestingly, because a common-law theory would afford recovery irrespective
of the principles under which the marriage was solemnized, the free exercise problem
may be a bit more pronounced because even a committed Reform Jew who never be-
lieved in the institution of a get could find himself liable in damages for failure to give
one. This would not occur under § 253 of the New York law. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw
§ 253 (McKinney 1986). Nevertheless, as noted earlier in connection with the get law,
affording women relief in these circumstances may be justified by a state's interests. See
supra notes 324-327 and accompanying text; note 360 and accompanying text. More-
over, a refusal to give a get is rarely motivated by religious beliefs--even a Reform Jew
has no principled objection against the giving of a get; at worst, he would regard it as an
unnecessary, superfluous act. See supra Subpart III.B.3. Note too, that under Nathan
Lewin's version of the statute, tort recovery would be limited to situations where barri-
ers exist because of the principles under which the marriage was solemnized. See Lewin
File, supra note 276. This limitation further minimizes the possibility that free exercise is
being curtailed. See supra note 403.
In any event, after Smith H, discussed infra Part V, the possibility of a free exercise
attack is greatly diminished.
408. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 84, § 46 cmt. f ("[I]t is more
likely that conduct is extreme and outrageous where defendant has knowledge that a
plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress.").
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dom of the plaintiff from unjustifiable emotional invasion, not
upholding or affirming the principles of religion.
If, on the other hand, a state were to enact a special statute fo-
cused exclusively on the "barrier to remarriage" problem and speci-
fying a unique and large liquidated damages penalty irrespective of
actual injury suffered, the constitutional issue would be less clear.
Here, the failure to perform a religious act gives rise to sanctions
that might be considerably greater than causing other forms of emo-
tional distress. The state is in effect passing judgment that noncom-
pliance with religious law is a more heinous violation of personal
integrity than other forms of invasion. Elevating religious sensibili-
ties to such a preferred position seems to raise establishment
problems. While it is true that a tort statute may be worded neu-
trally (as is section 253 of the New York law), speaking of "religious
or conscientious" constraints, any court would quickly see that the
purpose of the tort remedy is to protect the rights of Jewish women
to receive a get. Tort law may well be an appropriate, though cum-
bersome, vehicle in an agunah's efforts to secure justice, but only a
tort law that is even-handed and neutral in its application can do so
in a constitutionally permitted way.
In this respect, a "removal of barrier" tort statute seems to pose
considerably more problems than New York's get statute.4 °9 Sin
gling out "removal of barriers to remarriage" in the context of a
divorce proceeding makes perfect sense. The state has a special-
ized, unique secular interest in ensuring the efficacy of its divorce
laws, and withholding the grant of a divorce until its effectiveness
can be guaranteed is a narrowly tailored mechanism that achieves
that end. By contrast, the state does not have a specialized, unique
secular interest in singling out in its tort law one particular vice that
impinges on religious practice to the exclusion of other vices that do
not. Thus, while many of the secular purposes that justify the get
statute apply with equal force to the tort remedy,4 t0 and while the
potential for entanglement is significantly reduced, 41 ' a specially
drafted law whose exclusive purpose is the protection of uniquely
religious sensibilities carries with it at least the appearance of the
state placing its imprimatur on religion. As such, the constitutional-
ity of such a statute is highly suspect.4" 2
409. As to the Larkin problem, see supra notes 344-348 and accompanying text, a tort
statute would pose less problems.
410. See supra note 360-361 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 337-339 and accompanying text.
412. Technically, the statute fails the second prong of the Lemon test as restated by
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D. Halachic Concerns
A final point to consider is whether recognition of a tort rem-
edy, either by statute or common law, raises halachic problems. As
repeatedly noted, any get executed under compulsion, including the
order of a secular court, is invalid unless the compulsion was au-
thorized pursuant to the order of the bais din.4 t3 Such compulsion
may be authorized only in specially defined circumstances.4 14 Ac-
cording to the authoritative view of Rashba 4 '5 as codified by
Rema,4 16 invalidating coercion exists not only when there are
threats to person or property, but also when the alternative to the
get would be the imposition of financial penalties.4" 7 Thus, Rashba
rules that any get executed pursuant to the husband's prior commit-
ment to either pay or divorce is invalid.41 8 Moreover, those who
differ with Rashba do so only because the self-imposed nature of the
undertaking negates the element of compulsion.4" 9 Where the im-
position of financial constraints is nonconsensual, but arises by op-
eration of secular law, it is possible that all authorities would regard
the resulting execution of a get as invalid.42 °
It would appear, therefore, that any get issued under a potential
cloud of civil liability may well constitute a get meusah. While it may
be that a generalized fear of a possible common-law exposure in a
tort suit is too remote and attenuated to rise to the level of actual
duress, particularly because the magnitude of the consequences are
not spelled out in advance, a statute clearly setting out a husband's
liability irrespective of his intent and specifying a named sum to be
imposed for each day of delay seems indistinguishable from the pen-
alty clause condemned by Rashba. If anything, the fact that the stat-
utory penalties are not voluntarily self-imposed makes them even
worse. This is yet another reason to question the wisdom of a tort
statute. Theoretically, a halachically valid statute could be crafted
providing for damages only in cases where the recalcitrant spouse
Justice O'Connor (i.e., that the primary effect is the promotion or endorsement of reli-
gion). See supra notes 313-314, 328-336 and accompanying text.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
414. See supra note 80.
415. 4 RASHBA, supra note 75, no. 40; REMA, supra note 76, at 124:5.
416. REMA, supra note 76, at 124:5.
417. Id. Technically, Rema cites both views but rules that such a get should not be
executed. If, however, it has been, the divorce is valid after the fact.
418. Id.
419. See RABBI YOSEF COLON, supra note 83, no. 63.
420. This is not entirely clear. Some authorities may take the position that because
the penalty is a reasonable alternative, the decision not to pay, but to execute the get
instead, becomes a matter of choice. See supra note 75.
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either refuses to appear before a bais din or disobeys the decision of
a bais din. Any statute that clearly tracked the specific requirements
of religious doctrine, however, would be even more vulnerable to an
Establishment Clause attack and would likely not survive a constitu-
tional challenge.
While the Jewish community does not have control over the de-
velopment of common-law tort doctrine, it would not be in their
interest to lobby for a statute that would make failure to give a get an
actionable tort. Besides the questionable constitutionality of such
an attempt-an issue one could safely leave to the courts-there is
the distinct possibility that any resulting gittin will be halachically in-
valid. The supposed "solution" would be far worse than the prob-
lem that it was supposed to solve.
V. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHURCH-STATE LAW AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE AGUNAH PROBLEM
The legitimacy of governmental action that is alleged to consti-
tute an "establishment of religion" has historically been assessed
against the tripartite test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman,42 ' while
infringements on free exercise have been justified only if there is a
''compelling governmental interest" that could not be achieved
through less burdensome or restrictive means.422 Under both the
establishment and free exercise tests as they have been traditionally
formulated, the New York get law as well as judicial enforcement of
rabbinical arbitration agreements or even specific performance of
get covenants would appear to pass constitutional muster. Recent
court decisions, however, are changing some of the basic and long-
standing ground rules in this area.
A. The Smith Case and the First Amendment
1. The Decision.-The major recent development in free exer-
cise law was the 1990 decision of the Supreme Court in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith HI).423 Smith H
involved two drug counsellors who were fired from their jobs for
using peyote as part of a Native American religious ritual. It was
assumed that they were sincere practitioners of their religious be-
421. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see discussion supra Subpart III.B.1.
422. See supra note 318.
423. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In the author's judgment, these changes will have little
impact on the constitutionality of get covenants, Avitzur agreements, and the New York
get law. See supra Subpart III.B. I.
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liefs.4 24 They applied for unemployment compensation, which the
state denied on the grounds that the use of a controlled substance
constituted job-related "misconduct" that barred the collection of
compensation. In an earlier case, 425 the Court ruled that the propri-
ety of the denial depended squarely on whether the use of peyote
was proscribed under the state's criminal law and, if it was, whether
such a proscription constituted an impermissible infringement of
free exercise.42 6 Because neither question had been addressed by
the Oregon Supreme Court, 42 7 the case was remanded to the state
level for necessary findings.42 s In Smith H, the Supreme Court held,
in a six to three decision,429 that the state may constitutionally pro-
hibit the use of narcotics even in religious ceremonies. Although
the state could have adopted a religious exemption if it desired ,430
such an exemption was not constitutionally necessary. In its ab-
sence, the use of peyote constituted proscribable criminal conduct
that would justify the lesser sanction of a denial of unemployment
benefits.
2. The Impact of Smith II on Free Exercise Analysis.-On one
level, Smith II is not particularly shocking. The notion that parties
424. 494 U.S. at 872.
425. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660
(1988).
426. Id. at 672-74. Although Smith I did not involve a criminal prosecution, the Court
reasoned that any conduct that the state has made criminal can be the basis for the lesser
sanction of denial of benefits. See id. at 673-74. Thus, once it is established that the
ingestion of peyote even for religious purposes was proscribed by state law and constitu-
tionally could be, the propriety of denial of benefits would automatically follow.
427. The Oregon Supreme Court, in Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources, 721 P.2d 445 (1986), had no reason to address the criminality of sacramental
peyote use because it took the position that benefits could not be denied even if the
underlying misconduct was criminal as long as it was religiously motivated. See id. at
449-50. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case to the state court for a
determination of criminality. See Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 673-74.
428. See Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 673.
429. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Scalia and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and White. Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion affirming traditional free exercise
analysis. A dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Blackmun and was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall.
430. The opinion of the Court makes clear that although religious accommodations
are not constitutionally required, they are permitted. See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 890. In-
deed, a number of states do exempt the sacramental use of peyote from their drug laws.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6 (Michie 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-317(3)
(1985); see also Peyote Way Church v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that a religious exemption limited to the members of the Native American Church is
not violative of either the establishment clause or equal protection even where other
religious groups are not exempted).
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may not invoke religious freedom as a shield to criminal prosecution
is not new and dates at least as far back as the polygamy cases. 43'
What is new and disturbing is the fact that at least five members of
the Court took the position that the general, nondiscriminatory
scope of the law was in and of itself adequate justification to prose-
cute religious violators without the need to establish a "compelling
state interest" in doing so.432 The result in Smith H could easily
have been assimilated into the existing test of Sherbert v. Verner.43
The Court could have held, for example, that the pressing societal
need to curtail drug use constitutes a compelling state interest of a
far greater magnitude than the need for a uniform day of rest recog-
nized in Braunfeld v. Brown.4 Moreover, the potential for fraud and
abuse necessitates that the curtailment be absolute if less restrictive
means are insufficient to accomplish this goal. The Court's pointed
refusal to predicate its holding on the existence of a compelling
state interest-which it could easily have done-augurs poorly for
the cause of religious freedom.
Outside of the realm of noninterference with belief and affirma-
tion, apparently very little survives of the Free Exercise Clause and
the constitutional recognition of religion as a fundamental right.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, indicated that the government
may not constitutionally compel affirmation of belief, punish or pe-
nalize the expression of religious doctrine it believes to be false, im-
pose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies
over religious authority and dogma.4 35 Nor can a state prohibit a
given act only when it is performed for a religious reason.436 Never-
theless, the "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability [merely] on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' ,417
The Court further noted that "to make an individual's obligation to
431. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding the enforce-
ment of antipolygamy statutes against Mormons).
432. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 884-86. Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the judgment,
did not agree with this analysis. See id. at 897-903.
433. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
434. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
435. See Smith H, 494 U.S. at 877.
436. "It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of 'stat-
ues that are to be used for worship purposes' or to prohibit bowing down before a
golden calf." Id. at 877-78.
437. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
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obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his reli-
gious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-per-
mitting him, by virtue of his beliefs 'to become a law unto himself'-
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.
43 8
Smith II radically alters the nature of "free exercise" analysis
and, for those concerned for the preservation of religious liberty,
not necessarily for the better.439 It is widely regarded as sounding
the "death knell" for free exercise claims against generally applica-
ble laws or regulations, 440 and this is probably an accurate assess-
ment. Yet before the Free Exercise Clause is buried, it is important
to note a number of qualifications and limitations in the Court's
analysis.
First, while six justices of the Court concurred in the judgment,
only five rested their decision on the abandonment of the "compel-
ling state interest" standard.44 ' Justice O'Connor, who concurred
with the ruling, did so exclusively on the "compelling state interest"
theory rather than relying solely on the law's nondiscriminatory ap-
plication. 442 The existence of such a five to four split on the Court
indicates that the matter is far from settled, and the Sherbert test
could conceivably be resurrected.443
The Court further appeared to concede that to the extent a reli-
gious infringement also affects communicative and associational
rights under the First Amendment, strict scrutiny under the "com-
pelling state interest" standard will continue to be appropriate.4 44
Many religious liberty claims can be reformulated into claims based
on state infringement of rights of association, parenting, or the
438. Id. at 885 (citation omitted).
439. Indeed, serious concerns in the aftermath of Smith 11 have prompted the intro-
duction of federal legislation specifically designed to overturn it. See H.R. 2797, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
440. See, e.g., Aron Raskas, The Court's Smith Decision Threatens Religious Freedom, DAILY
REC., June 5, 1991, at 13; Ruth Marcus, Reins on Religious Freedom? Board Coalition Protests
Impact of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at A-I (quoting various views).
441. These includeJustice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and
Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and White.
442. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 891, 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
443. Justices Brennan and Marshall were replaced respectively by Justices Souter and
Thomas. Their views on the scope of free exercise are unknown, yet there is little rea-
son to believe they would be advocates for overruling Smith H. It must be noted, how-
ever, that of the four justices who would have retained the "compelling state interest"
standard (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor), two (Brennan and
Marshall) are no longer on the Court, while all five of the justices who joined in the
Scalia opinion (Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, and White) still are.
444. See Smith 1I, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
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like.445 For example, one of the common fears expressed in the
wake of Smith II is that parents could be prosecuted for allowing
minors to partake of wine during the Shabbat meals or at the Pass-
over seder.4 46 Yet could not any Jewish parent raise the argument
that the failure to accommodate religious observance not only im-
pacts on free exercise rights of religion, but also on the rights of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children by training them
in the precepts of their faith? Indeed, a similar associational argu-
ment could have been raised in Smith II itself. It remains to be seen
whether "religion plus" arguments will be sympathetically received
by the courts or whether they will be regarded as transparent at-
tempts to circumvent Smith H; it is at least possible, however, to
make the argument.
Moreover, the opinion is not clear whether the strict scrutiny
necessitated by the "compelling state interest" test is totally dis-
carded (at least in "pure" religion cases) or whether it may still sur-
vive in contexts outside of criminal prosecution. There is language
in the opinion that suggests that Smith II is limited to a denial of
religious exemption for criminal misconduct.447 Where the religious
practice in question is not criminal, but simply results in a denial of
governmental benefits, the Smith H opinion appears to indicate that
it may still be the law that religious exemptions must be granted
unless the "compelling state interest" test is met.448 This conclu-
sion, however, is not inescapable. In distinguishing Sherbert from
the facts in Smith H, the Court might simply have limited the scope
of earlier inconsistent precedent without necessarily suggesting that
such precedent, even as narrowly defined, should still be regarded
as binding law.449
445. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (invalidating compulsory
school attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to
send their children to school); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
that parents have a constitutional right to educate their children outside of the public
schools).
446. See Raskas, supra note 440.
447. See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 884 ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert
some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to re-
quire exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law."); id. ("Whether or not the
decisions are that limited, they at least have nothing to do with an across-the-board
criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct."); id. at 885 ("The government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its
ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.' " (cita-
tion omitted)).
448. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 883-84.
449. Indeed, all lower courts that have construed and applied Smith have refused to
411
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
B. The Future of the Lemon Test Under the Establishment Clause
Smith H involved the validation of a statute that was challenged
under the Free Exercise Clause as an infringement of religious free-
dom. It has no direct impact on Lemon's tripartite analysis under the
Establishment Clause.450 Indeed, the lower federal courts have con-
tinued to apply Lemon in cases decided after Smith //.451 The close
mirror-image relationship between the clauses, however, inevitably
suggests that changes on one side of the religion equation have
some repercussions on the other. Indeed, there are strong indica-
tions from the Court that the Lemon test may undergo a complete
overhaul or at least a radical redefinition in the direction of less
scrutiny of establishment claims. A harbinger of such an imminent
change was the 1989 decision of County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 4 52 a
complex, interlocking array of concurrences and dissents, which in-
dicated that at least four justices of the Court are willing to do to the
Establishment Clause what five justices of the Court did to the free
exercise guarantees in Smith H. Allegheny involved the constitution-
ality of two recurring holiday displays located on public property in
downtown Pittsburgh: a creche (nativity scene) placed inside of a
courthouse and a Christmas tree-menorah combination just outside
the City-County Building together with a sign saluting religious lib-
erty. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying the
Lemon test, ruled that both displays violated the Establishment
Clause because their "primary effect" was the advancement of reli-
limit the case to criminal prosecution and have upheld a variety of noncriminal laws that
negatively impact on religious observance and that do not afford any religious accom-
modation or exemption. See Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 277 (1991); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991);
Intercommunity Center forJustice & Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990); Salvation
Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 813 (3d Cir. 1990). See also the
disheartening cases of Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D. R.I. 1990), and Montgom-
ery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990), aft'd, 940 F.2d 661 (6th
Cir. 1991), both of which held that a state statute requiring autopsies for victims of
violent deaths need not provide a religious exemption for those people whose religious
beliefs prohibit desecration of the dead.
450. See supra Subpart III.B.I.
451. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.), petitionfor cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W.
3406 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1991) (No. 91-796); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1991) (No. 91-299); Roberts v.
Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Mar. 15,
1991) (No. 91-1448); Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 1305 (1991), all of which applied the tripartite test of Lemon to alleged Establishment
Clause violations without suggesting that Smith II changed the test in any way.
452. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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gion.453 The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
ruling that the cr~che was unconstitutional, but the menorah-Christ-
mas tree combination could be allowed to stand.454 Ironically, how-
ever, the judgment of the Court was fully supported by only two
justices. Four justices would have upheld both displays; 455 three
justices would have prohibited both displays.456 Only Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor actually took the position that there was a
constitutionally significant distinction between the cr~che and the
menorah-Christmas tree; they themselves were in disagreement over
the reasons why.45 7 Thus, although seven out of nine justices be-
lieved the Court's decision was erroneous, the creche was struck
down by a vote of five to four,458 and the menorah -Christmas tree
display was sustained by a vote of six to three.45 9 Because the actual
holding of the Court reflects no one's view of the Establishment
Clause other than those of Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, look-
ing at the Court's holding might be less important than focusing on
the particular approaches to establishment law that each of the jus-
tices advocated in his or her concurrence or dissent.
A careful analysis of the opinions reveals that five justices are
willing to retain the tripartite test of Lemon, or at least that part of
the test that focuses on "effects. ' 460 In determining whether a gov-
ernmental practice has the "primary effect" of advancing religion,
these justices strongly support the view, expressed by Justice
O'Connor in a number of concurrences, that the touchstone of the
inquiry is not merely whether religion is benefitted, but whether it is
"endorsed," "promoted," or "favored." '461 Specifically, the ques-
453. See ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655 (1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
492 U.S. 573 (1989). As is commonly the case, the court of appeals had no need to
consider purpose or entanglement because, in its judgment, the displays failed the "pri-
mary effect" criterion.
454. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 62 1.
455. See id. at 655-79.
456. See id. at 637 (opinion ofJustice Brennan); id. at 646 (opinion ofJustice Stevens).
457. Compare id. at 613-21 (Blackmun's analysis) with id. at 632-37 (O'Connor's
approach).
458. The five were justices Blackmun and O'Connor together with Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens.
459. The six were Justices Blackmun and O'Connor together with Kennedy, Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and White.
460. Justice O'Connor herself, who clearly advocates the "endorsement" test in ap-
plying the "effects" prong, has openly questioned the wisdom of the "excessive entan-
glement" criterion. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
461. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (citing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions
in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691
(1984)).
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tion in every instance is whether the challenged practice " 'sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity.' "'462 Whether a given display has this effect depends on a
consideration of its overall placement and context and how "viewers
would fairly understand [its] purpose. "463
It appears that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens con-
ceded the basic formulation of this standard, and simply disagreed
as to its application to the specific facts of the case.46 These jus-
tices maintained that the state's imprimatur exists whether Jewish
and Christian symbols are combined or whether only Christian ones
are shown. In either case, the nonbeliever is essentially excluded.465
Justice Blackmun argued, on the other hand, that both the menorah
and the Christmas tree have become largely secular symbols of his-
torical and seasonal impact and carry no such religious significa-
466 Jsiearention. justice O'Connor, agreeing with Justice Blackmun's result,
preferred not to ignore the religious nature of the symbols em-
ployed (at least in the case of the menorah) but, in the overall context
of the display, believed the message of pluralism and liberty was
dominant.467 In principle, therefore, there does not appear to be a
significant disagreement within this group of five, although Black-
462. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
463. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
464. The opinion is a bit confusing on this score. Although five justices joined in Part
III-A of Blackmun's opinion that affirmed both the Lemon test and the focus on "promo-
tion" and "endorsement," Part III-B, which contains the quoted language from Lynch
regarding the message conveyed to adherents and nonadherents and the need to focus
on context, was joined only by Justice Stevens. Nevertheless, the basic underlying con-
cept that the vice of establishment is the message that it conveys regarding an adherent's
standing in the political community seems to be accepted by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall as well. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, the
quoted language from Part III-B of the Allegheny opinion is merely an amplification of
that which was implicit in Part III-A of the opinion. Presumably, Justices Brennan and
Marshall refused to join Part III-B of the opinion because, first, it relies on Lynch v.
Donnelly, a creche case with which Brennan and Marshall disagreed and second, it sug-
gests distinctions based on context and proximity to other symbols, distinctions that
Brennan and Marshall were not prepared to make.
465. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 637- 46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
466. Id. at 613-21. Justice Brennan criticizes this argument by asserting that, rather
than the tree redefining the significance of the menorah, it may be just as likely that the
menorah redefines the nature of the tree. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
467. Id. at 632-37. O'Connor specifically disclaimed any reliance on the lack of a
more secular alternative. Here too, Brennan made a trenchant observation in noting
that a celebration of religious pluralism that appropriates Jewish and Christian symbols
hardly conveys a "neutral" message. He noted that the dictates of the Establishment
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mun and O'Connor were more willing to make finer contextual dis-
tinctions than were Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.468
The second group, however, represents a sharp break with past
Lemon analysis. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and White, began his opinion with an open invitation to re-
consider and revamp the Lemon test:
In keeping with the usual fashion of recent years, the ma-
jority applies the Lemon test to judge the constitutionality
of the holiday displays here in question. I am content for
present purposes to remain within the Lemon framework
but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopt-
ing, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area. Per-
suasive criticism of Lemon has emerged. . . . Substantial
revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in
order.469
Ultimately, however, this group does apply Lemon but-with heavy
reliance on the historical sanction given to practices such as prayers
at the opening of legislative and judicial proceedings and references
to God in coinage 4 70-they would replace O'Connor's "promotion"
test with one that would focus on elements of "coercion," "intimi-
dation," or "proselytization," and would therefore permit state rec-
ognition of the religious symbols adopted by its citizenry. 4"' Civic
acknowledgement of the role religion plays in the lives of its citizens
Clause not only mandate neutrality among religions but between religion and nonreli-
gion. Id. at 644 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
468. Indeed, Brennan criticizes Blackmun's preoccupation with the relative size or
placement of symbols as being more appropriate to "an exam in Art 101" than to consti-
tutional analysis. Id. at 643.
469. Id. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It should
be noted that even prior to Allegheny, a number of the justices who joined Kennedy had
already expressed in no uncertain terms their belief that Lemon should be discarded. See
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
470. Justice Kennedy's concurrence relies heavily on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983), which sustained the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer and
on the presence of long-standing practices such as the proclamation of a National Day of
Prayer, 36 U.S.C. § 169h (1988); a religious reference in the Pledge of Allegiance, 36
U.S.C. § 172 (1988); the national motto of"In God We Trust," 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1988);
and the use of that motto on all currency, 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(l) (1988). Conceding
that historical patterns alone cannot "justify contemporary violations of constitutional
guarantees," Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670, Justice Kennedy posited that historically sanc-
tioned patterns and traditions are probative in ascertaining the intended meaning of
those guarantees, and any interpretation of the clause that would prohibit such long-
standing traditions "cannot be a proper reading." Id.
471. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-60, 664-65.
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should be regarded as a "reasonable accommodation" to the feel-
ings and sensibilities of its populace rather than an "impermissible
establishment.' '472
Notwithstanding the heated rhetoric in the Court's denuncia-
tion of the Kennedy reformulation, 473 the differences between the
two tests should not be exaggerated. On a practical level, there may
not be that much of a distinction between the "endorsement" test
under Lemon and the "coercion" test advocated by the four-judge
plurality. Indeed, there is a substantial overlap. Even the advocates
of a "coercion" test recognize that coercion may take subtle forms
and may be indirect as well as direct.4 7 4 For example, it is unlikely
that any justice would permit daily school prayer in an elementary
school classroom on the grounds that any fifth-grader who elects
not to participate could leave the room.4 75 Justice Kennedy himself
notes that a municipally sponsored year-round display of a promi-
nent cross could very well have an intimidating effect on non-Chris-
tians, although no one would be openly demanding adherence to
the tenets of Christianity.4 76 Thus, even under the Kennedy analy-
sis, many cases of "promotion," "endorsement," or "favoritism"
will involve at least the less blatant forms of "coercion"; govern-
mental activities that make nonadherents feel like outsiders may cor-
respondingly generate "proselytization" pressures.4 77  Justice
Blackmun, in spite of his vigorous attacks on the Kennedy formula-
472. Id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In my view, the principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation's historic
traditions of diversity and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable
judgments respecting the accommodation or acknowledgement of holidays
with both cultural and religious aspects. No constitutional violation occurs
when they do so by displaying a symbol of the holiday's religious origins.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
473. See id. at 609 n.57, 611.
474. See id. at 660-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
475. Indeed, Kennedy specifically cites with approval Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), the case that invalidated prayer in the classroom, as an example of indirect coer-
cion. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 n.l (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
476. I doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the per-
manent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. This is not be-
cause government speech about religion is per se suspect, as the majority would
have it, but because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place
the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a
particular religion.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
477. See supra text accompanying note 461 (discussing derivation of "endorsement,"
"promotion," and "favoritism," and the importance of the message conveyed to
outsiders).
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tion, essentially conceded this point by noting that, if faithfully ap-
plied, the Kennedy test should yield many of the same results as
Lemon .478
Suffice it to say, however, that the four justices who pro-
pounded the Kennedy test are clearly of the mind that official recog-
nition of religion in rites of passage or at holiday times is to be
sharply distinguished from the type of permanent intrusion that has
longer lasting psychological effects. Issues such as duration, timing,
vulnerability of the audience, alternatives available to the audience,
the ease in exercising those alternatives-factors that are immaterial
under a pure "promotion" test-become highly relevant in assess-
ing the coercive impact of the governmental action under a
"proselytization" standard.
In short, while Blackmun's test focused on the nature of the
government's actions-how a disinterested observer would inter-
pret what the government was doing-Kennedy's test would focus
on the effect of those actions on the audience exposed to them. In-
terestingly, Kennedy's analysis has the effect of collapsing the Estab-
lishment Clause into the Free Exercise Clause. Under Kennedy's
formulation, the two clauses essentially coalesce into a single focus
of concern directed to the protection of individuals from govern-
mental actions that have the effect, directly or indirectly, of interfer-
ing with religious belief. Actions that have no such effects will be
permitted under this standard even if they otherwise involve the
state in public acknowledgement of the religious beliefs and rituals
of its citizenry.
Given the reality that these differing standards will indeed yield
different results in at least some cases, it is not clear what test the
Court will adopt. While headcounting is always a risky predictor, it
is significant that two of the five justices (Brennan and Marshall)
who would retain Lemon scrutiny are no longer on the Court, while
all four of the justices who would either abandon Lemon or emascu-
late it still are. The positions of Justices Souter and Thomas are
unknown and their votes will be critical. The Court's granting of
certiorari in Lee v. Weisman,"' a case involving the permissibility of
478. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 608, 609 n.57 (arguing that a creche display should be
banned even under a proselytization standard). But cf. id. at 602 (Kennedy's arguments
are "far reaching in their implications."); id. at 604 ("Justice Kennedy's reading of Marsh
would gut the core of the Establishment Clause, as this Court understands it."); id. at
609 (A "proselytization" test "seems nothing more than an attempt to lower considera-
bly the level of scrutiny in Establishment Clause cases.").
479. 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991). In Weisman v.
Lee, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court to enjoin a nonsec-
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nonsectarian prayer at a junior high school graduation ceremony,
indicates that it is prepared to reconsider Lemon. Indeed, the United
States as amicus specifically urged the Court to replace Lemon with a
less exacting standard, based on Justice Kennedy's Allegheny opin-
ion, a standard that would permit civic acknowledgement of religion
in public life as long as the activity does not create an official reli-
gion or coerce participation in religious activities. 4 0 The oral argu-
ments in Lee were presented November 6, 1991, and a decision is
expected shortly.48 '
In sum, the development of establishment law jurisprudence
will follow one of three paths: establishment cases will continue to
be analyzed under Lemon, will be judged by a substitute standard
that would validate legislation regardless of its "primary effect" as
long as its "purpose" is secular, or will be judged by an even more
liberal standard that would allow legislation or legal practices to
stand as long as there are no elements of coercion, intimidation, or
tarian prayer. See 908 F.2d at 1090. The district court had applied the tripartite test of
Lemon in a fairly straightforward manner to conclude that the state's sponsorship of a
prayer at a public school graduation places its stamp of approval on religion and there-
fore has the impermissible effect of an endorsement or promotion. See id. The Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari indicates movement away from Lemon and suggests that Jus-
tice Kennedy's invitation has been accepted.
480. See Brief for the Unites States as Amicus Curiae, Petition for certiorari filed in
Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1991). The United States conceded that
coercion may take subtle and indirect forms, but submitted that some consideration
must be given to an individual's free choice not to view or be present at a civic acknowl-
edgement of religion with which he does not agree. Id. at 32. The government also
made the telling point that the combination of Lemon and Marsh breeds a two-tiered
standard of review that leads to wildly inconsistent results. Under Marsh, the Court
appears to reject the Lemon test in favor of a blanket validation of historical practices
specifically validated by the Framers, e.g., legislative prayers, while Lemon will invalidate
those very same practices if occurring in contexts that were nonexistent at the time of
the Framers, e.g., prayers at high school graduations. Id. at 29.
It should be noted that not all justices view Marsh as a blanket validation of histori-
cal practice and that it can in fact be harmonized with the Lemon test. See Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 595-96 n.46 (Blackmun, J.); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
481. There are also a number of major establishment cases for which petitions for
certiorari have been filed, but the Supreme Court has not yet agreed to review. All of
them may pose the occasion for the reexamination of Lemon. To the extent Lee v. Weis-
man effects a change in the Lemon doctrine, these cases are likely to be remanded for
reconsideration. See Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990) (ban-
ning the municipal sponsorship of a Catholic Mass as part of an Italian-American festi-
val); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the banning of the
Bible from a fifth grade classroom); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a state statute that designates Good Friday as a legal holiday); Harris v. City
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug.
19, 1991) (No. 91-299) (upholding the use of Christian symbols as part of a municipal
seal).
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the like. Under any of these alternatives, the Court's direction will
be either to curtail Establishment Clause claims or keep the status
quo.
C. The Impact of Smith II and Allegheny on the Constitutionality of
the Get Law and Avitzur
Here, the conclusions appear to be simple and straightforward.
To the extent the get law can be sustained against free exercise at-
tacks based on the compelling secular state interests that it
serves, 4 82 the law can certainly survive the less exacting scrutiny in
effect after Smith II. This result follows for one of two reasons.
First, because the New York get law is phrased in terms of an obliga-
tion to remove "barriers to remarriage," rather than deliver a get, it
is in itself a law of general applicability that, under Smith II, need no
longer be justified by reference to a "compelling state interest."
Second, even if the get law is viewed as specifically targeted to the
problem of the Jewish agunah (which is indeed its primary purpose)
and thus, would not be directly protected under the Smith II analy-
sis, the "compelling state interests" that it serves, as well as the
fairly attenuated "free exercise" claims that can be raised in opposi-
tion,483 should continue to immunize the law from constitutional at-
tack. While Smith II may have removed the "compelling state
interest" test as a basis for evaluating general law, it should not be
read to preclude the use of such a test to validate laws that do not fit
the Smith II rubric. After all, Smith II's abandonment of Sherbert was
designed to curtail free exercise claims, not expand them.
By the same token, to the extent the get law furthers legitimate
state interests of a secular nature and does not endorse or advance
the cause of religion, but simply levels the playing field by removing
a disability that is peculiar to a particular religious class, the statute
passes muster not only under Lemon but under any probable alterna-
tive test that the Supreme Court is likely to adopt. The same is true
for get covenants and Avitzur-type agreements.484 If these contrac-
482. See supra Subpart III.B.3.
483. See supra notes 363-368 and accompanying text.
484. Indeed, it is arguable that the application of Kennedy's proselytization test would
even validate a "removal of barrier" tort statute. While such a statute may well consti-
tute a "promotion" or "endorsement" of religion, it is difficult to see how a narrowly
tailored legislative initiative, applicable in a relatively small number of cases, induces any
type of psychologically coercive effect on the citizenry to adhere to the tenets ofJuda-
ism. It is a close case, however, for although a "removal of barrier" tort statute may not
constitute "proselytization" forJudaism as a whole, it does directly coerce a recalcitrant
spouse to comply with a Jewish ceremony or ritual. Thus, the same objections that I
419
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tual arrangements were sustainable prior to Smith H and Allegheny,
they are even more justifiable afterwards. Thus, as frightening as
Smith, Allegheny, and the imminent decision of Lee may be for the
advocates of religious liberty, they pose little threat to the particular
religious problems addressed in this Article.
CONCLUSION
This Article has endeavored to trace the various legal avenues
that Jewish women unable to obtain gittin by conventional means
might be able to pursue. Jewish women have always had access to
the bais din system in securing a court order directing their husbands
to give them a get and, under certain circumstances, this order could
be enforced by imprisonment, fines, or corporal punishment.
Wholly apart from the halachic problems, however, this approach ac-
complishes little or nothing in societies like the United States where
rabbinical courts possess no coercive powers. The halachic power of
a bais din to incarcerate a husband for his failure to grant a get has no
meaning under a system where a bais din has no power to imprison
at all. In a sense, the agunah crisis does not stem from any limita-
tions internal to the halachic system itself, but from the interaction of
that system with the non-halachic societal structure within which it
attempts to operate.
On the secular side of the coin, there is ample case law author-
ity that would enforce agreements through an order of specific per-
formance to give a get or to submit to the jurisdiction of a rabbinic
tribunal. Even those parties without the foresight to enter into ex-
plicit prenuptial agreements may be able to invoke the terms of the
traditional ketubah to accomplish the same thing. In the absence of a
contract, aggrieved parties may be able to invoke theories of tort
law, though to date that response has not proven very successful.
Whether any of these legal solutions are truly adequate de-
pends on an intricate analysis of halacha to ensure that a resulting get
is not invalid by reason of its being coerced. The divergent opin-
ions among halachic schools, the lack of any apparent forum through
which halachic authorities could provide comprehensive, consistent
input to the secular judiciary, and the constitutional limitations of
the Establishment Clause all demonstrate that courts are ill-
equipped to engage in this type of comprehensive analysis. In its
absence, however, reliance on contract or tort law alone could be
raised earlier under the O'Connor test, see supra Subpart III.C, could indeed continue to
apply even under the Kennedy formulation.
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fatal to the halachic validity of the get. Extreme caution must be em-
ployed to ensure that judicial solicitude for victimized wives does
not engender a "cure" worse than the "illness." Finally, technical
devices such as prenuptial support agreements seem to present the
fewest halachic dilemmas and offer significant and widespread poten-
tial for relief, at least for those parties who have the foresight to
utilize them. Rabbis should encourage their congregants to employ
these expedients, and hopefully, they will come into common use.
